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A

TREATISE

ON

GOVERNMENT.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK OF

ARISTOTLE.

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PREFACE.

IT has been the fate of ARISTOTLE's writings to have met with praiſe, and cenſure, in a far greater degree than almoſt any other man's: at one time they were conſidered as the fountain of all knowledge; and to bring Ariſtotle's authority in defence of any opinion was thought ſufficiently to eſtabliſh the truth of it. Du Val cloſes his defence of him with the following quotation from Philo Judæus, "What the pupil is to the eye, what the intelligent mind to animal life, what Athens is to Greece, ſuch is Ariſtotle in the world of philoſophy:" but theſe

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high notions of his genius are not now entertained in many places, or amongſt many perſons; and, as we often ſee in in other particulars, his works are now as much degraded below their real value, as they were formerly exalted above it; ſo that a candid reader, who had never peruſed any of them, would naturally conclude, from the general nature of the human mind, that the truth muſt be found between the two oppoſite opinions, and that he neither merited the unlimited praiſe which has been beſtowed on him, or deſerved the contempt with which he has been treated. It cannot be ſuppoſed that an author, who profeſſed to treat of every thing which is an object of human knowledge, and even to exhauſt every ſubject that could come under the examination of human reaſon, ſhould not have made many miſtakes: but on the other hand, it would be

be very unreaſonable to admit, that ſo great a part of the learned world as have paid implicit obedience to his dictates, ſhould have been entirely governed by faſhion and prejudice, without once daring to uſe their own reaſon, in examining into the truth of the ſyſtem they adopted: ſo that would we acquire a juſt ſtandard of the merit of this celebrated philoſopher, we muſt abate ſomething from what is ſaid of him, both by his admirers and his deſpiſers.

If any one ſhould wonder from whence ſuch ſtrong prejudices on each ſide could poſſibly ariſe, and how it could happen, that the ſame works, at different times, ſhould be conſidered by different perſons, of nearly equal abilities in other reſpects, as containing either nothing at all valuable, or almoſt every thing, it may, I think, be thus accounted for: whenever there is

a matter in diſpute between two parties, there is a propenſity in mankind to extend their praiſe and blame far beyond the place where truth would fix it, and this eſpecially when ſupported by numbers; ſo that if we will but conſider the feuds which Ariſtotle has occaſioned in the literary world, it is no wonder that neither party ſhould know where to ſtop. Another cauſe for theſe prejudices may be found in the difficulty of his writings. What a Man has ſpent the beſt part of his life in acquiring the knowledge of, he will not eaſily allow to be of but little value, and independent of ſelf eſteem, his mind, long habituated to one train of thinking, comes in time to have his ideas very diſtinct and very clear; and the truths which he collects in the progreſs of his reading being exactly conformable to thoſe principles which he at firſt laid down as axioms, no wonder that

he ſhould give his aſſent to what he meets with in an author, that he has paid ſuch attention to, and be eager to eſtabliſh the credit of a book, in which his own is ſo much abſorbed, that if he admits that it contains little elſe, but what is falſe, frivolous, or unintelligible, he muſt allow that his own ſtudies have been miſerably miſapplied; but if their difficulty may prejudice men who have been long converſant in Ariſtotle's writings, in favour of them, there are other motives, equally cogent, to induce ſome perſons, on the ſame account, to be as eager in depreciating them: for what ſo good an excuſe for not taking the pains to underſtand an author, as that his writings are uſeleſs? No wonder then they ſhould ſhelter themſelves under the faſhion of the times, and join the general cenſure of Ariſtotle as a blockhead*; when,

* *Ariſtotle, whom I don't take to be ſo great a blockhead as thoſe do who never read him.* Fielding's Tom Jones.

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if they were preſſed to know from what part of his writings they formed ſo deciſive an opinion, they would be forced (and ſurely with a bluſh) to acknowledge, they never read a ſingle page in any of them, from whence to enable them to form a judgment from their own experience. There are others, who, not totally unacquainted with his writings, have yet ſoon given over the peruſal of them, diſguſted with the difficulty of the language, the obſcurity of his ſentiments, ariſing from the conciſeneſs of his expreſſion, and above all a peculiar ſeverity of reaſoning, which they ſay can afford no amuſement to ſcholars of taſte and genius, renders him fit to be read only by thoſe who are as dry as himſelf. Now, though I admit all but the concluſive part of theſe objections, yet to that I ſhall oppoſe the opinion of two moſt elegant ſcholars, one of whom literature ſtill boaſts

boaſts of, while, alas! ſhe is weeping over the urn of the other; ſcholars who would never have recommended Ariſtotle, was he not fit to be read by men of taſte and genius; for ſurely theſe accompliſhments are to be met in the higheſt degree in the writings of Dr. Warton and the late Mr. Gray; the firſt of theſe ſays, after having quoted the following character of him from Mr. Pope,

" *The mighty* STAGYRITE *firſt left the ſhore,*
Spread all his ſails, and durſt the deep explore.
He ſteer'd ſecurely, and diſcovered far,
Led by the light of the Mæonian ſtar.

" A noble and juſt character of the firſt and beſt of critics! and ſufficient to repreſs the faſhionable nauſeous petulance of ſeveral impertinent moderns, who have attempted to diſcredit this great and uſeful writer! Whoever ſurveys the variety and perfection of his productions, all delivered in the chaſteſt ſtyle,

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in the greateſt order, and the moſt pregnant brevity, is amazed at the immenſity of his genius. His Logic is a mighty effort of the mind: in which are diſcovered the principal ſources of the art of reaſoning, and the dependencies of one thought upon another; and where, by the different combinations he hath made of all the forms the underſtanding can aſſume in reaſoning, which he hath for it, he hath ſo cloſely confined it, that it cannot depart from them without arguing inconſequentially. His Phyſics contain many uſeful obſervations, particularly his hiſtory of animals. His Morals are perhaps the pureſt ſyſtem in antiquity. His Politics are a moſt valuable monument of the civil wiſdom of the ancients, as they preſerve to us the deſcription of ſeveral governments, and particularly of Crete and Carthage, that would otherwiſe have been unknown. But of all his compoſitions his Rhetoric and Poetics are moſt com-

complete. No writer has ſhewn a greater penetration into the receſſes of the human heart, than this philoſopher in the ſecond book of his rhetoric, where he treats of the different manners and paſſions that diſtinguiſh each different age and condition of men. No ſucceeding writer on eloquence, not even Tully, has added any thing new or important on the ſubject."

" To attempt to underſtand poetry without having diligently digeſted his poetics, would be as abſurd and impoſſible as to pretend to a ſkill in geometry without having ſtudied Euclid. The fourteenth, fifteenth, and ſixteenth chapters, wherein he has pointed out the propereſt methods of exciting terror and pity, convince us, that he was moſt intimately acquainted with thoſe objects which moſt forcibly affect the heart. The prime excellence of this precious treatiſe is the ſcholaſtic preciſion and philoſophical cloſeneſs with which

it is handled, without any addreſs to the paſſions or imagination."

Mr. Gray, after having ſpoken ſevere enough of the difficulty, and the conciſeneſs of his works, as well as the corruptions of the text, obſerves, however, that he has abundance of fine uncommon things, which makes him well worth the pains he gives one.

The judgment of ſuch writers as theſe is ſurely ſufficient to recommend at leaſt part of Ariſtotle's works to every one, who profeſſes to read for ſomething more than the amuſement of an hour. But would you know of what advantage a thorough knowledge of this venerable antient and his followers in the peripatetic philoſophy is, to ſtrengthen the powers of reaſon and diſcernment, and enable any one to write, not only with the moſt correct brevity, eaſieſt perſpicuity, and fulleſt conviction,

viction, but alſo with every ornament and embelliſhment of language, peruſe the writings of Mr. Harris, and you will find with aſtoniſhment, that a cloſe application to Ariſtotle's writings has been productive of graces, to the growth of which they are generally thought to be very unfavourable.

But why muſt our opinion of ſo multifarious as well as voluminous a writer be formed in the groſs? His productions may have different degrees of merit; is it right then to fix the ſtandard of it from our opinion of one piece only? or would it not be far better, to conſider his different writings ſeparately? that we may form a proper judgment of the different value of each, and at leaſt know which of them are worth the labour of underſtanding, before we give up the whole indiſcriminately. I have no doubt, but that if any

one, at an early part of his life, and with ſufficient leiſure for ſuch an undertaking, would engage in the ſevere taſk of being maſter of all his works, they would find themſelves ſufficiently repaid for their trouble: but as few perſons can be expected to do this, let me recommend ſuch as are of the moſt acknowledged utility, and ſo far intercede as to prevail, that his Rhetoric, his Poetics, and above all his Politics or treatiſe on Government, may not be as unknown to any reader of taſte and curioſity, in all but their names, as the cities of Pekin and Jedda. The reader may think, that the preference I give to the latter, is a compliment to my own judgment, in having choſe to tranſlate it rather than the others; but my recommendation is owing to the ſubject it treats of: it muſt certainly excite every one's curioſity, to know how mankind originally conducted themſelves

themſelves in ſo very important a buſineſs as that of living together, and to trace the firſt origin of ſociety from its primitive rudeneſs, through the various forms it has purſued, to the perfection, nay, and the depravation alſo, which at ſome periods it has arrived at: nor is this ſtudy leſs uſeful for the informing us of the nature of our own ſpecies, and pointing out the different exceſſes both of vice and virtue which it may arrive at; and I am perfectly perſuaded, had ſome writers, particularly of the laſt century, and the beginning of this, truſted more to experience, and leſs to hypotheſis, they would have given us repreſentations of human nature, far nearer the truth than what they have; on this account I do not recommend this work as containing only a hiſtory of the various governments which have in different periods really exiſted in the world, but, as a

valuable

valuable curioſity, ſhewing not only how men lived, but how they thought in former times; and ſurely an exact hiſtory of this latter, collected only from the mutilated fragments of antiquity which remain, if candidly executed, would be no little acquiſition to every one who would wiſh to trace the progreſs of reaſon, and obſerve the various cauſes which in ſome particulars have warpt the underſtandings of men, who have in others ſhewn ſo much penetration and knowledge of human nature, as well as the moſt perfect maſtery of reaſoning: and though, in ſome places of this work, the diſputative part may not be very intereſting to a modern reader, yet the whole claims his moſt attentive peruſal, as containing examples which may be copied with advantage in every age by every government, and reaſoning which is founded on eternal truths. Nor need I confine my recom-

recommendations to the ſpeculative only, but to the man in active life; for here are valuable leſſons, both what to follow, and what to avoid, to every freeman who has a ſhare in the government of that ſtate he lives in; for it is not only kings and ſtateſmen that may be here taught how to govern, but every member of the community, how he ought to be governed, and when reſiſtance begins to be a duty.

In a work of this ſort therefore the reader will be diſappointed, if he expects to meet with much of what is uſually called entertainment, at leaſt there is none of that ſort which can be enjoyed without attention; in particular I muſt beſpeak his patience, when he comes to thoſe parts of the work where Ariſtotle is engaged in a diſpute with Plato, and only requeſt him not to let his diſguſt at thoſe parts of it, prevent him from going through the whole. He will alſo, probably,

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object to the obſcurity of the ſtyle even in Engliſh, though I do aſſure him, that I have in many places ſpun out the tranſlation almoſt to a paraphraſe; I might have done ſo in many more, and with far greater eaſe to myſelf, but I ſhould then have left no traces of the admirable conciſeneſs of the original; and I think it the duty of every tranſlator to preſerve as much as poſſible the manner of his author: happy ſhall I be, if by endeavouring to take this middle courſe I may not have committed two faults, and preſerved the obſcurity, while the reader in vain looks for the conciſeneſs of the original; but, however this tranſlation may be executed, the tranſlator rather intreats the indulgence, than ſubmits to the judgment of the learned; he only hopes, that the acknowledged difficulty of the work, and the different explanations which the ſeveral commentators have given to the ſame paſſages, added to the

many corruptions in the text, will excuſe ſmall errors; and ſhould the reader meet with paſſages, wherein he perceives what he thinks very obvious miſtakes, and which any one might very eaſily have avoided, let it be conſidered, that a long attention to one ſentence only brings on a ſort of ſtupor on the mind, and prevents its exerting its uſual powers, as fixing the eyes too attentively on one object gives a dimneſs to the ſight, and occaſions a temporary weakneſs in the optic nerves.

But with all the imperfections of this tranſlation, and many the author fears will be found in it, he ſhall not regret his having preſumed to offer it to the Public, although he ſhould incur ſome cenſure on himſelf, if it occaſions thoſe who would never have peruſed the original, to acquire at leaſt ſome knowledge of ſo valuable an ancient; and he ſhould be ſtill happier,

if this attempt ſhould induce any ſcholar of acknowledged abilities to purſue the plan, and give the Public more of this Author's valuable works in the Engliſh language.

A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

AS we ſee that every City is a Society, and every Society is eſtabliſhed for ſome good purpoſe; for an apparent good is the ſpring of all human actions; it is evident that this is the Principle upon which they are every one founded, and this is more eſpecially true, of that which has for its Object the beſt poſſible, and is itſelf the moſt excellent, and comprehends all the reſt. Now this is called a City, and the Society thereof a Political Society; for

thoſe who think, that the Principles of a Political, a Regal, a Family, and an Herile Government, are the ſame, are miſtaken, while they ſuppoſe that each of theſe differ in the numbers to whom their power extends, but not in their conſtitution: ſo that with them a Herile Government is one compoſed of a very few, a Domeſtic of more, a Civil, and a Regal of ſtill more, as if there was no difference between a large Family, and a ſmall City, or that a Regal Government and a Political one are the ſame, only that in the one, a ſingle Perſon is continually at the head of public Affairs; in the other that each member of the State has in his turn a ſhare in the Government, and is at one time a Magiſtrate, at another a private perſon, according to the rules of political Science. But now this is not true, as will be evident to any one who will conſider this Queſtion in the moſt approved method. As, in an enquiry into every other Subject, it is neceſſary to ſeparate the different parts of which it is compounded, till we arrive at their firſt Elements, which are the moſt minute parts thereof; ſo by the ſame proceeding we ſhall acquire a knowledge of the Primary parts of a City, and ſee wherein they differ from each other, and whether the Rules of Art will give us any aſſiſtance, in examining into each of theſe things which are mentioned.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

NOW if in this particular Science, any one would attend to its original Seeds, and their firſt Shoot, he would then as in others have the Subject perfectly before him; and perceive in the firſt place, that it is requiſite, that thoſe ſhould be joined together, whoſe Species cannot exiſt without each other, as the Male, and the Female, for the buſineſs of Propagation; and this not through choice, but by that natural impulſe which acts both upon plants, and animals alſo, for the purpoſe of their leaving behind them others like themſelves. It is alſo from natural Cauſes that ſome Beings command, and others obey, that each may obtain their mutual ſafety; for a being who is endowed with a mind capable of reflection and forethought is by Nature the Superior and Governor, whereas he whoſe excellence is merely corporeal is formed to be a Slave; whence it follows, that the different State of Maſter and Slave is equally advantageous to both. But there is a natural difference between a Female and a Slave: for Nature is not like the Artiſts who make the Delphic ſwords for the uſe of the poor, but for every particular purpoſe, ſhe has her

ſeparate Inſtruments, and thus her ends are moſt compleat, for whatſoever is employed on one Subject only, brings that one to much greater perfection than when employed on many; and yet among the Barbarians, a female and a ſlave are upon a level in the Community, the reaſon for which is, that amongſt them, there are none qualified by Nature to govern, therefore their Society can be nothing but between ſlaves of different ſexes. For which reaſon the Poets ſay, It is proper for the Greeks to govern the Barbarians, as if a Barbarian and a Slave were by Nature one. Now of theſe two Societies the Domeſtic is the firſt, and Heſiod is right when he ſays, *firſt a Houſe, then a Wife, then an Ox for the Plow*, for the poor Man has always an Ox before a houſehold Slave. That Society then which Nature has eſtabliſhed for daily ſupport, is the Domeſtic, and thoſe who compoſe it are called by Charondas Ὁμοσιτοι; and by Epimenides the Cretan Ὁμοκαπνοι; but the Society of many Families, which was firſt inſtituted for their laſting, mutual advantage, is called a Village, and a Village is moſt naturally compoſed of the Deſcendants of one Family, whom ſome Perſons call Ὁμογαλακτες, the Children and the Childrens Children thereof: for which reaſon Cities were originally governed by Kings, as the Barbarian States now are, which are compoſed of

thoſe

thoſe who had before ſubmitted to kingly Government; for every Family is governed by the elder, as are the branches thereof, on account of their relationſhip thereunto, which is what Homer ſays, *Each one ruled his Wife and Child*; and in this ſcattered manner they formerly lived. And the opinion which univerſally prevails, that the Gods themſelves are ſubject to kingly Government, ariſes from hence, that all Men formerly were, and many are ſo now; and as they imagined themſelves to be made in the likeneſs of the Gods, ſo they ſuppoſed their manner of life muſt needs be the ſame. And when many Villages ſo entirely join themſelves together as in every reſpect to form but one Society, that Society is a City, and contains in itſelf, if I may ſo ſpeak, the end and perfection of Government: firſt founded that we might live, but continued that we may live happily. For which reaſon every City muſt be allowed to be the work of Nature, if we admit that the original Society between Male and Female is; for to this as their end all ſubordinate Societies tend, and the End of every thing is the nature of it. For what every Being is in its moſt perfect State, that certainly is the Nature of that Being, whether it be a Man, a Horſe, or a Houſe: beſides whatſoever produces the final Cauſe and the End which we deſire, muſt be beſt; but

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a Government complete in itſelf, is that final Cauſe and what is beſt. Hence it is evident, that a City is a natural production, and that Man is naturally a political animal, and that whoſoever is naturally, and not accidentally unfit for Society, muſt be either inferior or ſuperior to Man: thus the Man in Homer, who is reviled for being *without Society*, *without Law*, *without Family*. Such a one muſt naturally be of a quarrelſome diſpoſition, and as ſolitary as the birds. The Gift of Speech alſo evidently proves, that Man is a more ſocial animal than the Bees, or any of the herding Cattle: for Nature as we ſay, does nothing in vain, and Man is the only animal who enjoys it. Voice indeed, as being the token of pleaſure and pain, is imparted to others alſo, and thus much their Nature is capable of, to perceive pleaſure and pain, and to impart theſe ſenſations to others; but it is by ſpeech that we are enabled to expreſs what is uſeful for us, and what is hurtful, and of Courſe what is juſt, and what is unjuſt: for in this particular, Man differs from other animals, that he alone has a perception of good and evil, of juſt and unjuſt, and it is a participation of theſe common ſentiments which forms a Family and a City. Beſides the Notion of a City naturally precedes that of a Family or an Individual, for the whole muſt neceſſarily be prior to the parts;

parts; for if you take away the whole Man, you cannot ſay a Foot or a Hand remains, unleſs by equivocation, as ſuppoſing a hand of ſtone to be made, but that would only be a dead one; but every thing is underſtood to be this or that by its energic Qualities and Powers, ſo that when theſe no longer remain, neither can that be ſaid to be the ſame, but ſomething of the ſame name. That a City then precedes an individual is plain, for if an individual is not in himſelf ſufficient to compoſe a perfect Government, he is to a City, as other parts are to a whole: but he that is incapable of Society, or ſo complete in himſelf as not to want it, makes no part of a City, as a Beaſt or a God. There is then in all perſons a natural Impetus to aſſociate with each other in this manner, and he who firſt founded Civil Society, was the cauſe of the greateſt good; for as by the completion of it Man is the moſt excellent of all living beings, ſo without Law and Juſtice he would be the worſt of all, for nothing is ſo difficult to ſubdue as Injuſtice in Arms: but theſe Arms Man is born with, namely, Prudence and Valour, which he may apply to the moſt oppoſite purpoſes, for he who abuſes them will be the moſt wicked, the moſt cruel, the moſt luſtful, and moſt gluttonous being imaginable; for Juſtice is a Political Virtue, by the rules of it the State is regulated, and theſe rules are the criterion of what is right.

CHAP. III.

SINCE it is now evident of what Parts a City is compoſed, it will be neceſſary to treat firſt of Family Government, for every City is made up of Families, and every Family has again its ſeparate Parts of which it is compoſed. When a Family is complete, it conſiſts of Freemen and Slaves; but as in every Subject we ſhould begin with examining into the ſmalleſt Parts of which it conſiſts, and as the firſt, and ſmalleſt Parts of a Family, are the Maſter and Slave, the Huſband and Wife, the Father and Child, let us firſt enquire into theſe three, what each of them may be, and what they ought to be; that is to ſay, the Herile, the Nuptial, and the Paternal. Let theſe then be conſidered as the three diſtinct Parts of a Family: ſome think that the providing what is neceſſary for the Family is ſomething different from the Government of it, others that this is the greateſt Part of it; it ſhall be conſidered ſeparately; but we will firſt ſpeak of a Maſter and a Slave, that we may both underſtand the nature of thoſe things which are abſolutely neceſſary, and alſo try if we can learn any thing better on this

Subject

Subject than what is already known. Some Perſons have thought that the Power of the Maſter over his Slave originates from his ſuperior knowledge, and that this knowledge is the ſame in the Maſter, the Magiſtrate, and the King, as we have already ſaid; but others think that herile Government is contrary to Nature, and that it is the Law which makes one Man a Slave and another free, but that in Nature there is no difference; for which reaſon, that power cannot be founded in juſtice, but in force.

CHAP. IV.

SINCE then a ſubſiſtance is neceſſary in every Family, the means of procuring it certainly makes up part of the management of a Family, for without neceſſaries it is impoſſible to live, and to live well. As in all Arts which are brought to perfection it is neceſſary that they ſhould have their proper inſtruments if they would complete their works, ſo is it in the Art of managing a family: now of Inſtruments ſome of them are alive, others inanimate; thus with reſpect to the Pilot of the ſhip, the Tiller is without life, the Sailor is alive; for a Servant is as an inſtrument in many Arts. Thus Property is as an inſtrument to living; an Eſtate is a multitude of Inſtruments; ſo a Slave is an animated inſtrument, but every one that can miniſter of himſelf is more valuable than any other inſtrument; for if every Inſtrument, at command, or from a Preconception of its Maſter's will, could accompliſh its work (as the Story goes of the Statues of Dædalus; or what the Poet tells us of the Tripods of Vulcan, *that they moved of their own accord into the Aſſembly of the Gods)* the ſhuttle would then weave, and the lyre play of itſelf;

nor would the Architect want Servants, or the Maſter Slaves. Now what are generally called Inſtruments, are the Efficients of ſomething elſe, but Poſſeſſions are what we ſimply uſe: thus with a Shuttle we make ſomething elſe for our uſe; but we only uſe a Coat, or a Bed: ſince then *Making*, and *Uſing* differ from each other in Species, and they both require their Inſtruments, it is neceſſary that theſe ſhould be different from each other. Now Life is itſelf what we uſe, and not what we employ as the Efficient of ſomething elſe; for which reaſon the Services of a Slave are for Uſe. A Poſſeſſion may be conſidered in the ſame Nature as a part of any thing; now a Part is not only a Part of ſomething, but alſo is nothing elſe; ſo is a poſſeſſion; therefore a maſter is only the maſter of the Slave, but no part of him; but the Slave is not only the Slave of the maſter, but nothing elſe but that. This fully explains what is the nature of a Slave, and what are his Capacities; for that being who by nature is nothing of himſelf, but totally another's, and is a Man, is a Slave by nature; and that Man, who is the property of another, is his mere Chattel, though he continues a Man; but a Chattel is an Inſtrument for uſe, ſeparate from the body.

CHAP. V.

BUT whether any Perſon is ſuch by nature, and whether it is advantageous and juſt for any one to be a Slave or no, or whether all Slavery is contrary to nature, ſhall be conſidered hereafter; not that it is difficult to determine it upon general Principles, or to underſtand it from matters of fact; for that ſome ſhould govern, and others be governed, is not only neceſſary but uſeful, and from the hour of their Birth, ſome are marked out for thoſe purpoſes, and others for the other, and there are many Species of both ſorts. And the better thoſe are who are governed the better alſo is the Government, as for inſtance of Man, rather than the brute Creation: for the more excellent the materials are with which the work is finiſhed, the more excellent certainly is the work; and wherever there is a Governor and a Governed, there certainly is ſome work produced; for whatſoever is compoſed of many parts, which jointly become one, whether conjunct or ſeparate, evidently ſhew the marks of governing and governed; and this is true of every living thing in all nature; nay even in ſome things which partake not of Life, as in Muſic;

but

but this probably would be a diſquiſition too foreign to our preſent purpoſe. Every living thing in the firſt place is compoſed of Soul and Body, of theſe the one is by nature the Governor, the other the Governed; now if we would know what is natural, we ought to ſearch for it in thoſe Subjects in which Nature appears moſt perfect, and not in thoſe which are corrupted; we ſhould therefore examine into a Man who is moſt perfectly formed both in Soul, and Body, in whom this is evident, for in the depraved and vicious, the Body ſeems to rule rather than the Soul, on account of their being corrupt, and contrary to Nature. We may then, as we affirm, perceive in an Animal, the firſt principles of Herile and Political Government; for the Soul governs the Body as the Maſter governs his Slave; the Mind governs the Appetite, with a political or a kingly power, which ſhews that it is both natural and advantageous that the body ſhould be governed by the Soul, and the pathetic part by the Mind, and that part which is poſſeſſed of Reaſon; but to have no ruling power, or an improper one, is hurtful to all; and this holds true not only of Man, but of other Animals alſo, for tame Animals are naturally better than wild ones, and it is advantageous that both ſhould be under ſubjection to man; for this is productive of their common ſafety: ſo is it naturally

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with the Male and the Female; the one is ſuperior, the other inferior; the one governs, the other is governed; and the ſame rule muſt neceſſarily hold good with reſpect to all mankind. Thoſe Men therefore who are as much inferior to others as the Body is to the Soul, are to be thus diſpoſed of, as the proper uſe of them is their Bodies, in which their excellence conſiſts; and if what I have ſaid be true, they are Slaves by nature, and it is advantageous to them to be always under government. He then is by nature formed a Slave, who is qualified to become the Chattel of another Perſon, and on that account is ſo, and who has juſt reaſon enough to know, that there is ſuch a Faculty, without being indued with the uſe of it; for other animals have no perception of reaſon, but are entirely guided by appetite, and indeed they vary very little in their uſe from each other; for the advantage which we receive, both from Slaves, and tame Animals, ariſes from their bodily Strength adminiſtring to our neceſſities; for it is the Intention of Nature to make the Bodies of Slaves and Freemen different from each other, that the one ſhould be robuſt for their neceſſary purpoſes, the others erect, uſeleſs indeed for what Slaves are employed in, but fit for Civil Life, which is divided into the Duties of War and Peace; though theſe Rules do not always take place,

place, for Slaves have ſometimes the Bodies of Freemen, ſometimes the Souls; if then it is evident that if ſome Bodies are as much more excellent than others as the Statues of the Gods excel the human form, every one will allow that the inferior ought to be Slaves to the ſuperior; and if this is true with reſpect to the Body, it is ſtill juſter to determine in the ſame manner, when we conſider the Soul; though it is not ſo eaſy to perceive the Beauty of the Soul as it is of the Body. Since then ſome Men are Slaves by Nature, and others are Freemen, it is clear that where Slavery is advantageous to any one, then it is juſt to make him a Slave.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

BUT it is not difficult to perceive that thoſe who maintain the contrary Opinion have ſome reaſon on their ſide; for a Man may become a Slave two different ways; for he may be ſo by law alſo, and this law is a certain Compact, by which whatſoever is taken in Battle, is adjudged to be the property of the Conquerors: but many Perſons who are converſant in Law call in queſtion this pretended right, and ſay that it would be hard that a Man ſhould be compelled by violence, to be the Slave and Subject of another, who had the Power to compel him, and was his ſuperior in Strength; and upon this Subject, even of thoſe who are wiſe, ſome think one way and ſome another; but the Cauſe of this doubt and variety of Opinions ariſes from hence, that great abilities, when accompanied with proper means, are generally able to ſucceed by force: for Victory is always owing to a Superiority in ſome advantageous Circumſtances; ſo that it ſeems that force never prevails but in conſequence of great Abilities. But ſtill the diſpute concerning the juſtice of it remains; for ſome Perſons think, that juſtice conſiſts in benevolence, others think it juſt that the Powerful

Powerful ſhould govern: in the midſt of theſe contrary Opinions, there are no reaſons ſufficient to convince us, that the Right of being Maſter, and Governor, ought not to be placed with thoſe who have the greateſt Abilities. Some Perſons, entirely reſting upon the Right which the Law gives (for that which is legal is in ſome reſpects juſt) inſiſt upon it that Slavery occaſioned by War is juſt, not that they ſay it is wholly ſo, for it may happen that the Principle upon which the Wars were commenced is unjuſt; moreover no one will ſay that a man who is unworthily in Slavery, is therefore a Slave; for if ſo, men of the nobleſt Families might happen to be Slaves, and the deſcendants of Slaves, if they ſhould chance to be taken Priſoners in War, and ſold: to avoid this difficulty they ſay that ſuch Perſons ſhould not be called Slaves, but Barbarians only ſhould; but when they ſay this, they do nothing more than enquire who is a Slave by Nature, which was what we at firſt ſaid; for we muſt acknowledge that there are ſome Perſons, who, wherever they are, muſt neceſſarily be Slaves, but others, in no Situation; thus alſo it is with thoſe of noble deſcent: it is not only in their own Country that they are eſteemed as ſuch, but every where, but the Barbarians are reſpected on this account at home only; as if Nobility and Freedom were of two ſorts, the one univerſal, the

other not ſo. Thus ſays the Helen of Theodectes;

Who dares reproach me with the name of Slave?
When from the immortal Gods, on either ſide,
I draw my Lineage.

Thoſe who expreſs Sentiments like theſe, ſhew only that they diſtinguiſh the Slave and the Freeman, the Noble and the Ignoble from each other by their Virtues and their Vices; for they think it reaſonable, that as a Man begets a Man, and a Beaſt a Beaſt, ſo from a Good Man, a Good Man ſhould be deſcended; and this is what Nature deſires to do, but frequently cannot accompliſh it. It is evident then that this doubt has ſome reaſon in it, and that theſe Perſons are not Slaves, and thoſe Freemen, by the Appointment of Nature; and alſo that in ſome inſtances it is ſufficiently clear, that it is advantageous to both parties for this Man to be a Slave, and that to be a Maſter, and that it is right and juſt, that ſome ſhould be governed, and others govern, in the manner that nature intended; of which ſort of Government is that, which a Maſter exerciſes over a Slave. But to govern ill is diſadvantageous to both; for the ſame thing is uſeful to the part, and to the whole, to the Body and to the Soul; but the Slave is as it were a part of the Maſter, as if he were an animated part of his body, though ſeparate. For

which reaſon a mutual utility, and friendſhip may ſubſiſt, between the Maſter and the Slave, I mean when they are placed by Nature in that relation to each other, for the contrary takes place amongſt thoſe who are reduced to Slavery by the Law, or by Conqueſt.

CHAP. VII.

IT is evident from what has been ſaid, that an herile and a political Government are not the ſame, or that all governments are alike to each other, as ſome affirm; for one is adapted to the nature of Freemen, the other to that of Slaves. Domeſtic Government is a Monarchy, for that is what prevails in every houſe; but a political State is the Government of free men and equals. The Maſter is not ſo called from his knowing how to manage his Slave, but becauſe he is ſo; for the ſame reaſon a Slave and a Freeman have their reſpective Appellations. There is alſo one ſort of knowledge proper for a Maſter, another for a Slave; the Slave's is of the Nature of that which was taught by a Slave at Syracuſe; for he for a ſtipulated Sum inſtructed the Boys in all the buſineſs of a houſe-

hold Slave, of which there are various ſorts to be learnt, as the Art of Cookery, and other ſuch like ſervices, of which ſome are allotted to ſome, and others to others; ſome employments being more honourable, others more neceſſary; according to the proverb, *One Slave excels another, one Maſter excels another:* in ſuch like things the knowledge of a Slave conſiſts. The knowledge of the Maſter is to be able properly to employ his Slaves, for the maſterſhip of Slaves is the employment, not the mere poſſeſſion of them; not that this knowledge contains any thing great or reſpectable; for what a Slave ought to know how to do, that a Maſter ought to know how to order; for which reaſon, thoſe who have it in their power to be free from theſe low attentions, employ a Steward for this buſineſs, and apply themſelves either to public Affairs or Philoſophy: the knowledge of procuring what is neceſſary for a Family, is different from that which belongs either to the Maſter or the Slave: and to do this juſtly muſt be either by war, or hunting. And thus much of the difference between a Maſter and a Slave.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

AS a Slave is a particular Species of Property, let us by all means enquire into the Nature of Property in general, and the acquiſition of money, according to the manner we have propoſed. In the firſt place then, ſome one may doubt, whether the Getting of money, is the ſame thing as Oeconomy, or whether it is a part of it, or ſomething ſubſervient to it; and if ſo, whether it is as the Art of making Shuttles is to the Art of Weaving, or the Art of making Braſs, to that of Statue founding, for they are not of the ſame ſervice; for the one ſupplies the Tools, the other the Matter: by the Matter I mean, the Subject out of which the work is finiſhed, as Wool for the Cloth and Braſs for the Statue. It is evident then that the getting of money is not the ſame thing as Oeconomy, for the buſineſs of the one is to furniſh the means, of the other to uſe them; and what Art is there employed in the Management of a Family, but Oeconomy, but whether this is a part of it, or ſomething of a different Species, is a doubt; for if it is the buſineſs of him who is to get money, to find out how Riches and Poſſeſſions may

be

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be

be procured, and both theſe ariſe from various Cauſes, we muſt firſt enquire, whether the Art of Huſbandry is part of money getting, or ſomething different, and in general, whether the ſame is not true of every acquiſition, and every attention which relates to proviſion. But as there are many ſorts of Proviſion, ſo are the Methods of living both of Man and the brute Creation very various; and as it is impoſſible to live without food, the difference in that particular makes the lives of Animals ſo different from each other. Of Beaſts, ſome live in herds, others ſeparate, as is moſt convenient for procuring themſelves food; as ſome of them live upon fleſh, others on fruit, and others on whatſoever they light on, Nature having ſo diſtinguiſhed their courſe of life, that they can very eaſily procure themſelves ſubſiſtence; and as the ſame things are not agreeable to all, but one animal likes one thing and another another, it follows, that the lives of thoſe Beaſts who live upon fleſh muſt be different from the lives of thoſe who live on fruits; ſo is it with Men, their lives differ greatly from each other; and of all theſe, the Shepherd's is the idleſt, for they live upon the fleſh of tame animals, without any trouble, while they are obliged to change their habitations on account of their flocks, which they are compelled to follow, cultivating, as it were, a living farm.

farm. Others live exerciſing violence over living creatures, one purſuing this thing, another that, theſe preying upon Men; thoſe who live near lakes and marſhes, and rivers, or the ſea itſelf, on fiſhing, while others are Fowlers, or hunters of wild Beaſts; but the greater part of Mankind live upon the produce of the earth, and its cultivated fruits; and the manner in which all thoſe live who follow the direction of Nature, and labour for their own Subſiſtence, is nearly the ſame, without ever thinking to procure any proviſion by way of exchange or merchandize, ſuch are Shepherds, Huſbandmen, Robbers, Fiſhermen, and Hunters: ſome join different employments together, and thus live very agreeably; ſupplying thoſe deficiencies which were wanting to make their ſubſiſtence depend upon themſelves only: thus for inſtance; the ſame Perſon ſhall be a Shepherd and a Robber, or a Huſbandman and a Hunter; and ſo with reſpect to the reſt, they purſue that mode of life which Neceſſity points out. This Proviſion then Nature herſelf ſeems to have furniſhed all Animals with, as well immediately upon their firſt origin, as alſo when they are arrived at a State of maturity; for at the firſt of theſe periods, ſome of them are provided in the Womb with proper nouriſhment, which continues till that which is born can get food for itſelf, as is the

caſe

caſe with Worms and Birds; and as to thoſe which bring forth their Young alive, they have the Means for their ſubſiſtence, for a certain time, within themſelves, namely milk. It is evident then that we may conclude of thoſe things that are, that Plants are created for the Sake of Animals, and Animals for the Sake of Men; the Tame for our Uſe and Proviſion; the Wild, at leaſt the greater Part, for our proviſion alſo, or for ſome other advantageous purpoſe, as furniſhing us with cloaths, and the like. As Nature therefore makes nothing either imperfect, or in vain, it neceſſarily follows that ſhe has made all theſe things for Men: for which Reaſon what we gain in war, is in a certain degree a natural Acquiſition; for hunting is a part of it, which it is neceſſary for us to employ againſt wild beaſts; and thoſe Men, who being intended by Nature for Slavery are unwilling to ſubmit to it, on which occaſion, ſuch a War is by Nature juſt: that Species of acquiſition then only which is according to Nature, is part of Oeconomy; and this ought to be at hand, or if not, immediately procured, namely, what is neceſſary to be kept in Store to live upon, and which are uſeful as well for the State as the Family. And true Riches ſeem to conſiſt in theſe; and the Acquiſition of thoſe Poſſeſſions which are neceſſary

ceſſary for a happy life is not infinite; though Solon ſays otherwiſe in this verſe,

No Bounds to riches can be fixt for Man;

for they may be fixt as in other Arts; for the Inſtruments of no Art whatſoever are infinite, either in their number, or their magnitude; but Riches are a number of Inſtruments in domeſtic, and civil Oeconomy; it is therefore evident that the acquiſition of certain things according to nature, is a part both of domeſtic and civil Oeconomy, and for what reaſon.

CHAP. IX.

THERE is alſo another Species of acquiſition, which they particularly call pecuniary, and with great propriety; and by this indeed it ſeems that there are no bounds to riches and wealth. Now many perſons ſuppoſe, from their near relation to each other, that this is one and the ſame with that we have juſt mentioned, but it is not the ſame as that, though not very different; one of theſe is natural, the other is not, but rather owing to ſome Art and Skill; we will enter into a particular Examination of this Subject. The uſes of every poſſeſſion are two, both dependent upon the thing itſelf, but not in the ſame manner, the one ſuppoſing an inſeparable connection with it, the other not; as a Shoe, for inſtance, which may be either worn, or exchanged for ſomething elſe, both theſe are the uſes of the Shoe; for he who exchanges a Shoe with ſome man who wants one, for money, or proviſions, uſes the Shoe as a Shoe, but not according to the original intention, for Shoes were not at firſt made to be exchanged. The ſame thing holds true of all other poſſeſſions; for Barter, in general, had its original beginning in nature, ſome Men

having a ſurplus, others too little of what was neceſſary for them: hence it is evident, that the ſelling Proviſions for Money, is not according to the natural uſe of things; for they were obliged to uſe Barter for thoſe things which they wanted; but it is plain that Barter could have no place in the firſt, that is to ſay, in family Society; but muſt have begun when the number of thoſe who compoſed the community was enlarged: for the firſt of theſe had all things in common; but when they came to be ſeparated, they were obliged to exchange with each other, many different things which both Parties wanted. Which Cuſtom of Barter is ſtill preſerved amongſt many barbarous Nations, who procure one neceſſary with another, but never ſell any thing; as giving and receiving Wine, for Corn, and the like. This ſort of Barter is not contradictory to nature, nor is it any Species of Money-getting; but is neceſſary in procuring that Subſiſtance which is ſo conſonant thereunto. But this Barter introduced the uſe of Money, as might be expected; for a convenient Place from whence to import what you wanted, or to export what you had a Surplus of, being often at a great diſtance, Money neceſſarily made its way into Commerce; for it is not every thing which is naturally moſt uſeful, that is eaſieſt of Carriage; for which reaſon they invented ſomething

to exchange with each other, which they ſhould mutually give and take, that being really valuable itſelf, ſhould have the additional advantage of being of eaſy conveyance, for the purpoſes of Life, as Iron and Silver, or any thing elſe of the ſame nature: and this at firſt paſſed in value ſimply according to its weight or ſize; but in proceſs of time, it had a certain Stamp, to ſave the trouble of weighing, which Stamp expreſſed its value. Money then being eſtabliſhed as the neceſſary Medium of exchange, another Species of Money-getting ſoon took place, namely, by buying and ſelling, at probably firſt in a ſimple manner, afterwards with more ſkill and experience, where and how the greateſt profits might be made. For which reaſon the Art of Money-getting ſeems to be chiefly converſant about trade, and the buſineſs of it to be able to tell where the greateſt profits can be made, being the means of procuring abundance of Wealth and Poſſeſſions: and thus wealth is very often ſuppoſed to conſiſt in the Quantity of Money which any one poſſeſſes, as this is the Medium by which all trade is conducted, and a fortune made, others again regard it as of no value, as being of none by nature, but arbitrarily made ſo by compact; ſo that if thoſe who uſe it ſhould alter their Sentiments, it would be worth nothing, as being of no ſervice for any

neceſſary

neceſſary purpoſe. Beſides, he who abounds in Money often wants neceſſary food; and it is impoſſible to ſay that any Perſon is in good Circumſtances, when with all his Poſſeſſions he may periſh with hunger. Like Midas in the Fable, who from his inſatiable wiſh, had every thing he touched turned into Gold. For which reaſon others endeavour to procure other riches and other property, and rightly, for there are other riches, and property in nature; and theſe are the proper objects of Oeconomy: while Trade only procures Money, not by all means, but by the exchange of it, and for that purpoſe it is this which it is chiefly employed about, for Money is the firſt Principle and the end of Trade; nor are there any bounds to be ſet to what is thereby acquired. Thus alſo there are no limits to the Art of Medicine, with reſpect to the health which it attempts to procure; the ſame alſo is true of all other arts; no line can be drawn to terminate their bounds, the ſeveral Profeſſors of them, being deſirous to extend them as far as poſſible. (But ſtill the means to be employed for that purpoſe are limited; and theſe are the limits beyond which the Art cannot proceed.) Thus in the Art of acquiring riches there are no Limits, for the Object of that is money and poſſeſſions; but Oeconomy has a boundary, though this has not: for acquiring riches is not the Buſineſs

of

of that, for which reaſon it ſhould ſeem that ſome boundary ſhould be ſet to riches, though we ſee the contrary to this is what is practiſed; for all thoſe who get riches add to their money without end; the Cauſe of which is the near connection of theſe two Arts with each other, which ſometimes occaſions the one to change employments with the other, as getting of money is their common object: for Oeconomy requires the poſſeſſion of wealth, but not on its own account but with another view, to purchaſe things neceſſary therewith; but the other procures it merely to increaſe it: ſo that ſome perſons are confirmed in their belief, that this is the proper Object of Oeconomy, and think that for this Purpoſe Money ſhould be ſaved and hoarded up without end; the reaſon for which diſpoſition is, that they are intent upon living, but not upon living well; and this deſire being boundleſs in its extent, the means which they aim at for that purpoſe, are boundleſs alſo; and thoſe who propoſe to live well, often confine that to the enjoyment of the pleaſures of Senſe; ſo that as this alſo ſeems to depend upon what a Man has, all their care is to get Money, and hence ariſes the other Cauſe for this Art; for as this enjoyment is exceſſive in its degree, they endeavour to procure means proportionate to ſupply it; and if they cannot do this merely by the Art of dealing

in

in money, they will endeavour to do it by other ways, and apply all their Powers to a purpoſe they were not by Nature intended for. Thus for inſtance; Courage was intended to inſpire fortitude, not to get Money by; neither is this the End of the Soldiers or the Phyſician's Art, but Victory and Health. But ſuch Perſons make every thing ſubſervient to Money-getting, as if this was the only end; and to the End every thing ought to refer. We have now conſidered that Art of Money-getting which is not neceſſary, and have ſeen in what manner we became in want of it; and alſo that which is neceſſary, which is different from it; for that Oeconomy which is natural, and whoſe object is to provide food, is not like this unlimited in its extent, but has its bounds.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

WE have now determined what was before doubtful, whether or no the Art of getting Money is his buſineſs who is at the head of a Family or a State, and though not ſtrictly ſo, it is however very neceſſary; for as a Politician does not make Men, but receiving them from the hand of Nature employs them to proper purpoſes; thus the Earth, or the Sea, or ſomething elſe ought to ſupply them with proviſions, and this it is the buſineſs of the Maſter of the Family to manage properly; for it is not the Weaver's buſineſs to make Yarn, but to uſe it, and to diſtinguiſh what is good and uſeful, from what is bad and of no ſervice; and indeed ſome one may inquire why getting Money ſhould be a Part of Oeconomy, when the Art of Healing is not, as it is as requiſite that the Family ſhould be in health as that they ſhould eat, or have any thing elſe which is neceſſary; and as it is indeed in ſome particulars the buſineſs both of the Maſter of the Family, and he to whom the Government of the State is intruſted, to ſee after the health of thoſe under their Care, but in others not, but the Phyſician's; ſo alſo as to Money; in ſome

reſpects

reſpects it is the buſineſs of the Maſter of the Family, in others not, but of the Servant; but as we have already ſaid, it is chiefly Nature's, for it is her part to ſupply her offspring with food; for every thing finds nouriſhment left for it, in what produced it; for which reaſon the Natural riches of all Men ariſe from Fruits, and Animals, which may be applied, as we ſay, to two purpoſes, the one to make Money of, the other for the Service of the houſe; of which the firſt is neceſſary and commendable, the other juſtly cenſurable; for it has not its origin in nature, but amongſt ourſelves; for uſury is moſt reaſonably deteſted, as it is increaſing our fortune by money itſelf, and not employing it for the purpoſe it was originally intended, namely exchange.

CHAP. XI.

HAVING already ſufficiently conſidered the general Principles of this Subject, let us now go into the practical part thereof; the one is a liberal employment for the mind, the other neceſſary. Theſe things are uſeful in the Management of one's Affairs; to be ſkilful in the Nature of Cattle, which are moſt profitable, and where, and how; as for inſtance, what advantage will ariſe from keeping Horſes, or Oxen, or Sheep, or any other live Stock; it is alſo neceſſary to be acquainted with the Comparative value of theſe things, and which of them in particular places are worth moſt; for ſome do better in one place, ſome in another. Agriculture alſo ſhould be underſtood, and the management of Arable Grounds, and Orchards; and alſo the Care of Bees, and Fiſh, and Birds, from whence any profit may ariſe; theſe are the firſt and moſt conſiderable parts of domeſtic management. With reſpect to gaining money by exchange, the principal method of doing this is by Merchandize, which is carried on in three different ways, either by ſending the Commodity for Sale by Sea or by Land, or elſe ſelling it on the place where it grows; and

and theſe differ from each other in this, that the one is more profitable, the other ſafer. The Second Method is by uſury. The third by receiving Wages for work done, and this either by being employed in ſome mean Art, or elſe in mere bodily labour. There is alſo a third Species of improving a Fortune, that is ſomething between this, and the firſt; for it partly depends upon Nature, partly upon Exchange; the Subject of which is, things that are immediately from the Earth, or their produce, which, though they bear no fruit, are yet uſeful, ſuch as felling of Timber and the whole Art of Metallurgy, which includes many different Species, for there are various Sorts of things dug out of the Earth. Theſe we have now mentioned in general, but to enter into particulars concerning each of them, though it might be uſeful to the Artiſt, would be tireſome to dwell on. Now of all the works of Art, thoſe are the moſt excellent wherein chance has the leaſt to do, and thoſe are the meaneſt, which deprave the body, thoſe the moſt ſervile, in which bodily ſtrength alone is chiefly wanted, thoſe moſt illiberal, which require leaſt Skill; but as there are books wrote on theſe Subjects by ſome Perſons, as by Chares the Panian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, upon huſbandry and planting; and by others on other Matters, let thoſe who have occaſion

conſult them thereon; beſides every Perſon ſhould collect together whatſoever he hears occaſionally mentioned, by means of which many of thoſe who aimed at making a fortune, have ſucceeded in their intentions; for all theſe are uſeful to thoſe who make a point of getting money, as in the Contrivance of Thales the Mileſian (which was certainly a gainful one, but as it was his it was attributed to his wiſdom, though the Method he uſed was a general one, and would univerſally ſucceed) when they reviled him for his Poverty, as if the Study of Philoſophy was uſeleſs: for they ſay, that he, perceiving by his Skill in Aſtrology, that there would be great plenty of Olives that year, while it was yet winter, having got a little Money, he gave earneſt for all the Oil Works that were in Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a low Price, there being no one to bid againſt him; but when the Seaſon came for making Oil, many Perſons wanting them, he all at once let them upon what terms he pleaſed; and raiſing a large Sum of money by that means, convinced them that it was eaſy for Philoſophers to be rich if they choſe it, but that that was not what they aimed at; in this Manner is Thales ſaid to have ſhewn his wiſdom. It indeed is, as we have ſaid, generally gainful, for a Perſon to contrive to make a Monopoly of any thing; for which reaſon

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ſome Cities alſo take this Method when they want money, and monopolize their Commodities. There was a certain Perſon in Sicily who laid out a Sum of Money which was depoſited in his hand, in buying up all the Iron from the Iron Merchants; ſo that when the Dealers came from the Markets to purchaſe, there was no one had any to ſell but himſelf; and though he put no great advance upon it, yet by laying out fifty Talents he made an hundred. When Dioniſius heard this, he permitted him to take his Money with him, but forbid him to continue any longer in Sicily, as being one who contrived means for getting money, inconſiſtent with his affairs. This Man's View and Thales's was exactly the ſame; both of them contrived to procure a Monopoly for themſelves: it is uſeful alſo for Politicians to underſtand theſe things, for many States want to raiſe money and by ſuch means, as well as private families, nay more ſo; for which reaſon, ſome Perſons who are employed in the management of public Affairs, confine themſelves to this province only.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

THERE are then three Parts of Domeſtic Government, the Maſters, of which we have already treated, the Fathers, and the Huſbands; now the Government of the Wife, and Children, ſhould both be that of free perſons, but not the ſame; for the Wife ſhould be treated as a Citizen of a free State, the Children ſhould be under kingly power; for the Male is by nature ſuperior to the Female, except when ſomething happens contrary to the uſual Courſe of Nature, as is the elder, and perfect, to the younger and imperfect. Now in the generality of free States, the Governors, and the Governed, alternately change place; for an equality without any Preference is what Nature chuſes; however, when one governs and another is governed, ſhe endeavours that there ſhould be a diſtinction between them, in forms, expreſſions, and honours; according to what Amaſis ſaid of his Laver. This then ſhould be the eſtabliſhed rule between the Man and the Woman. The Government of Children ſhould be kingly; for the Power of the Father over the Child is founded in Affection and Seniority, which is a Species of kingly Government;

vernment; for which reaſon Homer very properly calls Jupiter *the Father of Gods and Men*, who was king of both theſe; for Nature requires that a king ſhould be of the ſame Species with thoſe whom he governs, though ſuperior in ſome particulars, as is the caſe between the Elder and the Younger, the Father and the Son.

CHAP. XIII.

IT is evident then that in the due Government of a Family, greater attention ſhould be paid to the ſeveral Members of it and their Virtues, than to the Poſſeſſions or Riches of it; and greater to the Freemen than the Slaves: but here ſome one may doubt whether there is any other virtue in a Slave than his organick Services, and of higher eſtimation than theſe, as temperance, fortitude, juſtice, and ſuch like habits, or whether they poſſeſs only bodily qualities: each ſide of the Queſtion has its difficulties; for if they poſſeſs theſe Virtues, wherein do they differ from Free Men? and that they do not, ſince they are Men, and partakers of Reaſon, is abſurd. Nearly the ſame inquiry may be made concerning a Woman, and a Child, whether theſe

alſo have their proper virtues; whether a Woman ought to be temperate, brave, and juſt, and whether a Child is temperate or no; and indeed this inquiry ought to be general, whether the Virtues of thoſe who, by Nature, either govern, or are governed, are the ſame, or different; for if it is neceſſary that both of them ſhould partake of the fair and good, why is it alſo neceſſary that, without exception, the one ſhould govern, the other always be governed: for this cannot ariſe from their poſſeſſing theſe Qualities in different Degrees; for to govern, and to be governed, are things different in Species, but *more* or *leſs* are not. And yet it is wonderful that one party ought to have them, and the other not; for if he who is to govern ſhould not be temperate and juſt, how can he govern well? or if he is to be governed, how can he be governed well? for he who is intemperate and a Coward, will never do what he ought: it is evident then that both parties ought to be Virtuous; but there is a difference between them, as there is between thoſe who by Nature command, and who by Nature obey, and this originates in the Soul; for in this, Nature has planted the Governing, or ſubmitting Principle, the Virtues of which we ſay are different, as are thoſe of a Rational and an Irrational being. It is plain then that the ſame principle may be extended farther, and that

there

there are in Nature a variety of things which govern and are governed; for a Freeman is governed in a different Manner from a Slave, a Male from a Female, and a Man from a Child: and all theſe have parts of Mind within them, but in a different manner. Thus a Slave can have no determination, a Woman but a weak one, a Child an imperfect one. Thus alſo muſt it neceſſarily be with reſpect to moral Virtues; all muſt be ſuppoſed to poſſeſs them, but not in the ſame manner, but as is beſt ſuited to every ones employment; on which account he who is to govern ought to be perfect in moral Virtue, for his buſineſs is entirely that of an Architect, and Reaſon is the Architect; while others want only that portion of it which may be ſufficient for their Station; from whence it is evident, that although Moral Virtue is common to all thoſe we have ſpoke of, yet the Temperance of a Man, and a Woman are not the ſame, nor their Courage, nor their Juſtice, though Socrates thought otherwiſe; for the Courage of the Man conſiſts in commanding, the Woman's in obeying; and the ſame is true in other particulars: and this will be evident to thoſe who will examine different Virtues ſeparately; for thoſe who uſe general Terms deceive themſelves when they ſay, that Virtue conſiſts in a good diſpoſition of Mind, or doing what is right, or ſomething of this ſort. They do

much better who enumerate the different Virtues as Georgias did, than thoſe who thus define them; and as Sophocles ſpeaks of a Woman, we think of all Perſons, that their Virtues ſhould be applicable to their Characters, for ſays he,

Silence is a woman's Ornament,

but it is not a Man's; and as a Child is incomplete, it is evident that his Virtue is not to be referred to himſelf in his preſent Situation, but to that in which he will be complete, and his Preceptor. In like manner the virtue of a Slave is to be referred to his Maſter; for we laid it down as a maxim, that the uſe of a Slave was to employ him in what you wanted; ſo that it is clear enough that few virtues are wanted in his Station, only that he may not neglect his work through idleneſs or fear: ſome Perſon may queſtion, if what I have ſaid is true, whether virtue is not neceſſary for artificers in their calling, for they often through idleneſs neglect their work, but the difference between them is very great; for a Slave is connected with you for life, but the artificer not ſo nearly: as near therefore as the Artificer approaches to the Situation of a Slave, juſt ſo much ought he to have of the Virtues of one; for a mean Artificer is to a certain point a Slave; but then a Slave is one of thoſe things

things which are by nature what they are, but this is not true of a Shoemaker, or any other Artiſt. It is evident then that a Slave ought to be trained to thoſe virtues which are proper for his Situation by his maſter; and not by him who has the power of a maſter, to teach him any particular Art. Thoſe therefore are in the wrong who would deprive Slaves of reaſon, and ſay that they have only to follow their Orders; for Slaves want more inſtruction than Children, and thus we determine this matter. It is neceſſary, I am ſenſible, for every one who treats upon Government, to enter particularly into the Relations of Huſband and Wife, and of Parent and Child, and to ſhew what are the virtues of each and their reſpective connections with each other; what is right and what is wrong; and how the one ought to be followed, and the other avoided. Since then every family is part of a City, and each of thoſe individuals are part of a family, and the virtue of the Parts ought to correſpond to the virtue of the whole; it is neceſſary, that both the Wives and Children of the community ſhould be inſtructed correſpondent to the nature thereof, if it is of conſequence to the virtue of the State, that the Wives and Children therein ſhould be virtuous, and of conſequence it certainly is, for the Wives are one half of the free Perſons; and of the Children the ſucceeding

Citizens are to be formed. As then we have determined theſe points, we will leave the reſt to be ſpoke to in another place, as if the Subject was now finiſhed; and beginning again anew, firſt conſider the Sentiments of thoſe who have treated of the moſt perfect forms of Government.

A TREA-

A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

SINCE then we propoſe to inquire, what Civil Society is of all others beſt, for thoſe who have it in their power to live intirely as they wiſh, it is neceſſary to examine into the Polity of thoſe States which are allowed to be well governed; and if there ſhould be any others which ſome Perſons have deſcribed, and which appear properly regulated, to note what is right and uſeful in them; and when we point out wherein

wherein they have failed, let not this be imputed to an affectation of wiſdom, for it is becauſe there are great defects in all thoſe which are already eſtabliſhed, that I have been induced to undertake this work. We will begin with that part of the Subject which naturally preſents itſelf firſt to our Conſideration. The Members of every State muſt of neceſſity have all things in common, or ſome things common, and not others, or nothing at all common. To have nothing in common is evidently impoſſible, for Society itſelf is one Species of community; and the firſt thing neceſſary thereunto, is a common place of habitation, namely the City, which muſt be one, and this every Citizen muſt have a ſhare in. But in a Government which is to be well founded, will it be beſt to admit of a community in every thing which is capable thereof, or only in ſome particulars, but in others not? for it is poſſible that the Citizens may have their Wives, and Children, and Goods in common, as in Plato's Commonwealth; for in that, Socrates affirms that all theſe particulars ought to be ſo. Which then ſhall we prefer? the Cuſtom which is already eſtabliſhed, or the Laws which are propoſed in that treatiſe?

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

NOW as a community of wives is attended with many other difficulties, ſo neither does the Cauſe for which he would frame his government in this manner, ſeem agreeable to reaſon, nor is it capable of producing that end which he has propoſed, and for which he ſays it ought to take place; nor has he given any particular directions for putting it in practice. Now I alſo am willing to agree with Socrates in the Principle which he proceeds upon, and admit that the City ought to be one, as much as poſſible; and yet it is evident that if it is contracted too much, it will be no longer a City, for that neceſſarily ſuppoſes a multitude; ſo that if we proceed in this manner, we ſhall reduce a City to a Family, and a Family to a ſingle Perſon: for we admit, that a Family is one, in a greater degree than a City, and a ſingle Perſon than a Family; ſo that if this end could be obtained, it ſhould never be put in practice, as it would annihilate the City; for a City does not only conſiſt of a large number of inhabitants, but there muſt alſo be of different Sorts; for were they all alike, there could be no City; for a Confederacy and a City

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are two different things; for a Confederacy is valuable from its numbers, although all thoſe who compoſe it are Men of the ſame calling; for this is entered into for the ſake of mutual defence, as we add an additional weight to make the Scale go down. The ſame diſtinction prevails between a City and a Nation, when the People are not collected into ſeparate Villages, but live as the Arcadians. Now thoſe things in which a City ſhould be one, are of different Sorts, and in preſerving an alternate reciprocation of Power between theſe, the ſafety thereof conſiſts (as I have already mentioned in my treatiſe on Morals) for amongſt Freemen and equals this is abſolutely neceſſary; for all cannot govern at the ſame time, but either by the year, or according to ſome other regulation or time, by which means every one in his turn will be in Office; as if the Shoemakers, and Carpenters ſhould exchange occupations, and not always be employed in the ſame Calling. But as it is evidently better, that theſe ſhould continue to exerciſe their reſpective trades; ſo alſo in Civil Society, where it is poſſible, it would be better that the Government ſhould continue in the ſame hands; but where it is not (as Nature has made all men equal, and therefore it is juſt, be the adminiſtration good or bad, that all ſhould partake of it) there it is beſt to obſerve a Ro-

a Rotation, and let thoſe who are their equals, by turns ſubmit to thoſe who are at that time Magiſtrates, as they will, in their turns, alternately be governors and governed, as if they were different Men: by the ſame Method different Perſons will execute different Offices. From hence it is evident, that a City cannot be one, in the Manner that ſome perſons propoſe; and that what has been ſaid to be the greateſt good, which it could enjoy, is abſolutely its deſtruction, which cannot be: for the good of any thing is that which preſerves it. For another reaſon alſo it is clear, that it is not for the beſt, to endeavour to make a City too much one, becauſe a Family is more ſufficient in itſelf than a ſingle Perſon, a City than a Family; and indeed Plato ſuppoſes that a City owes its exiſtence to that ſufficiency in themſelves, which the members of it enjoy. If then this ſufficiency is ſo deſirable, the leſs the City is one the better.

CHAP. III.

BUT admitting that it is moſt advantageous for a City to be one, as much as poſſible, it does not ſeem to follow that this will take place, by permitting all, at once to ſay this is mine, and this is not mine (though this is what Socrates regards as a proof that a City is entirely one) for the word *All* is uſed in two Senſes; if it means *each individual*, what Socrates propoſes will nearly take place; for each Perſon will ſay, this is his own Son, and his own Wife, and his own Property, and of every thing elſe that may happen to belong to him, that it is his own. But thoſe who have their Wives and Children in common will not ſay ſo, but all will ſay ſo, though not as individuals; therefore, to uſe the word all, is evidently a fallacious mode of ſpeech; for this word is ſometimes uſed diſtributively, and ſometimes collectively, on account of its double meaning, and is the cauſe of inconcluſive Syllogiſms in reaſoning. Therefore for all Perſons to ſay the ſame thing was their own, uſing the word all in its diſtributive Senſe, would be well, but is impoſſible: in its collective Senſe, it would by no means contribute to the

Concord

Concord of the State. Beſides, there would be another inconvenience attending this propoſal, for what is common to many is taken leaſt care of; for all Men regard more what is their own, than what others ſhare with them in, to which they pay leſs attention than is incumbent on every one: let me add alſo, that every one is more negligent of what another is to ſee to, as well as himſelf, than of his own private buſineſs; as in a Family, one is often worſe ſerved by many ſervants, than by a few. Let each Citizen then in the State have a thouſand Children, but let none of them be conſidered as the Children of that Individual, but let the relation of Father and Child be common to them all, and they will all be neglected. Beſides, in conſequence of this, whenever any Citizen behaved well or ill, every Perſon, be the number what it would, might ſay, this is my Son, or this Man's or that; and in this manner would they ſpeak, and thus would they doubt of the whole thouſand, or of whatever number the City conſiſted; and it would be uncertain to whom each child belonged, and when it was born, who was to take care of it: and which do you think is better, for every one to ſay this is mine, while they may apply it equally to two thouſand, or ten thouſand; or as we ſay, this is mine in our preſent forms of Government, where one Man calls

another his Son, another calls that ſame Perſon his Brother, another Nephew, or ſome other relation, either by blood or marriage, and firſt extends his care to him and his, while another regards him as one of the ſame Pariſh and the ſame Tribe; and it is better for any one to be a Nephew in his private Capacity, than a Son after that manner. Beſides, it will be impoſſible to prevent ſome Perſons from ſuſpecting that they are Brothers and Siſters, Fathers and Mothers to each other; for, from the mutual likeneſs there is between the Sire and the Offspring, they will neceſſarily conclude in what Relation they ſtand to each other, which Circumſtance, we are informed by thoſe writers who deſcribe different parts of the world, does ſometimes happen; for in Upper Africa there are Wives in common, who yet deliver their Children to their reſpective Fathers, being guided by their likeneſs to them. There are alſo ſome Mares and Cows, which naturally bring forth their Young ſo like the Male, that we can eaſily diſtinguiſh by which of them they were impregnated: ſuch was the Mare called Juſt, in Pharſalia.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

BESIDES, thoſe who contrive this Plan of community, cannot eaſily avoid the following Evils; namely, Blows, Murders involuntary or voluntary, Quarrels, and Reproaches, all which it would be impious indeed to be guilty of towards our Fathers and Mothers, or thoſe who are nearly related to us; though not to thoſe who are not connected to us by any Tye of Affinity: and certainly theſe miſchiefs muſt neceſſarily happen oftener amongſt thoſe who do not know how they are connected to each other, than thoſe who do; and when they do happen, if it is among the firſt of theſe, they admit of a legal expiation, but amongſt the latter, that cannot be done. It is alſo abſurd for thoſe who promote a community of Children, to forbid thoſe who love each other from indulging themſelves in the laſt exceſſes of that Paſſion, while they do not reſtrain them from the Paſſion itſelf, or thoſe intercourſes, which are of all things moſt improper, between a Father and a Son, a Brother and a Brother, and indeed the thing itſelf is moſt abſurd. It is alſo ridiculous to prevent this intercourſe between the neareſt relations,

for

for no other reaſon than the violence of the Pleaſure, while they think that the Relation of Father and Daughter, the Brother and Siſter, is of no conſequence at all. It ſeems alſo more advantageous for the State, that the Huſbandmen ſhould have their Wives and Children in common, than the Military, for they will have leſs Affection for them in that caſe, than when otherwiſe; for ſuch Perſons ought to be under Subjection, that they may obey the laws, and not ſeek after innovations. Upon the whole, the conſequences of ſuch a Law as this would be directly contrary to thoſe things which good Laws ought to eſtabliſh, and which Socrates endeavoured to eſtabliſh by his regulations concerning Women and Children: for we think that Friendſhip is the greateſt good which can happen to any City, as nothing ſo much prevents Seditions: and Amity in a City, is what Socrates commends above all things, which appears to be, as indeed he ſays, the Effect of Friendſhip; as we learn from Ariſtophanes in the Erotics, who ſays, that thoſe who love one another from the exceſs of that Paſſion, deſire to breathe the ſame Soul, and from being two to be blended into one: from whence it would neceſſarily follow, that both, or one of them, muſt be deſtroyed. But now in a City which admits of this Community, the Tye of Friendſhip muſt, from that

very cauſe, be extremely weak, when no Father can ſay, this is my Son; or Son, this is my Father; for as a very little of what is ſweet, being mixt with a great deal of water, is imperceptible after the mixture, ſo muſt all Family connections, and the names they go by, be neceſſarily diſregarded in ſuch a community, it being then by no means neceſſary that the Father ſhould have any regard for him he called a Son, or the Brothers for thoſe they call Brothers. There are two things which principally inſpire mankind with care and love of their Offspring, knowing it is their own, and what ought to be the object of their Affection, neither of which can take place in this ſort of Community. As for exchanging the Children of the Artificers and Huſbandmen with thoſe of the Military, and their's reciprocally with theſe, it will occaſion great confuſion in whatever manner it ſhall be done; for of neceſſity, thoſe who carry the Children muſt know from whom they took, and to whom they gave them; and by this means thoſe Evils which I have already mentioned, will neceſſarily be the more likely to happen, as blows, inceſtuous love, murders, and the like; for thoſe who are given from their own Parents to other Citizens, the Military, for inſtance, will not call them Brothers, Sons, Fathers, or Mothers. The ſame thing would happen to thoſe of the

the Military who were placed among the other Citizens; ſo that by this means every one would be in fear how to act in conſequence of Conſanguinity. And thus let us determine concerning a Community of Wives and Children.

CHAP. V.

WE proceed next to conſider in what manner Property ſhould be regulated, in a State which is formed after the moſt perfect Mode of Government, whether it ſhould be common or not; for this may be conſidered as a ſeparate Queſtion, from what had been determined concerning Wives and Children; I mean, whether it is better, that theſe ſhould be held ſeparate, as they now every where are, or that not only Poſſeſſions but alſo the Uſufruct of them ſhould be in common; or that the Soil ſhould have a particular owner, but that the produce ſhould be brought together and uſed as one common Stock, as ſome Nations at preſent do; or on the contrary, ſhould the Soil be common, and ſhould it alſo be cultivated in common, while the produce is divided amongſt the individuals for their particular uſe, which

which is ſaid to be practiſed by ſome Barbarians; or ſhall both the Soil and the Fruit be common? When the buſineſs of the huſbandman devolves not on the Citizen, the matter is much eaſier ſettled; but when thoſe labour together, who have a common right of poſſeſſion, this may occaſion ſeveral difficulties; for there may not be an equal proportion between their labour, and what they conſume; and thoſe who labour hard, and have but a ſmall proportion of the produce, will certainly complain of thoſe who take a large ſhare of it, and do but little for that. Upon the whole, as a Community between Man and Man ſo intire, as to include every thing poſſible, and thus to have all things that Man can poſſeſs in common, is very difficult, ſo is it particularly ſo with reſpect to property; and this is evident from that community which takes place, between thoſe who go out to ſettle a Colony; for they frequently have diſputes with each other upon the moſt common Occaſions, and come to blows upon trifles: we find too, that we oſteneſt correct thoſe Slaves, who are generally employed in the common Offices of the Family: a community of Property then has theſe, and other inconveniencies attending it. But the manner of Life which is now eſtabliſhed, more particularly when embelliſhed with good morals, and a Syſtem of equal laws, is far ſuperior to it, for it

will have the advantage of both; by both I mean, Properties being common, and divided alſo; for in ſome reſpects it ought to be in a manner common, but upon the whole private: for every Man's Attention being employed on his own particular Concerns, will prevent mutual complaints againſt each other; nay, by this means induſtry will be increaſed, as each perſon will labour to improve his own private property; and it will then be, that from a principle of virtue, they will mutually perform good Offices to each other, according to the Proverb, *All things are common amongſt friends*; and in ſome Cities there are traces of this Cuſtom to be ſeen, ſo that it is not impracticable, and particularly in thoſe which are beſt governed; ſome things are by this means in a manner common, and others might be ſo; for there, every Perſon enjoying his own private property, ſome things he aſſiſts his friend with, others are conſidered as in common; as in Lacedæmon, where they uſe each other's Slaves, as if they were, ſo to ſpeak, their own, as they do their Horſes and Dogs, or even any Proviſion they may want in a Journey. It is evident then that it is beſt to have property private, but to make the uſe of it common; but how the Citizens are to be brought to it, is the particular buſineſs of the Legiſlator. And alſo with reſpect to Pleaſure, it is unſpeakable how advantageous

tageous it is, that a Man ſhould think he has ſomething which he may call his own; for it is by no means to no purpoſe, that each Perſon ſhould have an Affection for himſelf, for that is natural, and yet to be a ſelf-lover is juſtly cenſured; for we mean by that, not one that ſimply loves himſelf, but one that loves himſelf more than he ought; in like manner we blame a money-lover, and yet both money and ſelf is what all Men love. Beſides, it is very pleaſing to us to oblige and aſſiſt our Friends and Companions, as well as thoſe whom we are connected with by the Rights of hoſpitality; and this cannot be done without the eſtabliſhment of private property, which cannot take place with thoſe who make a City too much one; beſides, they prevent every Opportunity of exerciſing two principal Virtues, Modeſty, and Liberality. Modeſty, with reſpect to the Female Sex, for this Virtue requires you to abſtain from her who is another's; Liberality, which depends upon private Property, for without that, no one can appear liberal, or do any generous Action; for Liberality conſiſts in imparting to others what is our own. This Syſtem of Polity does indeed recommend itſelf by its good Appearance, and ſpecious pretences to humanity; and when firſt propoſed to any one, muſt give him great pleaſure, as he will conclude it to be a wonderful bond of friend-

ſhip, connecting all to all; particularly when any one cenſures the Evils which are now to be found in Society, as ariſing from Properties not being common, I mean the diſputes which happen between Man and Man, upon their different contracts with each other; thoſe Judgments which are paſt in Court in conſequence of Fraud, and Perjury, and flattering the Rich, none of which ariſe from Properties being private, but from the Vices of Mankind. Beſides, thoſe who live in one general Community, and have all things in common, oftener diſpute with each other than thoſe who have their property ſeparate; from the very ſmall number indeed of thoſe who have their property in common, compared with thoſe where it is appropriated, the inſtances of their Quarrels are but few. It is alſo but right to mention, not only the Inconveniences they are preſerved from, who live in a communion of Goods, but alſo the advantages they are deprived of; for when the whole comes to be conſidered, this manner of life will be found impracticable. We muſt ſuppoſe then, that Socrates's miſtake aroſe from the Principle he ſet out with being falſe; we admit indeed, that both a Family and a City ought to be one, in ſome particulars, but not intirely; for there is a point, beyond which if a City proceeds in reducing itſelf to one, it will be no longer a City.

a City. There is alſo another point at which it will ſtill continue to be a City, but it will approach ſo near to not being one, that it will be worſe than none; as if any one ſhould reduce the voices of thoſe who ſing in concert to one, or a Verſe to a Foot. But the People ought to be made one, and a Community, as I have already ſaid, by Education; as Property at Lacedæmon, and their public Tables at Crete, were made common by their Legiſlators. But yet, whoſoever ſhall introduce any Education, and think thereby to make his City excellent and reſpectable, will be abſurd, while he expects to form it by that means, and not by Manners, Philoſophy, and Laws. And whoever would eſtabliſh a Government upon a Community of Goods, ought to know that he ſhould conſult the experience of many Years, which would plainly enough inform him, whether ſuch a Scheme is uſeful; for almoſt all things have already been found out, but ſome have been neglected, and others which have been known, have not been put in practice. But this would be moſt evident, if any one could ſee ſuch a Government really eſtabliſhed: for it would be impoſſible to frame ſuch a City, without dividing and ſeparating it into its diſtinct parts, as public Tables, Wards, and Tribes; ſo that here the Laws will do nothing more, than forbid the Military to engage in agri-

agriculture, which is what the Lacedæmonians are at preſent endeavouring to do. Nor has Socrates told us (nor is it eaſy to ſay) what Plan of Government ſhould be purſued with reſpect to the Individuals in the State, where there is a community of goods eſtabliſhed; for though the Majority of his Citizens will in general conſiſt of a multitude of Perſons of different Occupations, of thoſe he has determined nothing; whether the Property of the huſbandman ought to be in common, or whether each Perſon ſhould have his ſhare to himſelf; and alſo, whether their Wives and Children ought to be in common: for if all things are to be alike common to all, where will be the difference between them and the Military, or what would they get by ſubmitting to their Government? and upon what principles would they do it, unleſs they ſhould eſtabliſh the wiſe practice of the Cretans? for they, allowing every thing elſe to their Slaves, forbid them only Gymnaſtic Exerciſes, and the uſe of Arms. And if they are not, but theſe ſhould be in the ſame Situation with reſpect to their property, which they are in other Cities, what ſort of a Community will there be? in one City there muſt of neceſſity be two, and thoſe contrary to each other; for he makes the Military the Guardians of the State, and the huſbandman, artizans, and others, Citizens; and all thoſe

Quarrels,

Quarrels, Accuſations, and things of the like ſort, which he ſays are the bane of other Cities, will be found in his alſo: notwithſtanding Socrates ſays they will not want many Laws in conſequence of their Education, but ſuch only as may be neceſſary for regulating the Streets, the Markets, and the like, while at the ſame time it is the Education of the Military only, that he has taken any Care of. Beſides, he makes the Huſbandmen Maſters of property, upon paying a Tribute; but this would be likely to make them far more troubleſome and high ſpirited than the Helots, the Peneſtiæ, or the Slaves which others employ; nor has he ever determined whether it is neceſſary to give any attention to them in theſe particulars, nor thought of what is connected therewith, their Polity, their Education, their Laws; beſides, it is of no little conſequence, nor is it eaſy to determine, how theſe ſhould be framed, ſo as to preſerve the community of the Military. Beſides, if he makes the Wives common, while the Property continues ſeparate, who ſhall manage the domeſtic concerns with the ſame Care which the Man beſtows upon his Fields? nor will the inconvenience be remedied by making Property as well as Wives common; and it is abſurd to draw a compariſon from the Brute Creation, and ſay, that the ſame Principle ſhould regulate the Connection of a

Man

Man and a Woman, which regulates theirs amongſt whom there is no family Aſſociation. It is alſo very hazardous to ſettle the Magiſtracy as Socrates has done; for he would have Perſons of the ſame rank always in Office, which becomes the Cauſe of Sedition even amongſt thoſe who are of no Account, but more particularly amongſt thoſe who are of a couragious and warlike diſpoſition; it is indeed evidently neceſſary that he ſhould frame his community in this manner; for that Golden particle which God has mixt up in the Soul of Man, flies not from one to the other, but always continues with the ſame; for he ſays, that ſome of our Species have Gold, and others Silver, blended in their Compoſition from the moment of their Birth: but thoſe who are to be Huſbandmen and Artiſts, Braſs and Iron; beſides, though he deprives the Military of happineſs, he ſays, that the Legiſlator ought to make all the Citizens happy; but it is impoſſible that the whole City can be happy, without all, or the greater, or ſome part of it be happy. For happineſs is not like that numerical equality which ariſes from certain numbers when added together, although neither of them may ſeparately contain it; for happineſs cannot be thus added together, but muſt exiſt in every individual, as ſome properties belong to every Integral; and if the Military are not happy,

happy, who elſe are ſo? for the Artiſans are not, nor the multitude of thoſe who are employed in inferior Offices. The State which Socrates has deſcribed has all theſe defects, and others which are not of leſs conſequence.

CHAP. VI.

IT is alſo nearly the ſame in the treatiſe upon Laws which was writ afterwards, for which reaſon it will be proper in this place to conſider briefly, what he has there ſaid upon Government, for Socrates has thoroughly ſettled but very few parts of it; as for inſtance, in what manner the Community of Wives and Children ought to be regulated, how Property ſhould be eſtabliſhed, and Government conducted. Now he divides the Inhabitants into two Parts, Huſbandmen and Soldiers, and from theſe he ſelects a third Part who are to be Senators, and govern the City; but he has not ſaid whether or no the Huſbandman and Artificer ſhall have any, or what ſhare in the Government, or whether they ſhall have Arms, and join with the others in War, or not. He thinks alſo that the Women ought to go to war, and have the

ſame education as the Soldiers; as to other particulars, he has filled his Treatiſe with matter foreign to the purpoſe; and with reſpect to Education, he has only ſaid what that of the Guards ought to be. As to his Book of Laws, Laws are the principal Thing which that contains, for he has there ſaid but little concerning Government; and this Government, which he was ſo deſirous of framing in ſuch a manner, as to impart to its members a more intire Community of Goods than is to be found in other Cities, he almoſt brings round again to be the ſame as that other Government which he had firſt propoſed; for except the Community of Wives and Goods, he has framed both his Governments alike, for the Education of the Citizens is to be the ſame in both; they are in both to live without any ſervile employ, and their common Tables are to be the ſame, excepting that in *that* he ſays the Women ſhould have common Tables; and that there ſhould be a Thouſand Men at Arms, in *this*, that there ſhould be five Thouſand.

All the Diſcourſes of Socrates are maſterly, noble, new, and inquiſitive; but that they are all true, it may probably be too much to ſay. For now with reſpect to the Number juſt ſpoke of, it muſt be acknowleged that he would want the Country of Babylonia for them, or ſome one like it, of an immeaſurable extent, to ſupport

five Thouſand idle Perſons, beſides a much greater number of Women and Servants. Every one, it is true, may frame an Hypotheſis as he pleaſes, but yet it ought to be poſſible. It has been ſaid, that a Legiſlator ſhould have two things in view when he frames his Laws, the Country and the People. He will alſo do well, if he has ſome regard to the neighbouring States, if he intends that his Community ſhould maintain any political Intercourſe with them, for it is not only neceſſary that they ſhould underſtand that practice of War which is adapted to their own Country, but to others alſo; for admitting that any one chuſes not this life either in public or private, yet there is not the leſs occaſion for their being formidable to their Enemies, not only when they invade their Country, but alſo when they retire out of it. It may alſo be conſidered, whether the Quantity of each Perſon's Property may not be ſettled in a different Manner from what he has done it in, by making it more determinate; for he ſays, that every one ought to have enough whereon to live moderately, as if any one had ſaid to live well, which is the moſt comprehenſive expreſſion. Beſides, a Man may live moderately, and miſerably at the ſame time; he had therefore better have propoſed, that they ſhould live both moderately and liberally; for unleſs theſe two conſpire, luxury will come in on the

one hand, or wretchedneſs on the other, ſince theſe two modes of living are the only ones applicable to the employment of our Subſtance; for we cannot ſay with reſpect to a Man's fortune, that he is mild or courageous, but we may ſay that he is prudent and liberal, which are the only Qualities connected therewith. It is alſo abſurd to render Property equal, and not to provide for the increaſing number of the Citizens; but to leave that Circumſtance uncertain, as if it would regulate itſelf according to the number of Women who ſhould happen to be childleſs, let that be what it would, becauſe this ſeems to take place in other Cities; but the Caſe would not be the ſame in ſuch a State which he propoſes, and thoſe which now actually unite; for in theſe no one actually wants, as the property is divided amongſt the whole Community, be their numbers what they will; but as it could not then be divided, the Supernumeraries, whether they were many or few, would have nothing at all. But it is more neceſſary than even to regulate Property, to take care that the increaſe of the People ſhould not exceed a certain number; and in determining that, to take into Conſideration thoſe Children who will die, and alſo thoſe Women who will be barren; and to neglect this, as is done in ſeveral Cities, is to bring certain Poverty on the Citizens; and Poverty is the Cauſe

of

of Sedition and Evil. Now Phidon the Corinthian, one of the oldeſt Legiſlators, thought the Families and the number of the Citizens ſhould continue the ſame; although it ſhould happen that all ſhould have allotments at the firſt, diſproportionate to their Numbers. In Plato's Laws it is however different; we ſhall mention hereafter what we think would be beſt in theſe particulars. He has alſo neglected in that treatiſe to point out how the Governors are to be diſtinguiſhed from the Governed; for he ſays, that as of one Sort of Wool the Warp ought to be made, and of another the Woof, ſo ought ſome to govern, and others to be governed. But ſince he admits, that all their property may be increaſed fiveſold, why ſhould he not allow the ſame increaſe to the Country? he ought alſo to conſider, whether his allotment of the houſes will be uſeful to the Community, for he appoints two houſes to each Perſon, ſeparate from each other; but it is inconvenient for a Perſon to inhabit two houſes. Now he is deſirous to have his whole plan of Government, neither a Democracy, nor an Oligarchy, but ſomething between both, which he calls a Polity, for it is to be compoſed of Men at Arms. If Plato intended to frame a State, in which more than in any other every thing ſhould be common, he has certainly given it a right Name; but if he intended it

to be the next in perfection to that which he had already framed, it is not ſo; for perhaps ſome perſons will give the preference to the Lacedæmonian form of Government, or ſome other which may more compleatly have attained to the Ariſtocratic form. Some Perſons ſay, that the moſt perfect Government ſhould be compoſed of all others blended together, for which reaſon they commend that of Lacedæmon; for they ſay, that this is compoſed of an Oligarchy, a Monarchy, and a Democracy, their Kings repreſenting the monarchical Part, the Senate the Oligarchical; and, that in the Ephori may be found the Democratical, as theſe are taken from the People. But ſome ſay, that in the Ephori is abſolute Power, and that it is their common meal, and daily courſe of Life, in which the Democratical Form is repreſented. It is alſo ſaid in this Treatiſe of Laws, that the beſt form of Government muſt be one compoſed of a Democracy and a Tyranny; though ſuch a mixture no one elſe would ever allow to be any Government at all, or if it is, the worſt poſſible; thoſe propoſe what is much better, who blend many Governments together; for the moſt perfect is that which is formed of many parts. But now in this Government of Plato's, there are no traces of a Monarchy, only of an Oligarchy and Democracy; though he ſeems to chuſe that it ſhould rather

rather incline to an Oligarchy, as is evident from the Appointment of the Magiſtrates; for to chuſe them by lot, is common to both; but that a man of fortune muſt neceſſarily be a member of the Aſſembly, or to elect the magiſtrates, or take part in the management of public Affairs, while others are paſſed over, makes the State incline to an Oligarchy; as does the endeavouring that the greater Part of the Rich may be in Office, and that the Rank of their appointments may correſpond with their Fortunes. The ſame Principle prevails alſo in the Choice of their Senate; the Manner of electing which is favourable alſo to an Oligarchy; for all are obliged to vote for thoſe who are Senators of the firſt Claſs, afterwards they vote for the ſame number out of the ſecond, and then out of the third; but this compulſion to vote at the Election of Senators, does not extend to the third and fourth Claſſes, and the firſt and ſecond Claſs only, are obliged to vote for the fourth. By this means he ſays, he ſhall neceſſarily have an equal number of each rank, but he is miſtaken; for the Majority will always conſiſt of thoſe of the firſt rank, and the moſt conſiderable People; and for this reaſon, that many of the Commonalty not being obliged to it, will not attend the Elections. From hence it is evident, that ſuch a State will not conſiſt of a Democracy and a Monarchy,

narchy, and this will be further proved, by what we ſhall ſay when we come particularly to conſider this form of Government.

THERE will alſo great danger ariſe from the manner of Electing the Senate, when thoſe who are elected themſelves are afterwards to elect others; for by this means, if a certain number chuſe to combine together, though not very conſiderable, the Election will always fall according to their Pleaſure. Such are the things which Plato propoſes concerning Government, in his book of Laws.

CHAP. VII.

THERE are alſo ſome other forms of Government, which have been propoſed either by private Perſons, or Philoſophers, or Politicians, all of which come much nearer to thoſe which have been really eſtabliſhed, or now exiſt, than theſe two of Plato's; for neither have they introduced the innovation of a community of Wives and Children, and public Tables for the Women, but have been contented to ſet out with eſtabliſhing ſuch Rules as are abſolutely neceſſary.

THERE

THERE are ſome Perſons who think, that the firſt Object of Government ſhould be to regulate well every thing relating to private Property; for they ſay, that a neglect herein is the Source of all Seditions whatſoever. For this Reaſon, Phaleas the Chalcedonian firſt propoſed, that the Fortunes of the Citizens ſhould be equal, which he thought was not difficult to accompliſh when a community was firſt ſettled, but that it was a work of greater difficulty in one that had been long eſtabliſhed; but yet that it might be effected, and an equality of Circumſtances introduced by theſe Means, that the Rich ſhould give marriage Portions, but never receive any, while the Poor ſhould always receive, but never give.

BUT Plato, in his Treatiſe of Laws, thinks that a difference in Circumſtances ſhould be permitted to a certain Degree; but that no Citizen ſhould be allowed to poſſeſs more than five times as much as the loweſt Cenſus, as we have already mentioned. But Legiſlators who would eſtabliſh this Principle, are apt to overlook what they ought to conſider; that while they regulate the Quantity of Proviſions which each Individual ſhall poſſeſs, they ought alſo to regulate the Number of his Children; for if theſe exceed the allotted Quantity of Proviſion, the Law muſt neceſſarily be repealed; and

yet, in ſpight of the repeal, it will have the bad effect of reducing many from wealth to Poverty, ſo difficult is it for innovators not to fall into ſuch miſtakes. That an Equality of Goods was in ſome degree ſerviceable to ſtrengthen the Bands of Society, ſeems to have been known to ſome of the Ancients; for Solon made a Law, as did ſome others alſo, to reſtrain Perſons from poſſeſſing as much Land as they pleaſed. And upon the ſame Principle there are Laws which forbid Men to ſell their Property, as among the Locrians, unleſs they can prove that ſome notorious misfortune has befallen them. They were alſo to preſerve their Ancient Patrimony, which Cuſtom being broken through by the Leucadians, made their Government too Democratic; for by that means it was no longer neceſſary to be poſſeſſed of a certain fortune to be qualified to be a Magiſtrate. But if an Equality of Goods is eſtabliſhed, this may be either too much, when it enables the People to live luxurioufly, or too little, when it obliges them to live hard. Hence it is evident, that it is not proper for the Legiſlator to eſtabliſh an Equality of Circumſtances, but to fix a proper Medium. Beſides, if any one ſhould regulate the Diviſion of Property in ſuch a manner that there ſhould be a moderate ſufficiency for all, it would be of no uſe; for it is of more conſequence that the Citizens

ſhould entertain a Similarity of Sentiments, than an Equality of Circumſtances; but this can never be attained unleſs they are properly educated under the direction of the Law. But probably Phaleas may ſay, that this is what he himſelf mentions; for he both propoſes an equality of Property, and one plan of Education in his City. But he ſhould have ſaid particularly what Education he intended, nor is it of any ſervice to have this too much one; for this Education may be one, and yet ſuch as will make the Citizens over-greedy to graſp after Honours, or Riches, or both. Beſides, not only an inequality of Poſſeſſions, but alſo of Honours, will occaſion ſeditions, but this upon contrary grounds; for the vulgar will be ſeditious if there be an inequality of Goods, but thoſe of more elevated Sentiments, if there is an equality of Honours.

When Good and Bad do equal honours ſhare.

For men are not guilty of Crimes for neceſſaries only (for which he thinks an equality of goods would be a ſufficient remedy, as they would then have no occaſion to ſteal for cold, or hunger) but that they may enjoy what they deſire, and not wiſh for it in vain; for if their deſires extend beyond the common neceſſaries of life, they will be wicked to gratify them; and not only ſo,

but if their wiſhes point that way, they will do the ſame to enjoy thoſe pleaſures which are free from the Alloy of Pain. What Remedy then ſhall we find for theſe three Diſorders? and firſt, to prevent ſtealing from neceſſity, let every one be ſupplied with a moderate ſubſiſtance, which may make the Addition of his own Induſtry neceſſary; ſecondly, to prevent ſtealing to procure the luxuries of Life, let Temperance be enjoined; and thirdly, let thoſe who wiſh for pleaſure in itſelf, ſeek for it only in Philoſophy, for all others want the Aſſiſtance of Men. Since then Men are guilty of the greateſt Crimes from Ambition, and not from Neceſſity, no one for inſtance, aims at being a Tyrant, to keep him from the cold, hence great honour is due to him who kills not a Thief, but a Tyrant; ſo that Polity which Phaleas eſtabliſhes, would only be ſalutary to prevent little Crimes. He has alſo been very deſirous to eſtabliſh ſuch rules, as will conduce to perfect the internal Policy of his State, and he ought alſo to have done the ſame with reſpect to its neighbours, and all foreign Nations; for the Conſiderations of the Military eſtabliſhment ſhould take place in planning every Government, that it may not be unprovided in Caſe of a War, of which he has ſaid nothing; ſo alſo with reſpect to Property, it ought not only to be adapted to the Exigencies of the State,

but

but alſo to ſuch Dangers as may ariſe from without. Thus it ſhould not be ſo much as to tempt thoſe who are near, and more powerful to invade it, while thoſe who poſſeſs it are not able to drive out the invaders, nor ſo little as that the State ſhould not be able to go to war with thoſe who are quite equal to itſelf, and of this he has determined nothing; it muſt indeed be allowed that it is advantageous to a Community to be rather rich than poor; probably the proper boundary is this, not to poſſeſs enough to make it worth while for a more powerful neighbour to attack you, any more than he would thoſe who had not ſo much as yourſelf; thus when Autophradatus propoſed to beſiege Atarneus, Eubulus adviſed him to conſider what Time it would require to take the City, and then would have him determine whether it would anſwer, for that he ſhould chuſe, if it would even take leſs than he propoſed, to quit the place; his ſaying this made Autophradatus reflect upon the buſineſs, and give over the Siege. There is, indeed, ſome advantage in an equality of goods amongſt the Citizens to prevent Seditions; and yet, to ſay truth, no very great one; for Men of great Abilities will ſtomach their being put upon a level with the reſt of the Community. For which reaſon they will very often appear ready for every Commotion and Sedition; for the wickedneſs of

Mankind

Mankind is insatiable. For though at first two Oboli might be sufficient, yet when once it is become customary, they continually want something more, until they set no limits to their expectations; for it is the nature of our Desires to be boundless, and many live only to gratify them. But for this purpose, the first Object is, not so much to establish an equality of fortune, as to prevent those who are of a good disposition from desiring more than their own, and those who are of a bad one from being able to acquire it; and this may be done if they are kept in an inferior Station, and not exposed to injustice. Nor has he treated well the Equality of Goods, for he has extended his regulation only to Land; whereas a Man's Substance consists not only in this, but also in Slaves, Cattle, Money, and all that variety of things which fall under the name of Chattels; now there must be either an equality established in all these, or some certain Rule, or they must be left entirely at large. It appears too by his laws, that he intends to establish only a small State, as all the Artificers are to belong to the Public, and add nothing to the Complement of Citizens; but if all those who are to be employed in public Works, are to be the Slaves of the Public, it should be done in the same manner as it is at Epidamnum, and as Diophantus formerly

formerly regulated it at Athens. From theſe particulars any one may nearly judge, whether Phaleas's Community is well or ill eſtabliſhed.

CHAP. VIII.

HIPPODAMUS, the Son of Euruphon a Mileſian, contrived the Art of laying out Towns, and ſeparated the Pireus. This Man was in other reſpects too eager after notice, and ſeemed to many, to live in a very affected manner, with his flowing locks and his expenſive ornaments, and a coarſe warm veſt which he wore, not only in the winter, but alſo in the hot weather. As he was very deſirous of the Character of a univerſal Scholar, he was the firſt, who not being actually engaged in the Management of public Affairs, ſat himſelf to inquire what ſort of Government was beſt; and he planned a State, conſiſting of ten thouſand Perſons, divided into three parts, one conſiſting of artizans, another of huſbandmen, and the third of ſoldiers; he alſo divided the lands into three Parts, and allotted one to ſacred purpoſes, another to the public, and the third to individuals. The firſt of theſe was to ſupply what was neceſſary

ceſſary for the eſtabliſhed worſhip of the Gods; the ſecond was to be allotted to the ſupport of the Soldiery; and the third was to be the property of the Huſbandman. He thought alſo that there need only be three ſorts of laws, correſponding to the three ſorts of Actions which can be brought, namely for Aſſault, Treſpaſſes, or Death. He ordered alſo that there ſhould be a particular Court of Appeal, into which all Cauſes might be removed, which were ſuppoſed to have been unjuſtly determined elſewhere; which Court ſhould be compoſed of Old Men choſen for that purpoſe. He thought alſo that they ſhould not paſs Sentence by Votes; but that every one ſhould bring with him a Tablet, on which he ſhould write, that he found the Party Guilty, if it was ſo, but if not, he ſhould bring a plain Tablet; but if he acquitted him of one part of the indictment but not of the other, he ſhould expreſs that alſo on the Tablet; for he diſapproved of that general Cuſtom already eſtabliſhed, as it obliges the Judges to be guilty of Perjury if they determined poſitively either on the one Side or the other. He alſo made a Law, that thoſe ſhould be rewarded who found out any thing for the Good of the City, and that the Children of thoſe who fell in Battle, ſhould be educated at the public expence; which Law had never been propoſed by any other Legiſlator, though it is at preſent

preſent in uſe at Athens as well as in other Cities, he would have the Magiſtrates choſen out of the People in general, by whom he meant the three Parts before ſpoken of; and that thoſe who were ſo elected, ſhould be the particular Guardians of what belonged to the Public, to Strangers, and to Orphans. Theſe are the principal Parts, and moſt worthy of notice in Hippodamus's Plan. But ſome Perſons might doubt the propriety of his Diviſion of the Citizens into three Parts; for the Artizans, the Huſbandmen, and the Soldiers, are to compoſe one community, where the Huſbandmen are to have no Arms, and the Artizans neither Arms nor Land, which would in a manner render them ſlaves to the Soldiery. It is alſo impoſſible that the whole Community ſhould partake of all the honourable employments in it; for the Generals, and the Guardians of the State, muſt neceſſarily be appointed out of the Soldiery, and indeed the moſt honourable Magiſtrates; but as the two other Parts will not have their Share in the Government, how can they be expected to have any affection for it? But it is neceſſary that the Soldiery ſhould be ſuperior to the other two Parts, and this ſuperiority will not be eaſily gained without they are very numerous; and if they are ſo, why ſhould the community conſiſt of any other members? why ſhould any

others have a right to elect the Magiſtrates? Beſides, of what uſe are the Huſbandmen to this community? Artizans 'tis true are neceſſary, for theſe every City wants, and they can live upon their buſineſs. If the Huſbandmen indeed furniſhed the Soldiers with Proviſions, they would be properly part of the Community; but theſe are ſuppoſed to have their private property, and to cultivate it for their own uſe. Moreover, if the Soldiers themſelves are to cultivate that Common Land, which is appropriated for their ſupport, there will be no diſtinction between the Soldier and the Huſbandman, which the Legiſlator intended there ſhould be; and if there ſhould be any others who are to cultivate the Private Property of the Huſbandman, and the Common Lands of the Military, there will be a fourth Order in the State which will have no ſhare in it, and always entertain hoſtile ſentiments towards it. If any one ſhould propoſe that the ſame Perſons ſhould cultivate their own Lands and the public ones alſo, then there would be a deficiency of proviſions to ſupply two families, as the Lands would not immediately yield enough for themſelves and the Soldiers alſo; and all theſe things would occaſion great confuſion. Nor do I approve of his method of determining Cauſes, when he would have the judge ſplit the Caſe which comes ſimply before him; and thus, inſtead of

of being a Judge, become an Arbitrator. Now when any Matter is brought to Arbitration, it is cuſtomary for many Perſons to confer together upon the buſineſs that is before them; but when a Cauſe is brought before Judges it is not ſo; and many Legiſlators take care that the Judges ſhall not have it in their power to communicate their Sentiments to each other. Beſides, what can prevent confuſion on the bench, when one Judge thinks a fine ſhould be different from what another has ſet it at; one propoſing twenty Minæ, another ten, or be it more or leſs, another four, and another five; and it is evident, that in this manner they will differ from each other, while ſome will give the whole Damages ſued for, and others nothing; in this Situation, how ſhall their Determinations be ſettled? Beſides, a Judge cannot be obliged to perjure himſelf who ſimply acquits or condemns, if the Action is fairly and juſtly brought; for he who acquits the party, does not ſay that he ought not to pay any fine at all, but that he ought not to pay a fine of twenty Minæ. But he that condemns him is guilty of perjury, if he ſentences him to pay twenty Minæ, while he believes the Damages ought not to be ſo much. Now with reſpect to theſe honours which he propoſes to beſtow on thoſe who can give any information uſeful to the Community, this, though very pleaſing in

ſpeculation, is what the Legiſlator ſhould not ſettle, for it would encourage informers, and probably occaſion commotions in the State. And this propoſal of his gives riſe alſo to further Conjectures and Enquiries; for ſome Perſons have doubted, whether it is uſeful or hurtful to alter the eſtabliſhed Law of any Country, if even for the better; for which reaſon one cannot immediately determine upon what he here ſays, whether it is advantageous to alter the Law or not. We know indeed, that it is poſſible to propoſe to new model both the Laws and Government as a common good; and ſince we have mentioned this ſubject, it may be very proper to enter into a few particulars concerning it, for it contains ſome difficulties, as I have already ſaid, and it may appear better to alter them, ſince it has been found uſeful in other Sciences. Thus the Science of Phyſic is extended beyond its ancient bounds; ſo is the Gymnaſtic, and indeed all other Arts and Powers; ſo that one may lay it down for certain, that the ſame thing will neceſſarily hold good in the Art of Government. And it may alſo be affirmed, that experience itſelf gives a proof of this; for the Ancient Laws are too ſimple and barbarous; which allowed the Greeks to wear ſwords in the City, and to buy their Wives of each other. And indeed all the remains of old Laws which we have, are very

very ſimple; for inſtance, a Law in Cuma relative to murder. If any Perſon who proſecutes another for murder, can produce a certain number of witneſſes to it of his own Relations, the accuſed perſon ſhall be held guilty. Upon the whole, all Perſons ought to endeavour to follow what is right, and not what is eſtabliſhed; and it is probable that the firſt Men, whether they ſprung out of the earth, or were ſaved from ſome general Calamity, had very little underſtanding or knowledge, as is affirmed of theſe Aborigines; ſo that it would be abſurd to continue in the practice of their Rules. Nor is it moreover right to permit written Laws always to remain without alteration; for as in all other Sciences, ſo in Politics, it is impoſſible to expreſs every thing in writing with perfect exactneſs; for when we commit any thing to writing we muſt uſe general terms, but in every Action there is ſomething particular to itſelf, which theſe may not comprehend; from whence it is evident, that certain Laws will at certain times admit of alterations. But if we conſider this matter in another point of view, it will appear to require great caution; for when the advantage propoſed is trifling, as the accuſtoming the People eaſily to aboliſh their Laws is of bad conſequence, it is evidently better to paſs over ſome faults, which either the Legiſlator or the Magiſtrates

giſtrates may have committed; for the Alterations will not be of ſo much Service, as a habit of diſobeying the Magiſtrates will be of diſſervice. Beſides, the Inſtance brought from the Arts is fallacious; for it is not the ſame thing to alter the one as the other. For a Law derives all its Strength from Cuſtom, and this requires long time to eſtabliſh; ſo that, to make it an eaſy matter to paſs from the eſtabliſhed Laws to other new ones, is to weaken the Power of Laws. Beſides, here is another Queſtion; if the Laws are to be altered, are they all to be altered, and in every government, or not, and whether at the pleaſure of one Perſon or many? all which particulars will make a great difference; for which reaſon we will at preſent drop the enquiry, to purſue it at ſome other time. There are two conſiderations which offer themſelves with reſpect to the Government eſtabliſhed at Lacedæmon and Crete, and indeed in almoſt all other States whatſoever; one is, whether their Laws do or do not promote the beſt eſtabliſhment poſſible? the other is, whether there is any thing, if we conſider either the principles upon which it is founded, or the executive part of it, which prevents the form of Government that they had propoſed to follow from being obſerved; now it is allowed that in every well regulated State, the members of it ſhould be free from ſervile labour; but

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in what manner this ſhall be effected, is not ſo eaſy to determine; for the Penedia have very often attacked the Theſſalians, and the Helots the Lacedæmonians, for they in a manner continually watch an Opportunity for ſome misfortune befalling them. But no ſuch thing has ever happened to the Cretans; the reaſon for which probably is, that although they are engaged in frequent Wars with the neighbouring Cities, yet none of theſe would enter into an alliance with the Revolters, as it would be diſadvantageous for them, who themſelves alſo have their Villains. But now there is perpetual enmity between the Lacedæmonians and all their Neighbours, the Argives, the Meſſenians, and the Arcadians. Their Slaves alſo firſt revolted from the Theſſalians, while they were engaged in Wars with their neighbours the Acheans, the Perrabeans, and the Magneſians. It ſeems to me indeed, if nothing elſe, yet ſomething very troubleſome to keep upon proper terms with them; for if you are remiſs in your diſcipline, they grow inſolent, and think themſelves upon an equality with their Maſters; and if they are hardly uſed, they are continually plotting againſt you and hate you. It is evident then, that thoſe who employ Slaves, have not as yet hit upon the right way of managing them. As to the indulging of Women in any particular Liberties, it is hurtful to the

the End of Government, and the Proſperity of the City; for as a man and his wife are the two parts of a Family, if we ſuppoſe a City to be divided into two parts, we muſt allow that the number of Men and Women will be equal. In whatever City then the women are not under good regulations, we muſt look upon one half of it as not under the reſtraint of Law, as it there happened; for the Legiſlator, deſiring to make his whole City a collection of warriors with reſpect to the men, he moſt evidently accompliſhed his deſign; but in the mean time the women were quite neglected, for they live without reſtraint in every improper indulgence and luxury. So that in ſuch a State, riches will neceſſarily be in general eſteem, particularly if the men are governed by their wives, which has been the caſe with many a brave and warlike People except the Celts, and thoſe other nations, if there are any ſuch, who openly practice Pederaſty. And the firſt Mythologiſts ſeem not improperly to have joined Mars and Venus together; for all Nations of this Character are greatly addicted either to the Love of Women or of Boys, for which reaſon it was thus at Lacedæmon; and many things in their State were done by the Authority of the Women. For what is the difference; if the Power is in the hands of the Women, or in the hands of thoſe whom they themſelves

themſelves govern? it muſt turn to the ſame account. As this boldneſs of the Women can be of no uſe in any common occurrences, if it was ever ſo, it muſt be in War; but even here we find that the Lacedæmonian Women were of the greateſt diſſervice, as was proved at the time of the Theban Invaſion, when they were of no uſe at all, as they are in other Cities, but made more diſturbance than even the Enemy. The Origin of this indulgence which the Lacedæmonian Women enjoy, is eaſily accounted for; from the long time the Men were abſent from home, upon foreign Expeditions againſt the Argives, and afterwards the Arcadians and Meſſenians, ſo that, when theſe wars were at an End, their Military life, in which there is no little Virtue, prepared them to obey the Precepts of their law-giver; but we are told, that when Lycurgus endeavoured alſo to reduce the Women to an Obedience to his Laws, upon their refuſal, he declined it. It may indeed be ſaid that the Women were the Cauſes of theſe things, and of courſe all the fault was theirs. But we are not now conſidering, where the fault lies, or where it does not lie, but what is right and what is wrong; and when the manners of the women are not well regulated, as I have already ſaid, it muſt not only occaſion faults which are diſgraceful to the State, but alſo increaſe the love of Money. In the

next place, fault may be found with his unequal diviſion of Property, for ſome will have far too much, others too little; by which means the land will come into few hands, which buſineſs is badly regulated by his laws. For he made it infamous for any one either to buy or ſell their poſſeſſions, in which he did right; but he permitted any one that choſe it to give them away, or bequeath them, although nearly the ſame conſequences will ariſe from one practice as from the other. It is ſuppoſed that near two parts in five of the whole Country is the property of Women, owing to their being ſo often ſole Heirs, and having ſuch large fortunes in marriage; though it would be better to allow them none, or a little, or a certain regulated proportion. Now every one is permitted to make a woman his heir if he pleaſes; and if he dies inteſtate, he who ſuceeds as Heir at Law gives it to whom he pleaſes. From whence it happens, that although the Country is able to ſupport fifteen hundred horſe, and thirty thouſand foot, the number does not amount to one thouſand. And from theſe facts it is evident, that this particular is badly regulated; for the City could not ſupport one ſhock, but was ruined for want of Men. They ſay, that during the Reigns of their ancient Kings, they uſed to preſent foreigners with the Freedom of their City, to prevent there being a

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want of men while they carried on long wars; it is alſo affirmed that the number of Spartans was formerly ten thouſand; but be that as it will, an equality of property conduces much to increaſe the number of the people. The Law too which he made to encourage Population, was by no means calculated to correct this inequality; for being willing that the Spartans ſhould be as numerous as poſſible, to make them deſirous of having large families, he ordered that he who had three children ſhould be excuſed the Night-watch, and that he who had four ſhould pay no Taxes: though it is very evident, that while the Land was divided in this manner, that if the people increaſed there muſt many of them be very poor. Nor was he leſs blameable for the manner in which he conſtituted the Ephori; for theſe Magiſtrates take cognizance of things of the laſt importance, and yet they are choſe out of the people in general; ſo that it often happens that a very poor perſon is elected to that Office, who, from that circumſtance, is eaſily bought. There have been many inſtances of this formerly, as well as in the late affair at Andros. And theſe men, being corrupted with money, went as far as they could to ruin the City: and, becauſe their power was too great and nearly tyrannical, their Kings were obliged to flatter them, which contributed

greatly to hurt the State; ſo that it altered from an Ariſtocracy to a Democracy. This Magiſtracy is indeed the great ſupport of the State; for the People are eaſy, knowing that they are eligible to the firſt office in it; ſo that, whether it took place by the intention of the Legiſlator, or whether it happened by chance, this is of great ſervice to their affairs; for it is neceſſary that every member of the State ſhould endeavour, that each part of the Government ſhould be preſerved, and continue the ſame. And upon this principle their Kings have always acted, out of regard to their honour; the wiſe and good from their attachment to the Senate, a ſeat wherein, they conſider as the reward of virtue; and the common people, that they may ſupport the Ephori, of whom they conſiſt. And it is proper that theſe Magiſtrates ſhould be choſe out of the whole community, not as the cuſtom is at preſent, which is very ridiculous. The Ephori are the ſupreme Judges in cauſes of the laſt conſequence; but as it is quite accidental what ſort of perſons they may be, it is not right that they ſhould determine according to their own opinion, but by a written Law or eſtabliſhed Cuſtom. Their way of life alſo is not conſiſtent with the manners of the City, for it is too indulgent; whereas that of others is too ſevere; ſo that they cannot ſupport it, but

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are obliged privately to act contrary to law, that they may enjoy ſome of the pleaſures of ſenſe. There are alſo great defects in the inſtitution of their Senators. If indeed they were fitly trained to the practice of every human virtue, every one would readily admit that they would be uſeful to the Government; but ſtill it might be debated, whether they ſhould be continued Judges for life, to determine points of the greateſt moment, ſince the Mind has its old age as well as the Body; but as they are ſo brought up, that even the Legiſlator could not depend upon them as good men, their Power muſt be inconſiſtent with the ſafety of the State: for it is known that the Members of that Body have been guilty both of bribery and partiality in many public affairs; for which reaſon it had been much better, if they had been made anſwerable for their conduct, which they are not. But it may be ſaid the Ephori ſeem to have a check upon all the Magiſtrates. They have indeed in this particular very great Power; but I affirm that they ſhould not be intruſted with this controul in the manner they are. Moreover, the mode of choice which they make uſe of at the Election of their Senators is very childiſh. Nor is it right for any one to ſolicit for a place he is deſirous of; for every perſon, whether he chuſes it or not, ought to execute any office he is fit for. But his intention was

evidently the ſame in this, as in the other parts of his Government. For making his Citizens ambitious after Honours, with Men of that diſpoſition he has filled his Senate, ſince no others will ſolicit for that Office; and yet the principal part of thoſe crimes, which men are deliberately guilty of, ariſe from Ambition and Avarice. We will inquire at another time whether the Office of a King is uſeful to the State: thus much is certain, that they ſhould be choſe from a conſideration of their conduct, and not as they are now. But that the Legiſlator himſelf did not expect to make all his Citizens honourable and completely virtuous, is evident from this, that he diſtruſts them as not being good men; for he ſent thoſe upon the ſame Embaſſy that were at variance with each other; and thought, that in the Diſpute of the Kings the Safety of the State conſiſted. Neither were their common Meals at firſt well eſtabliſhed: for theſe ſhould rather have been provided at the public expence, as at Crete, where, as at Lacedæmon, every one was obliged to buy his portion, although he might be very poor, and could by no means bear the expence, by which means the contrary happened to what the Legiſlator deſired: for he intended that thoſe public Meals ſhould ſtrengthen the Democratic Part of his Government: but this Regulation

gulation had quite the contrary effect, for thoſe who were very poor could not take part in them; and it was an obſervation of their Forefathers, that the not allowing thoſe who could not contribute their Proportion to the common Tables, to partake of them, would be the Ruin of the State. Other perſons have cenſured his Laws concerning Naval affairs, and not without reaſon, as it gave riſe to diſputes. For the Commander of the Fleet is in a manner ſet up in oppoſition to the Kings, who are Generals of the Army for life. There is alſo another defect in his Laws worthy of cenſure, which Plato has given in his Book of Laws; that the whole Conſtitution was calculated only for the buſineſs of War: it is indeed excellent to make them Conquerors; for which reaſon the Preſervation of the State depended thereon. The Deſtruction of it commenced with their Victories: for they knew not how to be idle, or engage in any other employment than War. In this particular alſo they were miſtaken, that tho' they rightly thought, that thoſe Things which are the Objects of contention amongſt mankind, are better procured by Virtue than Vice, yet they wrongfully preferred the Things themſelves, to Virtue. Nor was the public Revenue well managed at Sparta, for the State was worth nothing while they were obliged to carry on the moſt extenſive Wars, and the Subſidies were very badly raiſed;

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for as the Spartans poſſeſſed a large extent of country, they were not exact upon each other, as to what they paid in. And thus an Event contrary to the Legiſlator's intention took place; for the State was poor, the individuals avaritious. Enough of the Lacedæmonian Government; for theſe ſeem the chief defects in it.

CHAP. X.

THE Government of Crete bears a near reſemblance to This, in ſome few particulars it is not worſe, but in general it is far inferior in its contrivance. For it appears and is allowed in many particulars the Conſtitution of Lacedæmon was formed in imitation of that of Crete; and in general moſt new Things are an Improvement upon the Old. For they ſay, that when Lycurgus ceaſed to be guardian to King Charilles he went abroad, and ſpent a long time with his relations in Crete, for the Lycians are a colony of the Lacedæmonians; and thoſe who firſt ſettled there adopted that Body of Laws which they found already eſtabliſhed by the inhabitants; in like manner alſo thoſe who now live near them have the very Laws which Minos firſt drew up.

up. This Iſland ſeems formed by nature to be the Miſtreſs of Greece, for it is intirely ſurrounded by a navigable ocean which waſhes almoſt all the maritime parts of that country, and is not far diſtant on the one ſide from Peloponneſus, on the other, which looks towards Aſia, from Triopium and Rhodes. By means of this ſituation Minos acquired the Empire of the Sea, and the Iſlands; ſome of which he ſubdued, in others planted Colonies: at laſt he died at Camicus while he was attacking Sicily. There is this analogy between the Cuſtoms of the Lacedæmonians and the Cretans, the Helots cultivate the Grounds for the one, the domeſtic Slaves for the other. Both States have their common Meals, and the Lacedæmonians called theſe formerly not Φιδιτια but Ανδρια, as the Cretans do; which proves from whence the cuſtom aroſe. In this particular their Governments are alſo alike: the Ephori have the ſame Power with thoſe of Crete, who are called Κοσμοι; with this difference only, that the number of the one is Five, of the other Ten. The Senators are the ſame as thoſe, whom the Cretans call the Council. There was formerly alſo a kingly Power in Crete; but it was afterwards diſſolved, and the Command of their Armies was given to the Κοσμοι. Every one alſo has a vote in their public Aſſembly; but this has only the Power of

confirming what has already paſſed the Council, and the Κοσμοι. The Cretans conducted their public Meals better than the Lacedæmonians, for at Lacedæmon each individual was obliged to furniſh what was aſſeſſed upon him; which if he could not do, there was a law which deprived him of the Rights of a Citizen, as has been already mentioned: but in Crete they were furniſhed by the community; for all the corn, and cattle, taxes and contributions, which the domeſtic Slaves were obliged to furniſh, were divided into parts, and allotted to the Gods, the Exigencies of the State, and theſe public Meals; ſo that all the Men, Women, and Children were maintained from a common ſtock. The Legiſlator gave great attention to encourage a habit of eating ſparingly, as very uſeful to the Citizens. He alſo endeavoured, that his Community might not be too populous, to leſſen the connection with Women, by introducing the love of boys: whether in this he did well or ill we ſhall have ſome other opportunity of conſidering. But that the public Meals were better ordered at Crete than at Lacedæmon is very evident. The Inſtitution of the Κοσμοι was ſtill worſe than that of the Ephori: for it contained all the faults incident to that Magiſtracy and ſome peculiar to itſelf; for in both caſes it is uncertain who will be elected: but the Lacedæmonians have

have this advantage which the others have not, that as all are eligible, the whole community have a ſhare in the higheſt honours, and therefore all deſire to preſerve the State: whereas among the Cretans the Κοσμοι are not choſen out of the People in general, but out of ſome certain Families, and the Senate out of the Κοσμοι. And the ſame obſervations which may be made on the Senate at Lacedæmon, may be applied to theſe; for their being under no controul, and their continuing for life, is an honour, greater than they merit; and to have their proceedings not regulated by a written law, but left to their own diſcretion, is dangerous. (As to there being no inſurrections, although the People ſhare not in the management of public affairs, this is no proof of a well-conſtituted Government, as the Κοσμοι have no opportunity of being bribed like the Ephori, as they live in an iſland, far from thoſe who would corrupt them.) But the method they take to correct that fault is abſurd, impolitic, and tyrannical: for very often either their fellow magiſtrates or ſome private perſons conſpire together and turn out the Κοσμοι. They are alſo permitted to reſign their office before their time is elapſed, and if all this was done by law it would be well, and not at the pleaſure of the individuals, which is a bad rule to follow. But what is worſt of all, is that general con-

fuſion, which thoſe who are in power introduce, to impede the ordinary courſe of Juſtice; which ſufficiently ſhews what is the nature of the Government, or rather lawleſs Force: for it is uſual with the principal perſons amongſt them to collect together ſome of the common people and their friends, and then revolt and ſet up for themſelves, and come to blows with each other. And what is the difference, if a State is diſſolved at once by ſuch violent means, or if it gradually ſo alters in proceſs of time as to be no longer the ſame Conſtitution? A State like this would ever be expoſed to the invaſions of thoſe who were powerful and inclined to attack it; but, as has been already mentioned, its ſituation preſerves it, as it is free from the inroads of Foreigners; and for this reaſon the Family Slaves ſtill remain quiet at Crete, while the Helots are perpetually revolting: for the Cretans take no part in foreign affairs, and it is but lately that any foreign troops have made an attack upon the Iſland; and their Ravages ſoon proved the ineffectualneſs of their Laws. And thus much for the Government of Crete.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

THE Government of Carthage ſeems well eſtabliſhed, and in many reſpects ſuperior to others; in ſome particulars it bears a near reſemblance to the Lacedæmonians; and indeed theſe three States, the Cretans, the Lacedæmonians, and the Carthaginians are in ſome things very like each other, in others they differ greatly. Amongſt many excellent Conſtitutions this may ſhew how well their Government is framed, that altho' the People are admitted to a ſhare in the Adminiſtration, the Form of it remains unaltered, without any popular inſurrections, worth notice, on the one hand, or degenerating into a Tyranny on the other. Now the Carthaginians have theſe things in common with the Lacedæmonians; public Tables for thoſe who are connected together by the tie of mutual Friendſhip, after the manner of their *Phiditia*; they have alſo a Magiſtracy, conſiſting of an hundred and four perſons, ſimilar to the Ephori, or rather ſelected with more judgment; for amongſt the Lacedæmonians, all the Citizens are eligible, but amongſt

amongſt the Carthaginians, they are choſen out of thoſe of the better ſort: there is alſo ſome analogy between the King and the Senate in both theſe Governments, though the Carthaginian Method of appointing their Kings is beſt, for they do not confine themſelves to one Family; nor do they permit the Election to be at large, nor have they any regard to Seniority; for if amongſt the Candidates there are any of greater merit than the reſt, theſe they prefer to thoſe who may be older; for as their Power is very extenſive, if they are perſons of no account, they may be very hurtful to the State, as they have always been to the Lacedæmonians; alſo the greater part of thoſe things which become reprehenſible by their exceſs, are common to all thoſe Governments which we have deſcribed. Now of thoſe Principles on which the Carthaginians have eſtabliſhed their mixt form of Government, compoſed of an Ariſtocracy and Democracy, ſome incline to produce a Democracy, others an Oligarchy: for inſtance, if the Kings and the Senate are unanimous upon any point in Debate, they can chuſe whether they will bring it before the People or no; but if they diſagree, it is to theſe they muſt appeal, who are not only to hear what has been approved of by the Senate, but are finally to determine upon it; and whoſoever chuſes it, has a right to ſpeak againſt

againſt any matter whatſoever that may be propoſed, which is not permitted in other caſes. The Five, who elect each other, have very great and extenſive powers; and theſe chuſe the Hundred, who are Magiſtrates of the higheſt rank: their power alſo continues longer than any other Magiſtrates, for it commences before they come into office, and is prolonged after they are out of it; and in this particular the State inclines to an Oligarchy: but as they are not elected by lot, but by ſuffrage, and are not permitted to take money, they are the greateſt Supporters imaginable of an Ariſtocracy.

The determining all Cauſes by the ſame Magiſtrates, and not one in one Court and another in another, as at Lacedæmon, has the ſame influence. The conſtitution of Carthage is now ſhifting from an Ariſtocracy to an Oligarchy, in conſequence of an opinion which is favourably entertained by many, who think that the Magiſtrates in the community ought not to be perſons of Family only, but of Fortune alſo; as it is impoſſible for thoſe who are in bad circumſtances to ſupport the dignity of their Office, or to be at leiſure to apply to public buſineſs. As chuſing men of Fortune to be Magiſtrates make a State incline to an Oligarchy, and men of Abilities, to an Ariſtocracy, ſo is there a third method of proceeding which took place in the Polity of Car-

Carthage; for they have an eye to theſe two particulars, when they elect their Officers, particularly thoſe of the higheſt rank, their Kings, and their Generals. It muſt be admitted, that it was a great fault in their Legiſlator not to guard againſt the Conſtitution's degenerating from an Ariſtocracy; for this is a moſt neceſſary thing to provide for at firſt, that thoſe citizens who have the beſt Abilities ſhould never be obliged to do any thing unworthy their character, but be always at leiſure to ſerve the Public, not only when in office, but alſo when private perſons; for if once you are obliged to look among the Wealthy, that you may have Men at leiſure to ſerve you, your greateſt Offices, of King, and General, will ſoon become venal; in conſequence of which, Riches will be more honourable than Virtue, and a Love of Money be the ruling principle in the City; for what, thoſe who have the chief Power, regard as honourable, will neceſſarily be the object which the Citizens in general will aim at; and where the firſt honours are not paid to Virtue, there the Ariſtocratic form of Government cannot flouriſh: for it is reaſonable to conclude, that thoſe who bought their places ſhould generally make an advantage of what they laid out their money for; as it is abſurd to ſuppoſe, that if a man of probity who is poor, ſhould be

be deſirous of gaining ſomething, a Bad Man ſhould not endeavour to do the ſame, eſpecially to reimburſe himſelf; for which reaſon the Magiſtracy ſhould be formed of thoſe who are moſt able to ſupport an Ariſtocracy. It would have been better for the Legiſlature to have paſſed over the Poverty of men of merit, and only to have taken care to have enſured them ſufficient leiſure, when in office, to attend to public Affairs. It ſeems alſo improper, that one perſon ſhould execute ſeveral Offices, which was approved of at Carthage; for one buſineſs is beſt done by one Perſon; and it is the duty of the Legiſlator to look to this, and not make the ſame Perſon a Muſician and a Shoemaker: ſo that where the State is not ſmall it is more politic and more popular to admit many perſons to have a Share in the Government; for, as I juſt now ſaid, it is not only more uſual, but every thing is better and ſooner done, when one thing only is allotted to one Perſon: and this is evident both in the Army and Navy, where almoſt every one, in his turn, both commands and is under command. But as their Government inclines to an Oligarchy, they avoid the ill effects of it, by always appointing ſome of the popular party to the Government of Cities, to make their fortunes. Thus they conſult this fault in their Conſtitution, and render it ſtable;

but this is depending on chance; whereas the Legiſlator ought to frame his Government, that there be no room for inſurrections. But now, if there ſhould be any General Calamity, and the People ſhould revolt from their Rulers, there is no remedy for reducing them to obedience by the laws. And theſe are the particulars of the Lacedæmonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian Governments, which ſeem worthy of commendation.

CHAP. XII.

SOME of thoſe perſons who have writ upon Government, had never any ſhare in public affairs, but always led a private life. Every thing worthy of notice in their works we have already ſpoke to. Others were Legiſlators, ſome in their own cities, others were employed in regulating the Governments of foreign States. Some of them only compoſed a Body of Laws; others formed the Conſtitution alſo, as Lycurgus; and Solon, who did both. The Lacedæmonians have been already mentioned. Some perſons think that Solon was an excellent Legiſlator, who could diſſolve a pure Oligarchy, and ſave the people from that Slavery which hung over them,

them, and eſtabliſh the antient Democratic form of Government in his country; wherein every part of it was ſo framed, as to be well adapted to the whole. In the Senate of Areopagus, an Oligarchy was preſerved; by the manner of electing their Magiſtrates, an Ariſtocracy; and in their courts of juſtice, a Democracy. Socrates ſeems not to have altered the eſtabliſhed form of Government, either with reſpect to the Senate, or the mode of electing their Magiſtrates; but to have raiſed the People to great conſideration in the State, by allotting the ſupreme judicial department to them; and for this ſome perſons blame him, as having done what would ſoon overturn that balance of power he intended to eſtabliſh; for by trying all cauſes whatſoever before the People, who were choſe by lot to determine them, it was neceſſary to flatter a tyrannical populace who had got this power; which contributed to bring the Government to that pure Democracy it now is. Both Ephialtes and Pericles abridged the power of the Areopagites, the latter of whom introduced the method of paying thoſe who attended the courts of juſtice: and thus every one who aimed at being popular proceeded increaſing the power of the People to what we now ſee it. But it is evident that this was not Socrates' intention, but that it aroſe from accident; for the People being the cauſe of the

naval victory over the Medes, aſſumed greatly upon it, and inliſted themſelves under factious demagogues, altho' oppoſed by the better part of the Citizens. He thought it indeed moſt neceſſary to entruſt the People with the choice of their Magiſtrates, and the power of calling them to account; for without that they muſt have been ſlaves and enemies to the other Citizens: but he ordered them to elect thoſe only who were perſons of good account and property, either out of thoſe who were worth five hundred Medimns, or thoſe who were called Ζευγιται, or thoſe of the third Cenſus, who were called Horſemen. As for thoſe of the fourth, which conſiſted of Mechanics, they were incapable of any office. Zaleucus was the Legiſlator of the Weſtern Locrians, as was Charondas, the Catanean, of his own Cities, and thoſe alſo in Italy and Sicily which belonged to the Calcidians. Some perſons endeavour to prove that Pnomacritus, the Locrian, was the firſt perſon of note who drew up Laws; and that he employed himſelf in that buſineſs while he was at Crete, where he continued ſome time to learn the prophetic Art: and they ſay, that Thales was his companion; and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were the ſcholars of Thales, and Charondas of Zaleucus; but thoſe who advance this, advance what is repugnant to chronology. Philolaus alſo, of the family

of

of the Bacchiades, was a Theban Legiſlator. This man was very fond of Diocles, a victor in the Olympic Games, and when he left his country from a diſguſt at an improper paſſion which his mother Alithoè had entertained for him, and ſettled at Thebes, Philolaus followed him, where they both died, and where they ſtill ſhew their tombs placed in view of each other, but ſo diſpoſed, that one of them looks towards Corinth, the other does not; the reaſon they give for this is, that Diocles, from his deteſtation of his Mother's paſſion, would have his tomb ſo placed that no one could ſee Corinth from it; but Philolaus choſe that it might be ſeen from his: and this was the cauſe of their living at Thebes. As Philolaus gave them Laws concerning many other things, ſo did he upon Adoption, which they call Adoptive Laws; and this he in particular did to preſerve the number of Families. Charondas did nothing new, except in actions for Perjury, which he was the firſt perſon who took into particular conſideration. He alſo drew up his Laws with greater elegance and accuracy than even any of our preſent Legiſlators. Philolaus introduced the Law for the equal diſtribution of Goods; Plato that for the Community of Women, Children, and Goods, and alſo for public Tables for the Women; and one concerning Drunkenneſs, that they might obſerve

ſerve Sobriety in their Sunpoſiums. He alſo made a law concerning their Warlike exerciſes; that they ſhould acquire a habit of uſing both hands alike, as it was neceſſary that one hand ſhould be as uſeful as the other. As for Draco's Laws, they were publiſhed when the Government was already eſtabliſhed, and they have nothing particular in them worth mentioning, except their ſeverity on account of the enormity of their Puniſhments. Pittacus was the author of ſome laws, but never drew up any form of Government; one of which was this, that if a drunken man beat any perſon, he ſhould be puniſhed more than if he did it when ſober; for as people are more apt to be abuſive when drunk than ſober, he paid no conſideration to the excuſe which drunkenneſs might claim, but regarded only the common benefit. Andromadas Reginus was alſo a Lawgiver to the Thracian Calcidians. There are ſome Laws of his concerning Murders, and Heireſſes extant, but theſe contain nothing that any one can ſay is new, and his own. And thus much for different ſorts of Governments, as well thoſe which really exiſt, as thoſe which different perſons have propoſed.

A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

EVERY one who inquires into the Nature of Government, and what are its different forms, ſhould make this almoſt his firſt queſtion, What is a City? For upon this there is a diſpute: for ſome perſons ſay, the City did this or that, while others ſay, not the City, but the Oligarchy, or the Tyranny. We ſee that the City is the only object which both the Politician and Legiſlator have in view in all they do: but Government is a certain ordering

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CHAP. I.

EVERY one who inquires into the Nature of Government, and what are its different forms, ſhould make this almoſt his firſt queſtion, What is a City? For upon this there is a diſpute: for ſome perſons ſay, the City did this or that, while others ſay, not the City, but the Oligarchy, or the Tyranny. We ſee that the City is the only object which both the Politician and Legiſlator have in view in all they do: but Government is a certain ordering

ordering of thoſe who inhabit a City. As a City is a collective body, and, like other wholes, compoſed of many parts, it is evident our firſt inquiry muſt be, what a Citizen is: for a City is a certain number of Citizens. So that we muſt conſider whom we ought to call Citizen, and who is one; for this is often doubtful: for every one will not allow that this character is applicable to the ſame perſon; for that Man who would be a Citizen in a Republic, would very often not be one in an Oligarchy. We do not include in this inquiry, many of thoſe who acquire this appellation out of the ordinary way, as honorary perſons, for inſtance, but thoſe only who have a natural right to it. Now it is not reſidence which conſtitutes a man a Citizen; for in this Sojourners, and Slaves are upon an equality with him; nor will it be ſufficient for this purpoſe, that you have the privilege of the laws, and may plead or be impleaded, for this all thoſe of different Nations, between whom there is a mutual agreement for that purpoſe, are allowed; although it very often happens, that Sojourners have not a perfect right therein, without the protection of a Patron, to whom they are obliged to apply, which ſhews that their ſhare in the community is incomplete. In like manner, with reſpect to Boys, who are not yet inrolled, or Old Men, who are paſt war, we admit that they

they are in ſome reſpects Citizens, but not completely ſo, but with ſome exceptions, for theſe are not yet arrived to years of maturity, and thoſe are paſt ſervice; nor is there any difference between them. But what we mean is ſufficiently intelligible and clear, we want a complete Citizen, one in whom there is no deficiency to be corrected, to make him ſo. As to thoſe who are baniſhed, or infamous, there may be the ſame objections made, and the ſame anſwer given. There is nothing that more characterizes a complete Citizen than having a ſhare in the judicial and executive part of the Government. With reſpect to Offices, ſome are fixed to a particular time, ſo that no perſon is, on any account, permitted to fill them twice; or elſe not till ſome certain period has intervened; others are not fixed, as a Juryman's, and a Member of the General Aſſembly: but probably ſome one may ſay, theſe are not offices, nor have the Citizens in theſe capacities any ſhare in the Government; though ſurely it is ridiculous to ſay, that thoſe who have the principal power in the State bear no office in it. But this objection is of no weight, for it is only a diſpute about words; as there is no general term which can be applied both to the office of a Juryman and a Member of the Aſſembly. For the ſake of diſtinction, ſuppoſe we call it an indeterminate Office: but I lay it down as a maxim,

that thoſe are Citizens who could exerciſe it. Such then is the deſcription of a Citizen who comes neareſt to what all thoſe who are called Citizens are. Every one alſo ſhould know, that of the component parts of thoſe things which differ from each other in ſpecies, after the firſt or ſecond remove, thoſe which follow have either nothing at all or very little common to each. Now we ſee that Governments differ from each other in their form, and that ſome of them are defective, others as excellent as poſſible: for it is evident, that thoſe which have many deficiencies and degeneracies in them muſt be far inferior to thoſe which are without ſuch faults. What I mean by degeneracies will be hereafter explained. Hence it is clear, that the Office of a Citizen muſt differ as Governments do from each other: for which reaſon he who is called a Citizen has, in a Democracy, every privilege which that ſtation ſuppoſes. In other forms of Government he may enjoy them; but not neceſſarily: for in ſome States the People have no power; nor have they any General Aſſembly, but a few Select Men. The trial alſo of different cauſes is allotted to different perſons; as at Lacedæmon, all diſputes concerning contracts are brought before ſome of the Ephori: the Senate are the judges in caſes of murder, and ſo on; ſome being to be heard by one Magiſtrate, others by another: and thus at Carthage

thage certain Magiſtrates determine all cauſes. But our former deſcription of a Citizen will admit of correction; for in ſome Governments the office of a Juryman, and a Member of the General Aſſembly is not an indeterminate one; but there are particular perſons appointed for theſe purpoſes, ſome or all of the Citizens being appointed Jurymen, or Members of the General Aſſembly, and this either for all cauſes and all public buſineſs whatſoever, or elſe for ſome particular one: and this may be ſufficient to ſhew what a Citizen is; for he who has a right to a ſhare in the judicial and executive part of Government in any City, him we call a Citizen of that place; and a City, in one word, is a collective body of ſuch perſons, ſufficient in themſelves to all the purpoſes of life.

CHAP. II.

IN common uſe, they define a Citizen to be one who is ſprung from Citizens on both ſides, not on the father's, or the mother's only. Others carry the matter ſtill further, and inquire how many of his anceſtors have been Citizens, as his grandfather, great grandfather, &c. but ſome perſons have queſtioned how the firſt of the family could prove themſelves Citizens, according to this popular, and careleſs definition. Gorgias of Leontium, partly entertaining the ſame doubt, and partly in jeſt, ſays, that, as a mortar is made by a mortar-maker, ſo a Citizen is made by a Citizen-maker, and a Lariſſæan by a Lariſſæan-maker. This is indeed a very ſimple account of the matter; for if Citizens are ſo, according to this definition, it will be impoſſible to apply it to the firſt founders or firſt inhabitants of States, who cannot poſſibly claim in right either of their father or mother. It is probably a matter of ſtill more difficulty to determine their rights as Citizens, who are admitted to their Freedom, after any revolution in the State. As for inſtance, at Athens, after the expulſion of the Tyrants, when Cliſthenes enrolled many foreigners and city-ſlaves amongſt

amongſt the Tribes; and the doubt with reſpect to them was, not whether they were Citizens or no, but whether they were legally ſo or not. Though indeed ſome perſons may have this further doubt, whether a Citizen can be a Citizen, when he is illegally made; as if an illegal Citizen, and one who is no Citizen at all, were in the ſame predicament: but ſince we ſee ſome perſons govern unjuſtly, whom yet we admit to govern, though not juſtly, and the definition of a Citizen is one who exerciſes certain Offices, for ſuch a one we have defined a Citizen to be, it is evident, that a Citizen illegally created yet continues to be a Citizen, but whether juſtly or unjuſtly ſo, belongs to the former inquiry.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

IT has alſo been doubted what was, and what was not, the Act of the City; as for inſtance, when a Democracy ariſes out of an Ariſtocracy, or a Tyranny; for ſome perſons then refuſe to fulfil their contracts; as if the right to receive the money was in the Tyrant, and not in the State, and many other things of the ſame nature; as if any covenant was founded for violence and not for the common good. So in like manner, if any thing is done by thoſe who have the management of public affairs, where a Democracy is eſtabliſhed, their actions are to be conſidered as the actions of the State, as well as in the Oligarchy, or Tyranny. And here it ſeems very proper to conſider this queſtion, When ſhall we ſay that a City is the ſame, and when ſhall we ſay that it is different?

IT is but a ſuperficial mode of examining into this queſtion, to begin with the place and the people; for it may happen that theſe may be divided from that, or that ſome one of them may live in one place, and ſome in another (but this queſtion may be regarded as no very knotty one; for, as a City may acquire that appellation

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on many accounts, it may be ſolved many ways); and in like manner, when men inhabit one common place, when ſhall we ſay that they inhabit the ſame City, or that the City is the ſame? for it does not depend upon the walls; for I can ſuppoſe Peloponneſus itſelf ſurrounded with a wall, as Babilon was, and every other place, which rather encircles many nations than one City, and that they ſay was taken three days, when ſome of the inhabitants knew nothing of it: but we ſhall find a proper time to determine this queſtion; for the extent of a City, how large it ſhould be, and whether it ſhould conſiſt of more than one people, theſe are particulars that the Politician ſhould by no means be unacquainted with. This too is a matter of inquiry, whether we ſhall ſay that a City is the ſame while it is inhabited by the ſame race of men, though ſome of them are perpetually dying, others coming into the world, as we ſay that a river or a fountain is the ſame, though the waters are continually changing; or when a ſimilar event takes place ſhall we ſay, the Men are the ſame, but the City is different: for if a City is a Community, it is a Community of Citizens; but if the mode of Government ſhould alter, and become of another ſort, it would ſeem a neceſſary conſequence that the City is not the ſame; as we regard the Tragic chorus, as different from the Comic, though

it may probably conſiſt of the ſame performers: thus every other community, or compoſition is ſaid to be different, if the ſpecies of compoſition is different; as in muſic the ſame hands produce different harmony, as the Doric and Phrigian. If this is true, it is evident, that when we ſpeak of a City as being the ſame, we refer to the Government there eſtabliſhed; and this, whether it is called by the ſame name or any other, or inhabited by the ſame men, or different. But whether or no it is right to diſſolve the Community, when the Conſtitution is altered, is another queſtion.

CHAP. IV.

AFTER what has been ſaid it follows, that we ſhould conſider, whether the ſame Virtues which conſtitute a good Man make a valuable Citizen, or different; and if a particular inquiry is neceſſary for this matter, we muſt firſt give a general deſcription of the Virtues of a good Citizen; for as a Sailor is one of thoſe who make up a Community, ſo is a Citizen, although the province of one Sailor may be different from another's (for

(for one is a Rower, another a Steerſman, a third a Boatſwain, and ſo on, each having their ſeveral appointments) it is evident, that the moſt accurate deſcription of any one good Sailor muſt refer to his peculiar abilities, yet there are ſome things in which the ſame deſcription may be applied to the whole Crew, as the ſafety of the Ship is the common buſineſs of all of them, for this is the general center of all their cares: ſo alſo with reſpect to Citizens, although they may in a few particulars be very different, yet there is one care, common to them all, the ſafety of the Community, for the Community of the Citizens compoſes the State; for which reaſon, the Virtue of a Citizen, has neceſſarily a reference to the State. But if there are different ſorts of Governments, it is evident, that thoſe actions which conſtitute the Virtue of an excellent Citizen in one community, will not conſtitute it in another; wherefore the virtue of ſuch a one cannot be perfect: but we ſay, a man is good when his Virtues are perfect; from whence it follows, that an excellent Citizen does not poſſeſs that Virtue, which conſtitutes a good Man. Thoſe who are any ways doubtful concerning this queſtion, may be convinced of the truth of it by examining into the beſt formed States: for, if it is impoſſible that a City ſhould conſiſt intirely of excellent Citizens (while it is neceſſary that every one ſhould do

well in his calling, in which conſiſts his excellence, as it is impoſſible that all the Citizens ſhould have the ſame qualifications) it is impoſſible that the Virtue of a Citizen and a good Man ſhould be the ſame; for all ſhould poſſeſs the Virtue of an excellent Citizen: for from hence neceſſarily ariſe the Perfection of the City: but that every one ſhould poſſeſs the Virtue of a good Man is impoſſible, without all the Citizens in a well-regulated State were neceſſarily virtuous. Beſides, as a City is compoſed of diſſimilar parts, as an animal is of life and body; the ſoul, of reaſon and appetite; a family, of a man and his wife; property of a maſter, and a ſlave; in the ſame manner, as a City is compoſed of all theſe, and many other very different parts, it neceſſarily follows, that the Virtue of all the Citizens cannot be ſame; as the buſineſs of him who leads the band is different from the other dancers. From all which proofs it is evident, that the Virtues of a Citizen cannot be one and the ſame. But do we never find thoſe Virtues united which conſtitute a good Man and excellent Citizen? for we ſay, ſuch a one, is an excellent Magiſtrate, and a prudent and good Man; but Prudence is a neceſſary qualification for all thoſe who engage in public affairs. Nay, ſome perſons affirm, that the education of thoſe who are intended to command, ſhould,

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from the beginning, be different from other Citizens, as the Children of Kings are generally inſtructed in riding and warlike execiſes; and thus Euripides ſays;

——— *No ſhowey Arts*
Be mine, but teach me what the State requires.

As if thoſe who are to rule, were to have an education peculiar to themſelves. But if we allow, that the Virtues of a good Man and a good Magiſtrate may be the ſame, and a Citizen is one who obeys the Magiſtrate, it follows, that the Virtue of the one cannot in general be the ſame as the Virtue of the other, although it may be true of ſome particular Citizen; for the Virtue of the Magiſtrate muſt be different from the Virtue of the Citizen. For which reaſon Jaſon declared, that was he deprived of his kingdom, he ſhould pine away with regret, as not knowing how to live a private man. But it is a great recommendation to know how to command as well as to obey; and to do both theſe things well, is the Virtue of an accompliſhed Citizen. If then the Virtue of a good Man conſiſts only in being able to command, but the Virtue of a good Citizen renders him equally fit for the one as well as the other, the commendation of both of them is not the ſame. It appears then, that both he who commands and he who obeys

ſhould each of them learn their ſeparate buſineſs: but that the Citizen ſhould be maſter of and take part in both theſe, as any one may eaſily perceive; in a family government there is no occaſion for the Maſter to know how to perform the neceſſary offices, but rather to enjoy the labour of others; for to do the other is a ſervile part. I mean by the other, the common family buſineſs of the Slave.

THERE are many ſorts of Slaves; for their employments are various: of theſe the Spinſters are one, who, as their name imports, get their living by the labour of their hands, and amongſt theſe all Mechanics are included; for which reaſons ſuch workmen, in ſome States, were not formerly admitted into any ſhare in the Government; till at length Democracies were eſtabliſhed: it is not therefore proper for any man of honour, or any citizen, or any one who engages in public affairs, to learn theſe ſervile employments, without they have occaſion for them for their own uſe; for without this was obſerved, the diſtinction between a Maſter and a Slave would be loſt. But there is a Government of another ſort, in which men govern thoſe who are their equals in rank, and freemen, which we call a Political Government, in which men learn to command, by firſt ſubmitting to obey, as a good General of Horſe, or a Commander in Chief,

Chief, muſt acquire a knowledge of their Duty, by having been long under the command of another, and the like in every appointment in the Army: for well is it ſaid, no one knows how to command, who has not himſelf been under command of another. The Virtues of thoſe are indeed different, but a good Citizen muſt neceſſarily be endowed with them; he ought alſo to know in what manner Freemen ought to govern, as well as be governed: and this too is the Duty of a good Man. And if the Temperance and Juſtice of him who commands is different from his who, though a Freeman, is under command, it is evident, that the Virtues of a good Citizen cannot be the ſame, as Juſtice for inſtance, but muſt be of a different ſpecies, in theſe two different ſituations, as the Temperance and Courage of a Man and a Woman are different from each other; for a Man would appear a coward, who had only that courage which would be graceful in a Woman, and a Woman would be thought a talker, who ſhould take as large a part in the converſation, as would become a Man of conſequence. The domeſtic employments of each of them are alſo different; it is the Man's buſineſs to acquire a ſubſiſtance, the Woman's to take care of it. But Diſcretion and Knowledge of public Affairs is a Virtue peculiar to thoſe who govern, while all others ſeem

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to be equally requiſite for both parties; but with this the Governed have no concern, it is theirs to entertain juſt notions: they indeed are like flute-makers, while thoſe who govern are the muſicians who play on them. And thus much to ſhew whether the Virtue of a good Man and an excellent Citizen is the ſame, or if it is different, and alſo how far it is the ſame, and how far different.

CHAP. V.

BUT with reſpect to Citizens there is a doubt remaining, whether thoſe only are truly ſo, who are allowed a ſhare in the Government, or whether the Mechanics alſo are to be conſidered as ſuch? for if thoſe who are not permitted to rule, are to be reckoned among them, it is impoſſible that the Virtue of all the Citizens ſhould be the ſame, for theſe alſo are Citizens; and if none of them are admitted to be Citizens, where ſhall they be ranked? for they are neither Sojourners, nor Foreigners? or ſhall we ſay that there will no inconvenience ariſe from their not being Citizens, as they are neither Slaves nor Freedmen: for this is certainly

tainly true, that all thoſe are not Citizens, who are neceſſary to the exiſtence of a City, as boys are not Citizens in the ſame manner that men are, for thoſe are perfectly ſo, the others under ſome conditions; for they are Citizens, though imperfect ones: for in former times among ſome people, the Mechanics were either Slaves or Foreigners, for which reaſon many of them are ſo now: and indeed the beſt regulated States will not permit a Mechanic to be a Citizen; but if it be allowed them, we cannot then attribute the Virtue we have deſcribed to every Citizen, or free Man, but to thoſe only, who are diſengaged from ſervile offices. Now thoſe who are employed by one perſon in them, are Slaves; thoſe, who do them for money, are Mechanics, and hired Servants: hence it is evident on the leaſt reflection what is their ſituation, for what I have ſaid is fully explained by appearances. Since the number of Communities is very great, it follows neceſſarily, that there will be many different ſorts of Citizens, particularly of thoſe who are governed by others, ſo that in one State, it may be neceſſary to admit Mechanics, and hired Servants to be Citizens, but in others it may be impoſſible; as particularly in an Ariſtocracy, where Honours are beſtowed on Virtue and Dignity: for it is impoſſible for one who lives the life of a Mechanic, or hired Servant to acquire

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the practice of Virtue. In an Oligarchy alſo hired Servants are not admitted to be Citizens; becauſe there a man's right to bear any Office is regulated by his Fortune; but Mechanics are, for many Citizens are very rich. There was a law at Thebes, that no one could have a ſhare in the Government, till he had been ten years out of trade. In many States the law invites Strangers to accept the Freedom of the City; and in ſome Democracies the Son of a Free-woman is himſelf free. The ſame is alſo obſerved in many others, with reſpect to natural Children; but it is through want of Citizens regularly born that they admit ſuch: for theſe laws are always made in conſequence of a ſcarcity of inhabitants; ſo, as their numbers increaſe, they firſt deprive the Children of a Male or Female Slave of this privilege, next the Child of a Free-woman, and laſt of all, they will admit none, but thoſe whoſe fathers, and mothers were both free. That there are many ſorts of Citizens, and that he may be ſaid to be as completely, who ſhares the honours of the State, is evident from what has been already ſaid. Thus Achilles, in Homer, complains of Agamemnon's treating him like an unhonoured Stranger; for a Stranger, or Sojourner is one who does not partake of the Honours of the State: and whenever the right to the Freedom of the City is kept obſcure, it is for the

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ſake of the inhabitants. From what has been ſaid it is plain, whether the Virtue of a good Man and an excellent Citizen is the ſame or different: and we find, that in ſome States it is the ſame, in others not; and alſo that this is not true of each Citizen, but of thoſe only who take the lead, or are capable of taking the lead in public affairs, either alone or in conjunction with others.

CHAP. VI.

HAVING eſtabliſhed theſe points, we proceed next to conſider whether one form of Government only ſhould be eſtabliſhed, or more than one; and if more, how many, and of what ſort, and what are the differences between them. The Form of Government is the ordering, and regulating of the City, and all the offices in it, particularly thoſe wherein the ſupreme power is lodged; and this power is always poſſeſſed by the Adminiſtration; but the Adminiſtration itſelf is that particular Form of Government, which is eſtabliſhed in any State: thus in a Democracy the ſupreme power is lodged in the whole People; on the

contrary, in an Oligarchy it is in the hands of a few. We ſay then, that the form of Government in theſe States are different, and we ſhall find the ſame thing hold good in others. Let us firſt determine for whoſe ſake a City is eſtabliſhed, and point out the different ſpecies of Rule, which Man may ſubmit to in ſocial life. I have already mentioned in my Treatiſe on the Management of a Family, and the Power of the Maſter, that Man is an animal naturally formed for ſociety, and that therefore, when he does not want any foreign aſſiſtance, he will of his own accord deſire to live with others; not but that mutual advantage induces them to it, as far as it enables each perſon to live more agreeably; and this is indeed the great object not only to all in general, but alſo to each individual: but it is not merely matter of choice, but they join in ſociety alſo, even that they may be able to live, which probably is not without ſome ſhare of merit, and they alſo ſupport civil ſociety, even for the ſake of preſerving life, without they are grievouſly overwhelmed with the miſeries of it: for it is very evident, that men will endure many calamities for the ſake of living, as being ſomething naturally ſweet and deſirable. It is eaſy to point out the different modes of Government, and we have already ſettled them in our exoteric diſcourſes. The power of the Maſter, though by nature equally

equally ſerviceable, both to the Maſter and to the Slave; yet nevertheleſs has for its object the benefit of the Maſter, while the benefit of the Slave ariſes accidentally; for if the Slave is deſtroyed, the power of the Maſter is at an end: but the authority which a man has over his wife, and children, and his family, which we call Domeſtic Government, is either for the benefit of thoſe who are under ſubjection, or elſe for the common benefit of the whole: but its particular object is the benefit of the governed, as we ſee in other arts; in Phyſic for inſtance, and the Gymnaſtic exerciſes, wherein, if any benefit ariſe to the Maſter, it is accidental; for nothing forbids the Maſter of the exerciſes, from ſometimes being himſelf one of thoſe who exerciſes, as the Steerſman is always one of the ſailors; but both the Maſter of the exerciſes, and the Steerſman conſider the good of thoſe who are under their government. Whatever good may happen to the Steerſman, when he is a ſailor, or to the Maſter of the exerciſes, when he himſelf makes one at the games, is not intentional, or the object of their power; thus in all political Governments, which are eſtabliſhed to preſerve and defend the equality of the Citizens, it is held right to rule by turns. Formerly, as was natural, every one expected that each of his fellow Citizens ſhould in his turn ſerve the public, and thus

adminiſter to his private good, as he himſelf when in office had done for others; but now every one is deſirous of being continually in power, that he may enjoy the advantage which he makes of public buſineſs, and being in office; as if places were a never-failing remedy for every complaint, and were on that account ſo eagerly ſought after. It is evident then, that all thoſe Governments which have a common good in view, are rightly eſtabliſhed, and ſtrictly juſt, but thoſe who have in view only the good of the rulers, are all founded on wrong principles, and are widely different from what a Government ought to be, for they are Tyranny over Slaves, whereas a City is a community of free men.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

HAVING eſtabliſhed theſe particulars, we come to conſider next the different number of Governments which there are, and what they are; and firſt, what are their excellencies: for when we have determined this, their defects will be evident enough.

IT is evident that every form of Government or Adminiſtration, for the words are of the ſame import, muſt contain a ſupreme power over the whole State, and this ſupreme power muſt neceſſarily be in the hands of one perſon, or a few, or many; and when either of theſe apply their power for the common good, ſuch States are well governed; but when the intereſt of the one, the few, or the many, who enjoy this power, is alone conſulted, then ill; for you muſt either affirm that thoſe who make up the Community are not Citizens, or elſe let theſe ſhare in the advantages of Government. We uſually call a State which is governed by one perſon, for the common good, a Kingdom; one that is governed by more than one, but by a few only, an Ariſtocracy; either becauſe the Government is in the hands of the moſt worthy Citizens, or becauſe it is the beſt form for the City, and its inhabitants. When the Citizens at large govern,

govern, for the public good, it is called a State; which is alſo a common name for all other Governments, and theſe diſtinctions are conſonant to reaſon; for it will not be difficult to find one perſon, or a very few, of very diſtinguiſhed abilities, but almoſt impoſſible to meet with the majority of a people eminent for every virtue; but if there is one common to a whole nation it is valour; for this is created and ſupported by numbers: for which reaſon in ſuch a State the profeſſion of arms will always have the greateſt ſhare in the Government. Now the corruptions attending each of theſe Governments are theſe; a Kingdom may degenerate into a Tyranny, an Ariſtocracy into an Oligarchy, and a State into a Democracy. Now a Tyranny is a Monarchy where the good of one man only is the object of Government, an Oligarchy conſiders only the Rich, and a Democracy only the Poor; but neither of them have a common good in view.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

IT will be neceſſary to enlarge a little more upon the nature of each of theſe States, which is not without ſome difficulty, for he who would enter into a philoſophical inquiry into the principles of them, and not content himſelf with a ſuperficial view of their outward conduct, muſt paſs over and omit nothing, but explain the true ſpirit of each of them. A Tyranny then is, as has been ſaid, a Monarchy, where one perſon has an abſolute and deſpotic power over the whole community and every member therein: an Oligarchy, where the ſupreme power of the State is lodged with the Rich: a Democracy, on the contrary, is where thoſe have it, who are worth little, or nothing. But the firſt difficulty, that ariſes from the diſtinctions which we have laid down is this, ſhould it happen that the majority of the inhabitants who poſſeſs the power of the State (for this is a Democracy) ſhould be rich, the queſtion is, how does this agree with what we have ſaid? the ſame difficulty occurs, ſhould it ever happen that the poor compoſe a ſmaller part of the people than the rich, but from their ſuperior abilities acquire the ſupreme power; for this is what they call an Oligarchy: it ſhould ſeem then that

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our definition of the different States was not correct: nay, moreover, could any one ſuppoſe that the majority of the people were poor, and the minority rich, and then deſcribe the State in this manner, that an Oligarchy was a Government in which the rich, being few in number, poſſeſſed the ſupreme power, and that a Democracy was a State in which the poor, being many in number, poſſeſſed it, ſtill there will be another difficulty; for what name ſhall we give to thoſe States we have been deſcribing? I mean, that in which the greater number are rich, and that in which the leſſer number are poor (where each of theſe poſſeſs the ſupreme power). If there are no other States than thoſe we have deſcribed, it ſeems therefore evident to reaſon, that whether the ſupreme power is veſted in the hands of many or few may be a matter of accident; but that it is clear enough, that when it is in the hands of the few, it will be a Government of the Rich; when in the hands of the many, it will be a Government of the Poor; ſince in all countries there are many poor and few rich: it is not therefore the cauſe that has been already aſſigned (namely, the number of people in power) that makes the difference between the two Governments; but an Oligarchy, and Democracy differ in this, from each other, in the poverty of thoſe who govern in the one, and the riches of thoſe who govern in the other; for

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when the Government is the hands of the rich, be they few or be they more, it is an Oligarchy; when it is in the hands of the poor, it is a Democracy: but, as we have already ſaid, the one will be always few, the other numerous; but both will enjoy liberty, from whence will ariſe continual diſputes with each other, for the lead in public affairs.

CHAP. IX.

LET us firſt determine what are the proper limits of an Oligarchy and a Democracy, and what is juſt, in each of theſe States; for all men have ſome natural inclination to juſtice; but they proceed therein, only to a certain degree; nor can they univerſally point out what is abſolutely juſt; as, for inſtance, what is equal, appears juſt, and is ſo; but not to all; only among thoſe who are equals: and what is unequal, appears juſt, and is ſo; but not to all, only amongſt thoſe who are unequals; which circumſtance ſome people neglect, and therefore judge ill; the reaſon for which is, they judge for themſelves, and every one almoſt is the worſt judge in his own cauſe. Since then juſtice has reference

to perſons, the ſame diſtinctions muſt be made with reſpect to perſons, which are made with reſpect to things, in the manner that I have already deſcribed in my Ethics. As to the equality of the things, theſe they agree in; but their diſpute is, concerning the equality of the perſons, and chiefly for the reaſon above aſſigned; becauſe they judge ill in their own cauſe; and alſo becauſe each party thinks, that if they admit what is right in ſome particulars, they have done juſtice on the whole: thus, for inſtance, if ſome perſons are unequal in riches, they ſuppoſe them unequal in the whole; or, on the contrary, if they are equal in liberty, they ſuppoſe them equal in the whole: but what is abſolutely juſt they omit; for if Civil Society was founded for the ſake of preſerving and increaſing property, every one's right in the City would be equal to his fortune; and then the reaſoning of thoſe who inſiſt upon an Oligarchy would be valid; for it would not be right that he who contributed one Mina ſhould have an equal ſhare in the hundred, along with him who brought in all the reſt, either of the original money or what was afterwards acquired. Nor was civil ſociety founded merely to preſerve the lives of its members; but that they might live well: for otherwiſe a State might be compoſed of Slaves, or the animal creation: but this is not ſo; for theſe have no ſhare in the hap-

happineſs of it; nor do they live after their own choice; nor is it an alliance mutually to defend each other from injuries, or for a commercial intercourſe: for then the Tyrrhenians, and Carthaginians, and all other nations between whom treaties of commerce ſubſiſt, would be Citizens of one City; for they have articles to regulate their exports, and imports, and engagements for mutual protection, and alliances for mutual defence; but yet they have not all the ſame Magiſtrates eſtabliſhed among them, but they are different among the different people; nor does the one take any care, that the morals of the other ſhould be as they ought, or that none of thoſe who have entered into the common agreements ſhould be unjuſt, or in any degree vitious, only that they do not injure any member of the Confederacy. But whoſoever endeavours to eſtabliſh wholſome laws in a State, attends to the virtues, and the vices of each individual who compoſes it; from whence it is evident, that the firſt care of him who would found a City, truly deſerving that name, and not nominally ſo, muſt be to have his Citizens virtuous; for otherwiſe it is merely an alliance for ſelf-defence; differing from thoſe of the ſame caſt which are made between different people, only in place: for Law is an Agreement and a Pledge, as the ſophiſt Lycophron ſays, between the Ci-

tizens of their intending to do juſtice to each other, though not ſufficient to make all the Citizens juſt and good: and that this is fact is evident, for could any one bring different places together, as for inſtance, incloſe Megara and Corinth in a wall, yet they would not be one City, not even if the inhabitants intermarried with each other, though this inter-community contributes much to make a place one City. Beſides, could we ſuppoſe a ſet of people to live ſeparate from each other, but within ſuch a diſtance as would admit of an intercourſe, and that there were laws ſubſiſting between each party, to prevent their injuring one another in their mutual dealings, ſuppoſing one a Carpenter, another a Huſbandman, Shoe-maker, and the like, and that their numbers were ten thouſand, ſtill all that they would have together in common would be a Tariff for trade, or an Alliance for mutual defence, but not the ſame City. And why? not becauſe their mutual intercourſe is not near enough, for even if perſons ſo ſituated ſhould come to one place, and every one ſhould live in his own houſe as in his native City, and there ſhould be alliances ſubſiſting between each party, to mutually aſſiſt and prevent any injury being done to the other, ſtill they would not be admitted to be a City by thoſe who think correctly; if they preſerved the ſame Cuſtoms when they

they were together, as when they were ſeparate. It is evident then, that a City is not a Community of place; nor eſtabliſhed for the ſake of mutual ſafety or traffic with each other; but that theſe things are the neceſſary conſequences of a City, although they may all exiſt, where there is no City: but a City is a Society of people joining together with their families, and their children, to live agreeably for the ſake of having their lives as happy, and as independent as poſſible: and for this purpoſe it is neceſſary that they ſhould live in one place, and intermarry with each other: hence in all Cities there are family-meetings, clubs, ſacrifices, and public entertainments, to promote friendſhip; for a love of ſociability is friendſhip itſelf: ſo that the end then for which a City is eſtabliſhed is, that the inhabitants of it may live happy, and theſe things are conducive to that end: for it is a community of families and villages, for the ſake of a perfect independent life; that is, as we have already ſaid, for the ſake of living well and happily. It is not therefore founded for the purpoſe of men's merely living together, but for their living as men ought; for which reaſon thoſe who contribute moſt to this end deſerve to have greater power in the City, than thoſe who are their equals in family and freedom, but their inferiors in civil virtue, or thoſe who excel

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them in wealth, but are below them in worth. It is evident from what has been ſaid, that in all diſputes upon Government each party ſays ſomething that is juſt.

CHAP. X.

IT may alſo be a doubt where the ſupreme power ought to be lodged. Shall it be with the majority, or the wealthy, with a number of proper perſons, or one better than the reſt, or with a tyrant? But which ever of theſe we prefer ſome difficulty will ariſe. For what? ſhall the Poor have it, becauſe they are the majority? they may then divide among themſelves what belongs to the Rich: nor is this unjuſt; becauſe truly it has been ſo judged by the ſupreme power. But what avails it to point out what is the height of injuſtice, if this is not? Again, if the Many ſeize into their own hands every thing which belongs to the Few, it is evident that the City will be at an end. But Virtue will never deſtroy what is virtuous; nor can what is right, be the ruin of the State: therefore ſuch a law can never be right, nor can the acts of a Tyrant ever be wrong, for of neceſſity they muſt all be juſt;

juſt; for he, from his unlimited power, compels every one to obey his command, as the Multitude oppreſs the Rich. Is it right then that the Rich, the few, ſhould have the ſupreme power? and what if they be guilty of the ſame rapine, and plunder the poſſeſſions of the Majority, that will be as right as the other: but that all things of this ſort are wrong, and unjuſt is evident. Well then, theſe of the better Sort ſhall have it: but muſt not then all the other Citizens live unhonoured, without ſharing the offices of the City; for the offices of a City are its honours, and if one ſet of men are always in power, it is evident that the reſt muſt be without honour. Well then, let it be with One Perſon, of all others the fitteſt for it: but by this means the power will be ſtill more contracted, and a greater number than before continue unhonoured. But ſome one may ſay, that it is wrong to let man have the ſupreme power and not the law, as his ſoul is ſubject to ſo many paſſions. But if this law appoints an Ariſtocracy, or a Democracy, how will it help us in our preſent doubts? for thoſe things will happen which we have already mentioned.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

OTHER particulars we will conſider ſeparately; but it ſeems proper to prove, that the ſupreme power ought to be lodged with the Many, rather than with thoſe of the better Sort, who are few; and alſo to explain what doubts (and probably juſt ones) may ariſe: now, though not One Individual of the Many may himſelf be fit for the ſupreme power, yet when theſe Many are joined together, it does not follow, but they may be better qualified for it, than thoſe; and this not ſeparately, but as a collective body; as the public Suppers exceed thoſe which are given at one perſon's private expence: for, as they are many, each perſon brings in his ſhare of virtue and wiſdom; and thus, coming together, they are like one man made up of a multitude, with many feet, many hands, and many intelligencies: thus is it with reſpect to the manners and underſtandings of the multitude taken together; for which reaſon the public are the beſt judges of muſic and poetry; for ſome underſtand one part, ſome another, and all collectively the whole; and in this particular men of conſequence differ from each of the many; as they ſay, thoſe who are beautiful do from

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thoſe who are not ſo, and as fine pictures excel any natural objects, by collecting the ſeveral beautiful parts which were diſperſed among different originals into one, altho' the ſeparate parts, as the eye or any other, might be handſomer than in the picture. But if this diſtinction is to be made between every people and every general aſſembly, and ſome few men of conſequence, it may be doubtful whether it is true; nay, it is clear enough that, with reſpect to a few, it is not; ſince the ſame concluſion might be applied even to brutes: and indeed wherein do ſome men differ from brutes? Not but that nothing prevents what I have ſaid being true of the people in ſome States. The doubt then which we have lately propoſed, with all its conſequences, may be ſettled in this manner; it is neceſſary that the freemen who compoſe the bulk of the people ſhould have abſolute power in ſome things; but as they are neither men of property, nor act uniformly upon principles of virtue, it is not ſafe to truſt them with the firſt offices in the State, both on account of their iniquity and their ignorance; from the one of which they will do what is wrong, from the other they will miſtake: and yet it is dangerous to allow them no power or ſhare in the Government; for when there are many poor people who are incapable of acquiring the honours of their country, the State muſt neceſſarily have many

enemies in it; let them then be permitted to vote in the public aſſemblies, and to determine cauſes; for which reaſon Socrates, and ſome other Legiſlators, gave them the power of electing the officers of the State, and alſo of enquiring into their conduct when they came out of office, and only prevented their being Magiſtrates by themſelves; for the multitude, when they are collected together have all of them ſufficient underſtanding for theſe purpoſes, and, mixing among thoſe of higher rank, are ſerviceable to the City, as ſome things, which alone are improper for food, when mixed with others, make the whole more wholeſome than a few of them would be. But there is a difficulty attending this form of Government, for it ſeems, that the perſon, who himſelf was capable of curing any one who was then ſick, muſt be the beſt judge who to employ as a phyſician; but ſuch a one muſt be himſelf a phyſician; and the ſame holds true in every other practice and art: and as a phyſician ought to give an account of his practice to a phyſician, ſo ought it to be in other arts: thoſe whoſe buſineſs is phyſic may be divided into three ſorts, the firſt of theſe is he who makes up the medicines; the ſecond preſcribes, and is to the other as the architect is to the maſon; the third is he who underſtands the ſcience, but never practiſes it: now theſe three diſtictions may be found in

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thoſe who underſtand all other arts; nor have we leſs opinion of their judgment who are only inſtructed in the principles of the art, than of thoſe who practiſe it: and with reſpect to elections the ſame method of proceeding ſeems right; for to elect a proper perſon in any ſcience, is the buſineſs of thoſe who are ſkilful therein; as in geometry, of Geometricians; in ſteering, of Steerſmen: but if ſome individuals ſhould know ſomething of particular arts, and works, they do not know more than the profeſſors of them: ſo that even upon this principle neither the election of magiſtrates, nor the cenſure of their conduct, ſhould be entruſted to the many. But probably all that has been here ſaid may not be right; for, to reſume the argument I lately uſed, if the people are not very brutal indeed, although we allow that each individual knows leſs of theſe affairs than thoſe who have given particular attention to them, yet when they come together they will know them better, or at leaſt not worſe; beſides, in ſome particular arts it is not the workman only who is the beſt judge; namely, in thoſe the works of which are underſtood by thoſe who do not profeſs them: thus he who builds a houſe is not the only judge of it, for the maſter of the family who inhabits it is a better; thus alſo a ſteerſman is a better judge of a tiller than he who made it; and he who gives an

entertainment than the cook. What has been ſaid ſeems a ſufficient ſolution of this difficulty; but there is another that follows: for it ſeems abſurd that the power of the State ſhould be lodged with thoſe who are but of indifferent morals, inſtead of thoſe who are of excellent characters. Now the power of election and cenſure are of the utmoſt conſequence, and this, as has been ſaid, in ſome States they entruſt to the people; for the General Aſſembly is the ſupreme Court of all, and they have a voice in this, and deliberate in all public affairs, and try all cauſes, without any objection to the meanneſs of their circumſtances, and at any age: but their queſtors, generals, and other great officers of State are taken from men of great fortune, and worth. This difficulty alſo may be ſolved upon the ſame principle; and here too they may be right, for the power is not in the man, who is member of the Aſſembly, or Council, but the Aſſembly itſelf, and the Council, and the People, of which each individual of the whole Community are the parts, I mean as ſenator, adviſer, or judge; for which reaſon it is very right, that the Many ſhould have the greateſt powers in their own hands; for the people, the council, and the judges are compoſed of them, and the property of all theſe collectively is more than the property of any perſon, or a few who fill the great offices of the State: and thus I determine theſe points.

The firſt queſtion that we ſtated ſhews plainly, that the ſupreme power ſhould be lodged in laws duly made, and that the Magiſtrate, or Magiſtrates, either one, or more, ſhould be authorized to determine thoſe caſes which the laws cannot particularly ſpeak to, as it is impoſſible for them, in general language, to explain themſelves upon every thing that may ariſe: but what theſe laws are, which are eſtabliſhed upon the beſt foundations, has not been yet explained, but ſtill remains a matter of ſome queſtion: but the laws of every State will neceſſarily be like every State, either trifling or excellent, juſt or unjuſt; for it is evident, that the laws muſt be framed correſpondent to the Conſtitution of the Government; and, if ſo, it is plain, that a well-formed Government will have good laws, a bad one, bad ones.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

SINCE in every art, and ſcience the end aimed at, is always good, ſo particularly in this, which is the moſt excellent of all, the founding of Civil Society, the good wherein aimed at is Juſtice; for it is this which is for the benefit of all. Now, it is the common opinion, that Juſtice is a certain Equality; and in this point all the philoſophers are agreed, when they treat of morals: for they ſay, what is juſt, and to whom; and that equals ought to receive equal: but we ſhould know how we are to determine, what things are equal and what unequal; and in this there is ſome difficulty, which calls for the philoſophy of the politician. Some perſons will probably ſay, that the employments of the State ought to be given according to every particular excellence of each Citizen, if there is no other difference between them and the reſt of the Community, but they are in every reſpect elſe alike: for Juſtice attributes different things to perſons differing from each other in their character, according to their reſpective merits. But if this is admitted to be true, complexion, or height, or any ſuch advantage will be a claim for a greater ſhare of the public rights. But, that this is evidently abſurd, is clear from other arts and ſciences;

ence; for with reſpect to muſicians, who play on the flute together, the beſt flute is not given to him who is of the beſt family, for he will play never the better for that, but the beſt inſtrument ought to be given to him, who is the beſt artiſt. If what is now ſaid does not make this clear, we will explain it ſtill further: if there ſhould be any one, a very excellent player on the flute, but very deficient in family and beauty, though each of them are more valuable endowments than a ſkill in muſic, and excel this art, in a higher degree, than that player excels others, yet the beſt flutes ought to be given to him; for the ſuperiority in beauty, and fortune, ſhould have a reference to the buſineſs in hand; but theſe have none. Moreover, according to this reaſoning, every poſſible excellence might come in compariſon with every other; for if bodily ſtrength might diſpute the point with riches or liberty, even any bodily ſtrength might do it; ſo that if one perſon excelled in ſize more than another did in virtue, and his ſize was to qualify him to take place of the other's virtue, every thing muſt then admit of a compariſon with each other; for if ſuch a ſize is greater than virtue by ſo much, it is evident another muſt be equal to it: but, ſince this is impoſſible, it is plain, that it would be contrary to common ſenſe to diſpute a right to any office in the State from every ſuperiority whatſo-

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ever: for if one perſon is ſlow, and the other ſwift, neither is the one better qualified, nor the other worſe on that account, though in the Gymnaſtic races a difference in theſe particulars would gain the prize; but a pretenſion to the offices of the State ſhould be founded on a ſuperiority in thoſe qualifications, which are uſeful to it: for which reaſon thoſe of family, independency, and fortune, with great propriety, contend with each other for them; for theſe are the fit perſons to fill them: for a City can no more conſiſt of all poor men, than it can of all Slaves. But if ſuch perſons are requiſite, it is evident that thoſe alſo who are juſt, and valiant, are equally ſo; for without Juſtice and Valour no State can be ſupported, the former being neceſſary for its exiſtence, the latter for its happineſs.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

IT ſeems, then, requiſite for the eſtabliſhment of a State, that all, or at leaſt many of theſe particulars ſhould be well canvaſſed, and inquired into; and that Virtue and Education may moſt juſtly claim the right of being conſidered as the neceſſary means of making the Citizens happy, as we have already ſaid. As thoſe who are equal in one particular are not therefore equal in all, and thoſe who are unequal in one particular are not therefore unequal in all, it follows that all thoſe Governments which are eſtabliſhed upon a principle which ſuppoſes they are, are erroneous. We have already ſaid, that all the members of the community will diſpute with each other for the Offices of the State; and in ſome particulars juſtly, but not ſo in general; the rich, for inſtance, becauſe they have the greateſt landed property, and the ultimate right to the ſoil is veſted in the Community; and alſo becauſe their fidelity is in general moſt to be depended on. The freemen, and men of family will diſpute the point with each other, as nearly on an equality; for theſe latter have a right to a higher regard as Citizens, than obſcure perſons, for honourable deſcent is every-

where of great eſteem: nor is it an improper concluſion, that the deſcendants of men of worth will be men of worth themſelves; for noble birth is the fountain of virtue to men of family: for the ſame reaſon alſo we juſtly ſay, that Virtue has a right to put in her pretenſions. Juſtice, for inſtance, is a virtue, and ſo neceſſary to ſociety, that all others muſt yield her the precedence. Let us now ſee what the Many have to urge on their ſide againſt the Few; and they may ſay, that if, when collectively taken, they are compared with them, they are ſtronger, richer, and better than they are. But ſhould it ever happen that all theſe ſhould inhabit the ſame City, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as the many, ſuch as uſually make up the Community, I aſk, will there then be any reaſon to diſpute concerning who ſhall govern, or will there not? for in every Community which we have mentioned there is no diſpute where the ſupreme power ſhould be placed; for as theſe differ from each other, ſo do thoſe in whom that is placed; for in one State the Rich enjoy it, in others the Meritorious, and thus, each according to their ſeparate manners. Let us however conſider, what is to be done when all theſe happen at the ſame time to inhabit the ſame City. If the Virtuous ſhould be very few in number, how then ſhall we act? ſhall we prefer the Virtuous

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on account of their abilities, if they are capable of governing the City? or ſhould they be ſo many as almoſt intirely to compoſe the State? There is alſo a doubt concerning the pretenſions of all thoſe who claim the honours of Government: for thoſe who found them either on Fortune, or Family have nothing which they can juſtly ſay in their defence; ſince it is evident upon their principle, that if any one perſon can be found richer than all the reſt, the right of governing all theſe will be juſtly veſted in this one perſon. In the ſame manner, one man, who is of the beſt Family, will claim it from thoſe who diſpute the point upon Family merit: and probably in an Ariſtocracy the ſame diſpute might ariſe on the ſcore of Virtue, if there is one man, better than all the other men of worth, who are in the ſame community; it ſeems juſt, by the ſame reaſoning, that he ſhould enjoy the ſupreme power. And upon this principle alſo, while the Many ſuppoſe they ought to have the ſupreme command, as being more powerful than the few, if one or more than one, tho' a ſmall number, ſhould be found ſtronger than themſelves, theſe ought rather to have it than they. All theſe things ſeem to make it plain, that none of theſe principles are juſtly founded, on which theſe perſons would eſtabliſh their right to the ſupreme power; and that all men whatſoever ought to obey

them: for with reſpect to thoſe who claim it, as due to their Virtue or their Fortune, they might have juſtly ſome objection to make; for nothing hinders but that it may ſometimes happen, that the Many may be better or richer than the Few, not as individuals, but in their collective capacity. As to the doubt which ſome perſons have propoſed and objected, we may anſwer it in this manner; it is this, whether a Legiſlator, who would eſtabliſh the moſt perfect ſyſtem of laws, ſhould calculate them for the uſe or the better part of the Citizens, or the Many, in the circumſtances we have already mentioned? The rectitude of any thing conſiſts in its equality; that therefore which is equally right will be advantageous to the whole State, and to every member of it in common. Now, in general, a Citizen is one who both ſhares in the Government, and alſo in his turn ſubmits to be governed; their condition, it is true, is different in different States: the beſt is that in which a man is enabled to chuſe and to perſevere in a courſe of virtue during his whole life, both in his public and private ſtate. But ſhould there be one perſon, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon degree of virtue, though not enough to make up a Civil State, ſo that the virtue of the many, or their political abilities ſhould be too inferior to come in compariſon with theirs, if more than

one; or if but one, with his only; ſuch are not to be conſidered, as part of the City; for it would be doing them injuſtice to rate them on a level with thoſe who are ſo far their inferiors in virtue and political abilities, that they appear to them like a God amongſt men. From whence it is evident, that a ſyſtem of laws muſt be calculated for thoſe who are equal to each other in nature and power. Such men therefore are not the object of law; for they are themſelves a law: and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to include them in the penalties of a law: for probably they might ſay what Anthiſthenes tells us the Lions did to the Hares, when they demanded to be admitted to an equal ſhare with them in the Government. And it is on this account that Democratic States have eſtabliſhed the Oſtraciſm; for an equality ſeems the principal object of their Government. For which reaſon they compel all thoſe who are very eminent for their power, their fortune, their friendſhips, or any other cauſe which may give them too great weight in the Government, to ſubmit to the Oſtraciſm, and leave the City for a ſtated time; as the fabulous hiſtories relate the Argonauts ſerved Hercules, for they refuſed to take him with them in the ſhip Argo, on account of his ſuperior valour. For which reaſon thoſe who hate a Tyranny, and find fault with the

the advice which Periander gave to Thraſibulus, muſt not think there was nothing to be ſaid in its defence; for the ſtory goes, that Periander ſaid nothing to the meſſenger in anſwer to the buſineſs he was conſulted about, but ſtriking off thoſe ears of corn, which were higher than the reſt, reduced the whole crop to a level; ſo that the meſſenger, without knowing the cauſe of what was done, related the fact to Thraſibulus, who underſtood by it, that he muſt take off all the principal men in the City. Nor is this ſerviceable to Tyrants only; nor is it Tyrants only who do it; for the ſame thing is practiſed both in Oligarchies and Democracies: for the Oſtraciſm has in a manner nearly the ſame power, by reſtraining and baniſhing thoſe who are too great; and what is done in one City, is done alſo by thoſe who have the ſupreme power in ſeparate States; as the Athenians, with reſpect to the Samians, the Chians, and the Leſbians; for when they ſuddenly acquired the ſuperiority over all Greece, they brought the other States into ſubjection, contrary to the treaties which ſubſiſted between them. The King of Perſia alſo, very often reduces the Medes and Babylonians, when they aſſume upon their former power: and this is a principle which all Governments whatſoever keep in their eye; even thoſe which are beſt adminiſtered, as well as thoſe which are not, do it; theſe for the

the ſake of private utility, the others for the public good. The ſame thing is to be perceived in the other arts and ſciences; for a painter would not repreſent an animal with a foot diſproportionally large, tho' he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the ſhipwright make the prow, or any other part of the veſſel, larger than it ought to be; nor will the maſter of the band permit any who ſings louder and better than the reſt, to ſing in concert with them. There is therefore no reaſon, that a Monarch ſhould not act in agreement with free States, to ſupport his own power, if they do the ſame thing for the benefit of their reſpective communities; upon which account when there is any acknowledged difference in the power of the Citizens, the reaſon upon which the Oſtraciſm is founded will be politically juſt; but it is better for the Legiſlator ſo to eſtabliſh his State at the beginning as not to want this remedy: but if in a courſe of time ſuch an inconvenience ſhould ariſe, to endeavour to amend it by ſome ſuch correction. Not that this was the uſe it was put to: for many did not regard the benefit of their reſpective Communities, but made the Oſtraciſm a weapon in the hand of Sedition. It is evident then, that in corrupt Governments it is partly juſt and uſeful to the individual, though probably it is as clear, that it is not intirely juſt: for in a well-governed

State

State there may be great doubts about the uſe of it, not on account of the pre-eminence which one may have in ſtrength, riches, or connection: but when the pre-eminence is Virtue, what then is to be done? for it ſeems not right to turn out and baniſh ſuch a one; neither does it ſeem right to govern him, for that would be like deſiring to ſhare the power with Jupiter, and to govern him: nothing then remains but what indeed ſeems natural, and that is, for all perſons quietly to ſubmit to the Government of thoſe who are thus eminently Virtuous, and let them be perpetually Kings in the ſeparate States.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

AFTER what has been now ſaid, it ſeems proper to change our ſubject, and to inquire into the nature of Monarchies; for we have already admitted them to be one of thoſe ſpecies of Government, which are properly founded. And here let us conſider, whether a kingly Government is proper for a city, or a country, whoſe principal object is the happineſs of the inhabitants, or rather ſome other. But let us firſt determine whether this is of one kind only, or more; and it is eaſy to know, that it conſiſts of many different ſpecies, and that the Forms of Government are not the ſame in all: for at Sparta the kingly power ſeems chiefly regulated by the Laws; for it is not ſupreme in all circumſtances; but when the King quits the territories of the State, he is their General in war; and all Religious affairs are intruſted to him: indeed the kingly power with them is chiefly that of a General, who cannot be called to an account for his conduct, and whoſe command is for life: for he has not the power of life and death, except as a General; as they frequently had in their expeditions by martial law, which we learn from Homer; for when Agamemnon is affronted in council, he reſtrains his re-

ſentment, but when he is in the field, and armed with this power, he tells the Greeks ;

Whoe'er I know ſhall ſhun th' impending fight,
To dogs, and vultures, ſoon ſhall be a prey ;
For death is mine.——

This then is one ſpecies of monarchical Government, in which the kingly power is in a General for life; and is ſometimes hereditary, ſometimes elective: beſides, there is alſo another, which is to be met with among ſome of the Barbarians, in which the Kings are inveſted with powers, nearly equal to a Tyranny, yet are, in ſome reſpects, bound by the laws, and the cuſtoms of their country ; for as the Barbarians are by nature more prone to ſlavery than the Greeks, and thoſe in Aſia, more than thoſe in Europe, they endure, without murmuring, a deſpotic Government ; for this reaſon their Governments are Tyrannies ; but yet not liable to be overthrown, as being cuſtomary and according to law. Their guards alſo are ſuch as are uſed in a kingly Government, not a deſpotic one; for the guards of their Kings are his citizens, but a Tyrant's are foreigners. The one commands, in the manner the law directs, thoſe who willingly obey ; the other, arbitrarily, thoſe who conſent not. The one therefore is guarded by the citizens,

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the other againſt them. Theſe, then, are the two different ſorts of theſe Monarchies, and another is that, which in antient Greece, they called Æſumnetes; which is nothing more than an elective Tyranny; and its difference from that which is to be found amongſt the Barbarians, conſiſts not in its not being according to law, but only in its not being according to the antient cuſtoms of the country. Some perſons poſſeſſed this power for life, others only for a particular time, or particular purpoſe, as the people of Mitylene elected Pittacus to oppoſe the Exiles, who were headed by Antimenides, and Alcæus the poet, as we learn from a poem of his; for he upbraids the Mitylenians for having choſe Pittacus for their Tyrant, and with one voice extolling him to the ſkies, who was the ruin of a raſh and devoted people. Theſe ſorts of Government then are, and ever were, deſpotic, on account of their being Tyrannies; but inaſmuch as they are elective, and over a free people, they are alſo kingly. A fourth ſpecies of kingly Government is that, which was in uſe in the Heroic times, when a free people ſubmitted to a kingly Government, according to the laws and cuſtoms of their country. For thoſe who were at firſt of benefit to mankind, either in arts or arms, or by collecting them into civil ſociety, or procuring them an eſtabliſhment, became the Kings of a willing people,

and eſtabliſhed an hereditary Monarchy. They were particularly their Generals in war, and preſided over their Sacrifices, excepting ſuch only as belonged to the Prieſts: they were alſo the ſupreme Judges over the people; and in this caſe ſome of them took an oath, others did not; when they did, the form of ſwearing was by their ſceptre held out. In antient times the power of the Kings extended to every thing whatſoever, both civil, domeſtic, and foreign; but in after-times they relinquiſhed ſome of their privileges, and others the people aſſumed, ſo that, in ſome States, they left their Kings only the right of preſiding over the Sacrifices; and even thoſe whom it were worth while to call by that name, had only the right of being commander in chief in their foreign wars. Theſe then are the four ſorts of Kingdoms: the firſt is that of the Heroic times; which was a Government over a free people, with its rights in ſome particulars marked out; for the King was their General, their Judge, and their High Prieſt. The ſecond, that of the Barbarians; which is an hereditary deſpotic Government, regulated by laws: the third is that which they call Æſumnetic, which is an elective Tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedæmonian; and this, in few words, is nothing more than an hereditary Generalſhip: and in theſe particulars they differ from each other.

other. There is a fifth ſpecies of kingly Government, which is, when one perſon has a ſupreme power over all things whatſoever, in the manner that every State and every City has over thoſe things which belong to the Public: for as the Maſter of a Family is King in his own Houſe, ſo ſuch a King is Maſter of a Family, in his own City, or State.

CHAP. XV.

BUT the different ſorts of kingly Governments may, if I may ſo ſay, be reduced to two; which we will conſider more particularly. The laſt ſpoke of, and the Lacedæmonian, for the chief of the others are placed between theſe, which are as it were at the extremities, they having leſs power than an abſolute Government, and yet more than the Lacedæmonians; ſo that the whole matter in queſtion may be reduced to theſe two points; the one is, whether it is advantageous to the Citizens to have the office of General continue in one perſon for life, and whether it ſhould be confined to any particular families, or whether every one ſhould be eligible: the other, whether it is advantageous for one perſon to have the ſupreme power over every thing or not.

not. But to enter into the particulars concerning the office of a Lacedæmonian General would be rather to frame Laws for a State, than to conſider the nature and utility of its conſtitution, ſince we know that the appointing of a General is what is done in every State. Paſſing over this queſtion then, we will proceed to conſider the other part of their Government, which is the Polity of the State; and this it will be neceſſary to examine particularly into, and to go through ſuch queſtions as may ariſe. Now the firſt thing, which preſents itſelf to our conſideration, is this, whether it is beſt to be governed by a good man, or by good laws? Thoſe who prefer a kingly Government think, that laws can only ſpeak a general language, but cannot adapt themſelves to particular circumſtances; for which reaſon it is abſurd in any ſcience to follow written Rule; and even in Egypt, the phyſician was allowed to alter the mode of cure which the Law preſcribed to him, after the fourth day; but if he did it ſooner it was at his own peril: from whence it is evident, on the very ſame account, that a Government of written Laws is not the beſt; and yet general reaſoning is neceſſary to all thoſe, who are to govern, and it will be much more perfect, in thoſe who are intirely free from paſſions, than in thoſe to whom they are natural. But now this is a quality which

Laws

Laws poſſeſs; while the other is natural to the human ſoul. But ſome one will ſay in anſwer to this, that Man will be a better judge of particulars. It will be neceſſary, then, for a King to be a Lawgiver, and that his Laws ſhould be publiſhed, but that thoſe ſhould have no authority, which are abſurd, as thoſe which are not, ſhould. But whether is it better for the Community, that thoſe things which cannot poſſibly come under the cognizance of the Law, either at all, or properly, ſhould be under the government of every worthy Citizen, as the preſent method is, when the public Community, in their general aſſemblies, act as judges and counſellors, where all their determinations are upon particular caſes. For one individual, be he who he will, will be found, upon compariſon, inferior to a whole people taken collectively: but this is what a City is, as a public entertainment is better than one man's portion: for this reaſon the multitude judge of many things better than any one ſingle perſon. They are alſo leſs liable to corruption from their numbers, as water is from its quantity: beſides, the judgment of an individual muſt neceſſarily be perverted, if he is overcome by anger, or any other paſſion; but it would be hard indeed, if the whole Community ſhould be miſled by anger. Moreover, let the people be free, and they will do nothing but in con-

formity to the Law, except only in thoſe caſes which the Law cannot ſpeak to. But though what I am going to propoſe may not eaſily be met with, yet if the majority of the State ſhould happen to be good men, ſhould they prefer one uncorrupt governor, or many equally good, is it not evident that they ſhould chuſe the many? But there may be diviſions among theſe, which cannot happen when there is but one. In anſwer to this it may be replied, that all their ſouls will be as much animated with virtue, as this one man's. If then a Government of Many, and all of them good men, compoſe an Ariſtocracy, and the Government of One, a Kingly power, it is evident, that the people ſhould rather chuſe the firſt, than the laſt; and this whether the State is powerful or not, if many ſuch perſons ſo alike can be met with: and for this reaſon probable it was, that the firſt Governments were generally Monarchies; becauſe it was difficult to find a number of perſons eminently virtuous, more particularly as the world was then divided into ſmall communities; beſides, Kings were appointed in return for the benefits they had conferred on mankind; but ſuch actions are peculiar to good men: but when many perſons equal in virtue appeared at the time, they brooked not a ſuperiority, but ſought after an equality, and eſtabliſhed a Free State; but after this, when they degenerated,

nerated, they made a property of the public; which probably gave riſe to Oligarchies; for they made wealth meritorious, and the honours of Government were reſerved for the rich: and this was the origin of Tyrannies, and theſe in their turn gave riſe to Democracies; for the power of the Tyrants continually decreaſing, on account of their rapacious avarice, the people grew powerful enough to frame and eſtabliſh Democracies: and as Cities after that happened to increaſe, probably it was not eaſy for them to be under any other Government than a Democracy. But if any perſon prefers a kingly Government in a State, what is to be done with the King's children? Is the family alſo to reign? .But ſhould they have ſuch children as ſome perſons uſually have, it will be very detrimental. It may be ſaid, that then the King, who has it in his power, will never permit ſuch children to ſucceed to his Kingdom. But it is not eaſy to truſt to that; for it is very hard, and requires greater virtue than is to be met with in human nature. There is alſo a doubt, concerning the power with which a King ſhould be intruſted: whether he ſhould be allowed force ſufficient, to compell thoſe who do not chuſe to be obedient to the Laws, and how he is to ſupport his Government? for if he is to govern according to Law, and do nothing of his own will which

is contrary thereunto, at the ſame time it will be neceſſary to protect that power with which he guards the Law. This matter however may not be very difficult to determine; for he ought to have a proper power, and ſuch a one is that, which will be ſufficient to make the King ſuperior to any one perſon, or even a large part of the Community, but inferior to the Whole, as the Antients always appointed guards for that perſon whom they created Æſumnetes or Tyrant; and ſome one adviſed the Syracuſians, when Dionyſius aſked for guards, to allow him ſuch.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

WE will next conſider the abſolute Monarch that we have juſt mentioned, who does every thing according to his own will: for a King governing under the direction of Laws, which he is obliged to follow, does not of himſelf create any particular ſpecies of Government, as we have already ſaid: for in every State whatſoever, either Ariſtocracy or Democracy, it is eaſy to appoint a General for life; and there are many, who entruſt the Adminiſtration of affairs to one perſon only; ſuch is the Government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the ſame at Opontè. As for an abſolute Monarchy as it is called, that is to ſay, when the whole State is wholly ſubject to the will of one perſon, namely the King, it ſeems to many that it is unnatural, that one man ſhould have the intire rule over his fellow Citizens, when the State conſiſts of equals: for nature requires that the ſame right, and the ſame rank, ſhould neceſſarily take place amongſt all thoſe who are equal by nature: for as it would be hurtful to the body, for thoſe who are of different conſtitutions, to obſerve the ſame regimen, either of diet, or clothing, ſo is it with reſpect to the honours of the State, as hurtful, that thoſe who

are equal in merit ſhould be unequal in rank; for which reaſon it is as much a man's duty to ſubmit to command, as to aſſume it, and this alſo by rotation; for this is law, for Order is law; and it is more proper that Law ſhould govern, than any one of the Citizens: upon the ſame principle, if it is advantageous to place the ſupreme power in ſome particular perſons, they ſhould be appointed to be only guardians, and the ſervants of the Laws, for the ſupreme power muſt be placed ſomewhere; but they ſay, that it is unjuſt that where all are equal, one perſon ſhould continually enjoy it. But it ſeems unlikely that man ſhould be able to adjuſt that which the Law cannot determine; it may be replied, that the Law having laid down the beſt rules poſſible, leaves the adjuſtment and application of particulars to the diſcretion of the Magiſtrate; beſides, it allows any thing to be altered, which experience proves may be better eſtabliſhed. Moreover, he who would place the ſupreme power in mind, would place it in God, and the Laws; but he who intruſts man with it, gives it to a wild beaſt, for ſuch his appetites ſometimes make him; for paſſion influences thoſe who are in power, even the very beſt of men: for which reaſon, Mind is Law, without Deſire. The inſtance taken from the arts ſeems fallacious: wherein it is ſaid to be wrong for a ſick perſon to apply for

for a remedy to books, but that it would be far more eligible to employ thoſe who are ſkilful in phyſic; for theſe are not biaſſed by any paſſion with reſpect to their patient, to act contrary to the principles of their art; but when the cure is performed receive a pecuniary recompence: whereas thoſe who have the management of public affairs do many things through hatred or favour. And, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be obſerved, that whenever a ſick perſon ſuſpects that his phyſician has been perſuaded by his enemies, to be guilty of any foul practice to him, in his profeſſion, he then rather chuſes to apply to books for his cure: and not only this, but even phyſicians themſelves when they are ill call in other phyſicians: and thoſe who teach others the Gymnaſtic exerciſes, exerciſe with thoſe of the ſame profeſſion, as being incapable from ſelf-partiality to form a proper judgment of what concerns themſelves. From whence it is evident, that thoſe who ſeek for what is juſt, ſeek for a Medium; now Law is a Medium. Moreover, the moral Law is far ſuperior and converſant with far ſuperior objects than the written Law; for the ſupreme Magiſtrate is ſafer to be truſted to than the one, tho' he is inferior to the other. But as it is impoſſible, that one perſon ſhould have an eye to every thing himſelf, it will be neceſſary that the ſupreme

Magiſtrate

Magiſtrate ſhould employ ſeveral ſubordinate ones under him; why then ſhould not this be done at firſt, inſtead of appointing one perſon in this manner? Beſides, if, according to what has been already ſaid, the Man of Worth is on that account fit to govern, two Men of Worth are certainly better than one: as for inſtance, in Homer, *Let two together go:* and alſo Agamemnon's wiſh; *Were ten ſuch faithful Counſel mine!* Not but that there are even now ſome particular Magiſtrates inveſted with ſupreme power, to decide, as Judges, thoſe things which the Law cannot, as being one of thoſe caſes which comes not properly under its juriſdiction; for of thoſe which can there is no doubt: ſince then Laws comprehend ſome things, but not all, it is neceſſary to inquire, and conſider which of the two is preferable, that the beſt Man, or the beſt Law ſhould govern; for to reduce every ſubject, which can come under the deliberation of Man, into a Law is impoſſible. No one then denies, that it is neceſſary that there ſhould be ſome perſon to decide thoſe caſes, which cannot come under the cognizance of a written Law: but we ſay, that it is better to have many than one; for though every one who decides according to the principles of the Law decides juſtly; yet ſurely it ſeems abſurd to ſuppoſe, that one perſon can ſee better with two eyes, and hear

better

better with two ears, or do better with two hands and two feet, than Many can do with many: for we ſee that abſolute Monarchs now furniſh themſelves with many eyes and ears, and hands, and feet; for they entruſt thoſe who are friends to them, and their Government, with part of their power; for if they are not friends to the Monarch, they will not do what he chuſes; but if they are friends to him, they are friends alſo to his Government: but a friend is an equal, and like his friend: if then he thinks that ſuch ſhould govern, he thinks that his equal alſo ſhould govern. Theſe are nearly the objections which are uſually made to a Kingly power.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

PROBABLY what we have ſaid may be true of ſome perſons, but not of others; for ſome men are by nature formed to be under the Government of a Maſter; others, of a King; others, to be the Citizens of a free State, juſt and uſeful; but a Tyranny is not according to nature, nor the exceſſes of any other Government whatſoever; for they are contrary to it. But it is evident from what has been ſaid, that among equals it is neither advantageous nor right, that one perſon ſhould be Lord over all, where there are no eſtabliſhed Laws, but where his will is the Law; or where there are; nor is it right that one who is good ſhould have it over thoſe who are good; or one who is not good, over thoſe who are not good; nor one who is ſuperior to the reſt in worth, except in a particular manner, which ſhall be deſcribed, though indeed it has been already mentioned. But let us next determine what people are beſt qualified for a kingly Government, what for an Ariſtocratic, and what for a Democratic. And, firſt, for a Kingly; and it ſhould be thoſe who are accuſtomed by nature to ſubmit the Civil Government of themſelves to a Family eminent for Virtue: for an Ariſtocracy, thoſe who are naturally framed to bear the rule

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of Free Men, whoſe ſuperior virtue makes them worthy of the management of others: for a Free State, a warlike people, formed by nature both to govern and be governed by Laws, which admit the pooreſt Citizen to the ſhare honours of the Commonwealth, according to his worth. But whenever a whole family, or any one of another ſhall happen ſo far to excel in virtue as to exceed all other perſons in the community, then it is right that the Kingly power ſhould be in them, or if it is an individual who does ſo, that he ſhould be King and Lord of all; for this, as we have juſt mentioned, is not only correſpondent to that principle of right, which all founders of all States, whether Ariſtocracies, Oligarchies, or Democracies, have a regard to (for in placing the ſupreme power they all think it right to fix it to Excellence, though not the ſame); but it is alſo agreeable to what has been already ſaid; as it would not be right to kill, or baniſh, or oſtraciſe ſuch a one for his ſuperior merit. Nor would it be proper to let him have the ſupreme power only in turn; for it is contrary to nature, that what is higheſt ſhould ever be loweſt: but this would be the caſe ſhould ſuch a one ever be governed by others. So that there can nothing elſe be done, but to ſubmit, and permit him continually to enjoy the ſupreme power. And thus much

with reſpect to Kingly power in different States, and whether it is or is not advantageous to them, and to what, and in what manner. Since then we have ſaid that there are three ſorts of regular Governments, and of theſe the beſt muſt neceſſarily be that which is adminiſtered by the beſt men (and this muſt be that which happens to have one man, or one family, or a number of perſons, excelling all the reſt in Virtue, who are able to govern and be governed in ſuch a manner as will make life moſt agreeable, and we have already ſhewn that the Virtue of a good man and of a Citizen in the moſt perfect Government will be the ſame) it is evident, that in the ſame manner, and for thoſe very qualities which would procure a man the character of good, any one would ſay, that the Government of a State was a well eſtabliſhed Ariſtocracy, or Kingdom; ſo that it will be found to be Education and Morals that are almoſt the whole which go to make a good man, and the ſame qualities will make a good Citizen or good King.

Theſe particulars being treated of, we will now proceed to conſider what ſort of Government is beſt, how it naturally ariſes, and how it is eſtabliſhed; for it is neceſſary to make a proper inquiry concerning this.

A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

IN every art and ſcience which is not converſant in Parts, but in ſome one Genus in which it is complete, it is the buſineſs of that art alone, to determine what is fitted to its particular Genus; as what particular exerciſe is fitted to a certain particular body, and ſuits it beſt: for that body which is formed by nature the moſt perfect and ſuperior to others, neceſſarily requires the beſt exerciſe; and alſo of what one kind that muſt be

which will ſuit the generality; and this is the buſineſs of the Gymnaſtic arts: and although any one ſhould not deſire to acquire an exact knowledge and ſkill in theſe exerciſes, yet it is not, on that account, the leſs neceſſary that he who profeſſes to be a maſter and inſtruct the youth in them ſhould be perfect therein: and we ſee that this is what equally befalls the healing, ſhip-building, cloth-making, and indeed all other arts; ſo that it evidently belongs to the ſame art to find out what kind of Government is beſt, and would of all others be moſt correſpondent to our wiſh, while it received no moleſtation from without: and what particular ſpecies of it is adapted to particular perſons; for there are many who probably are incapable of enjoying the beſt form: ſo that the Legiſlator, and he who is truly a Politician, ought to be acquainted, not only with that which is moſt perfect imaginable, but alſo, that which is the beſt ſuited to any given circumſtances. There is, moreover, a third ſort, an imaginary one, and he ought, if ſuch a one ſhould be preſented to his conſideration, to be able to diſcern what ſort of one it would be at the beginning; and, when once eſtabliſhed, what would be the proper means to preſerve it a long time. I mean, for inſtance, if a State ſhould happen not to have the beſt form of Government, or be deficient in what was neceſſary, or

not receive every advantage poſſible, but ſomething leſs. And, beſides all this, it is neceſſary to know what ſort of Government is beſt fitting for all Cities: for moſt of thoſe writers who have treated this ſubject, however ſpeciouſly they may handle other parts of it, have failed in deſcribing the practical parts: for it is not enough to be able to perceive what is beſt, without it is what can be put in practice. It ſhould alſo be ſimple, and eaſy for all to attain to. But, contrary to this, they invent only the moſt ſubtile forms of Government, which are very complicated in their part. Others again, chuſing rather to treat of what is common, cenſure thoſe which now exiſt, and extol the excellence of a particular State, as the Lacedæmonian, or ſome other: but every Legiſlator ought to eſtabliſh ſuch a form of Government, as from the preſent ſtate, and diſpoſition of the people who are to receive it, they will moſt readily ſubmit to, and perſuade the Community to partake of: for it is not a buſineſs of leſs trouble, to correct the miſtakes of an eſtabliſhed Government, than to form a new one; as it is as difficult to recover what we have forgot, as to learn any thing afreſh. He, therefore, who aſpires to the character of a Legiſlator, ought, beſides all we have already ſaid, to be able to correct the miſtakes of a Government already eſtabliſhed, as we have before mentioned. But

this

this is impoſſible to be done by him who does not know how many different forms of Government there are: ſome perſons think, that there is only one ſpecies both of Democracy and Oligarchy; but this is not true: ſo that no one ſhould be unacquainted with the difference of theſe Governments, how great they are, and whence they they ariſe; and ſhould have equal knowledge to perceive what Laws are beſt, and what are moſt ſuitable to each particular Government: for all Laws are, and ought to be framed, agreeable to the State that is to be governed by them, and not the State to the Laws: for Government is a certain ordering in a State, which particularly reſpects the Magiſtrates in what manner they ſhall be regulated, and where the ſupreme power ſhall be placed; and what ſhall be the final object which each Community ſhall have in view; but the Laws are ſomething different from what regulates and expreſſes the form of the conſtitution; it is their office to direct the conduct of the Magiſtrate, in the execution of his office, and the puniſhment of offenders. From whence it is evident, that the founders of Laws ſhould attend both to the number, and the different ſorts of Government; for it is impoſſible that the ſame Laws ſhould be calculated for all ſorts of Oligarchies and all ſorts of Democracies, for of both theſe Governments there are many ſpecies, not one only.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

SINCE, then, according to our firſt method in treating of the different forms of Government, we have divided thoſe which are regular into three ſorts, the Kingly, the Ariſtocratical, the Free States, and ſhewn the three exceſſes which theſe are liable to. The Kingly, of becoming Tyrannical; the Ariſtocratical, Oligarchical; and the Free State, Democratical: and as we have already treated of the Ariſtocratical and Kingly; for to enter into an inquiry what ſort of Government is beſt, is the ſame thing as to treat of theſe two expreſly; for each of them deſires to be eſtabliſhed upon the principles of Virtue: and as moreover we have already determined wherein a Kingly power and an Ariſtocracy differ from each other, and when a State may be ſaid to be governed by a King, it now remains that we examine into a Free State, and alſo theſe other Governments, an Oligarchy, a Democracy, and a Tyranny; and it is evident, of theſe three exceſſes which muſt be the worſt of all, and which next to it; for, of courſe, the exceſſes of the beſt and moſt holy muſt be the worſt; for it muſt neceſſarily happen either that the Name of King only will remain, or elſe that the King will aſſume more power

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than belongs to him, from whence Tyranny will ariſe, the worſt exceſs imaginable, a Government the moſt contrary poſſible to a Free State. The exceſs next hurtful is an Oligarchy; for an Ariſtocracy differs much from this ſort of Government: that which is leaſt ſo, is a Democracy. This ſubject has been already treated of, by one of thoſe writers who have gone before me, though his ſentiments are not the ſame as mine: for he thought, that of all excellent Conſtitutions, as a good Oligarchy, or the like, a Democracy was the worſt, but of all bad ones, the beſt. Now I affirm, that all theſe States have, without exception, fallen into exceſs; and alſo that he ſhould not have ſaid, that one Oligarchy was better than another, but that it was not quite ſo bad. But this queſtion we ſhall not enter into at preſent. We ſhall firſt inquire how many different ſorts of Free States there are; ſince there are many ſpecies of Democracies and Oligarchies; and which of them is the moſt comprehenſive, and moſt deſireable after the beſt form of Government; or if there is any other, like an Ariſtocracy, well eſtabliſhed; and alſo which of theſe is beſt adapted to moſt Cities, and which of them is preferable for particular perſons: for, probably, ſome may ſuit better with an Oligarchy than a Democracy, and others better with a Democracy than an Oligarchy;

and

and afterwards in what manner any one ought to proceed who deſires to eſtabliſh either of theſe States, I mean every ſpecies of Democracy, and alſo of Oligarchy. And, to conclude, when we ſhall have briefly gone through every thing that is neceſſary, we will endeavour to point out the ſources of corruption, and ſtability, in Government, as well thoſe which are common to all as thoſe, which are peculiar to each State, and from what cauſes they chiefly ariſe.

CHAP. III.

THE reaſon for there being many different ſorts of Governments is this, that each State conſiſts of a great number of parts; for, in the firſt place, we ſee that all Cities are made up of families: and again, of the multitude of theſe ſome muſt be rich, ſome poor, and others in the middle ſtation; and that, both of the rich and poor, ſome will be uſed to arms, others not. We ſee alſo, that ſome of the common people are huſband-men, others attend the market, and others are artificers. There is alſo a difference between the Nobles in their wealth, and the dignity in which they live:

for inſtance, in the number of horſes they breed; for this cannot be ſupported without a large fortune: for which reaſon, in former times, thoſe Cities, whoſe ſtrength conſiſted in horſe, became by that means Oligarchies; and they uſed horſe in their expeditions againſt the neighbouring Cities; as the Eretrians, the Chalcidians, the Magnetians, who lived near the river Meander, and many others in Aſia. Moreover, beſides the difference of fortune, there is that which ariſes from family, and merit; or, if there are any other diſtinctions which make part of the City, they have been already mentioned in treating of an Ariſtocracy, for there we conſidered how many parts each City muſt neceſſarily be compoſed of; and ſometimes each of theſe have a ſhare in the Government, ſometimes a few, ſometimes more. It is evident then, that there muſt be many forms of Government, differing from each other in their particular conſtitution: for the parts of which they are compoſed, each differ from the other. For Government is the ordering of the Magiſtracies of the State; and theſe the Community ſhare between themſelves, either as they can attain them by force, or according to ſome common equality which there is amongſt them, as poverty, wealth, or ſome thing which they both partake of. There muſt therefore neceſſarily be as many different forms of Governments

vernments as there are different ranks in the Society, ariſing from the ſuperiority of ſome over others, and their different ſituations. And theſe ſeem chiefly to be two, as they ſay, of the Winds: namely, the North and the South; and all the others are declinations from theſe. And thus in Politics, there is the Government of the Many, and the Government of the Few; or a Democracy, and an Oligarchy: for an Ariſtocracy may be conſidered as a ſpecies of Oligarchy, as being alſo a Government of the Few; and what we call a Free State, may be conſidered as a Democracy: as in the Winds they conſider the Weſt as part of the North, and the Eaſt as part of the South: and thus it is in muſic, according to ſome, who ſay, there are only two ſpecies of it, the Doric and the Phrygian, and all other ſpecies of compoſition they call after one of theſe names; and many people are accuſtomed to conſider the nature of Government in the ſame light; but it is both more convenient and more correſpondent to truth, to diſtinguiſh Governments as I have done, into two ſpecies: one, of thoſe which are eſtabliſhed upon proper principles; of which there may be one or two ſorts: the other which includes all the different exceſſes of theſe; ſo that we may compare the beſt form of Government to the moſt harmonious piece of Muſic; the the Oligarchic, and Deſpotic to the more violent tunes; and the Democratic, to the ſoft and gentle airs.

CHAP. IV.

WE ought not to define a Democracy as ſome do, who ſay ſimply, that it is a Government where the ſupreme power is lodged in the People; for even in Oligarchies the ſupreme power is in the Majority. Nor ſhould they define an Oligarchy, a Government where the ſupreme power is in the hands of a Few: for let us ſuppoſe the number of a people to be thirteen hundred, and that of theſe, one thouſand were rich, who would not permit the three hundred poor to have any ſhare in the Government, although they were free, and their equal in every thing elſe; no one would ſay, that this Government was a Democracy. In like manner, if the Poor, when few in number, ſhould acquire the power over the Rich, though more than themſelves, no one would ſay, that this was an Oligarchy; nor this, when the reſt who are rich, have no ſhare in the adminiſtration. We ſhould rather ſay, that a Democracy is, when the ſupreme power is in the hands of the Freemen; an Oligarchy, when it is in the hands of the Rich: it happens indeed, that in the one caſe the Many will poſſeſs it, in the other the Few; becauſe there are many poor, and few rich. And if the power of the State was to be diſtributed according to the Size of the Citizens, as they

they ſay it is in Æthiopia, or according to their Beauty, it would be an Oligarchy: for the number of thoſe who are large and beautiful is ſmall. Nor are thoſe things, which we have already mentioned, alone ſufficient to deſcribe theſe States; for ſince there are many ſpecies both of a Democracy, and an Oligarchy, the matter requires farther conſideration; as we cannot admit, that if a few perſons, who are Free, poſſeſs the ſupreme power over the Many, who are not Free, that this Government is a Democracy: as in Apollonia, in Ionia, and in Thera: for in each of theſe Cities the honours of the State belong to ſome few particular Families, who firſt founded the Colonies. Nor would the Rich, becauſe they are ſuperior in numbers, form a Democracy, as formerly at Colophon; for there the Majority had large poſſeſſions, before the Lydian war: but a Democracy is a State where the Freemen and the Poor, being the Majority, are inveſted with the Power of the State. An Oligarchy is a State where the Rich and thoſe of Noble families, being few, poſſeſs it. We have now proved, that there are various forms of Government, and have aſſigned a reaſon for it; and ſhall proceed to ſhew, that there are even more than theſe, and what they are, and why; ſetting out with the principle we have already laid down. We admit, that every City conſiſts not of one, but many

parts: thus, if we ſhould endeavour to comprehend the different ſpecies of Animals, we ſhould firſt of all note thoſe parts which every animal muſt have, as a certain ſenſorium, and alſo what is neceſſary to acquire and retain food, as a mouth and a belly; beſides certain parts to enable it to move from place to place. If, then, theſe are the only parts of an animal, and there are differences between them; namely, in their various ſorts of ſtomachs, bellies, and ſenſoriums: to which we muſt add, their motive powers; the number of the combinations of all theſe muſt neceſſarily make up the different ſpecies of animals. For it is not poſſible, that the ſame kind of animal ſhould have any very great difference in its mouth or ears; ſo that when all theſe are collected, who happen to have theſe things ſimilar in all, they make up a ſpecies of animals, of which there are as many, as there are of theſe general combinations of neceſſary parts. The ſame thing is true of what are called States; for a City is not made of one, but many parts, as has already been often ſaid; one of which is thoſe who ſupply it with proviſions, called Huſbandmen, another called Mechanics, whoſe employment is in the manual arts, without which the City could not be inhabited; of theſe ſome are buſied about what is abſolutely neceſſary, others in what contribute to the elegancies, and pleaſures of life; the third ſort are your

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Exchange-men, I mean by theſe your buyers, ſellers, merchants, and victuallers; the fourth are your hired-labourers, or workmen; the fifth are the men at arms, a rank not leſs uſeful than the other, without you would have the Community ſlaves to every invader; but what cannot defend itſelf is unworthy of the name of a City; for a City is ſelf-ſufficient, a Slave not. So that when Socrates, in Plato's Republic, ſays, that a City is neceſſarily compoſed of four ſorts of people, he ſpeaks elegantly but not correctly, and theſe are, according to him, weavers, huſband-men, ſhoe-makers, and builders; he then adds, as if theſe were not ſufficient, ſmiths, herdſmen for what cattle are neceſſary, and alſo merchants and victuallers, and theſe are by way of appendix to his firſt liſt; as if a City was eſtabliſhed for neceſſity, and not happineſs, or as if a ſhoe-maker and a huſband-man were equally uſeful. He reckons not the Military a part, before the increaſe of territory, and joining to the borders of the neighbouring powers will make war neceſſary: and even amongſt them who compoſe his four diviſions, or whoever have any connection with each other, it will be neceſſary to have ſome one to diſtribute Juſtice, and determine between man and man. If, then, the Mind is a more valuable part of man than the Body, every one would wiſh to have thoſe things more regarded in his City,

which

which tend to the advantage of theſe, than common matters, ſuch are War and Juſtice; to which may be added Council, which is the buſineſs of civil wiſdom (nor is it of any conſequence, whether theſe different employments are filled by different perſons, or one, as the ſame man is oftentimes both a ſoldier and a huſband-man): ſo that if both the Judge and the Senator are parts of the City, it neceſſarily follows that the Soldier muſt be ſo alſo. The ſeventh ſort are thoſe who ſerve the Public in expenſive employments at their own charge: theſe are called the Rich. The eighth, are thoſe who execute the different offices of the State, and without theſe it could not poſſibly ſubſiſt: it is therefore neceſſary that there ſhould be ſome perſons capable of governing, and filling the places in the City; and this either for life, or in rotation: the office of Senator, and Judge, of which we have already ſufficiently treated, are the only ones remaining. If, then, theſe things are neceſſary for a State, that it may be happy and juſt, it follows, that the Citizens who engage in public affairs ſhould be men of abilities therein. Several perſons think, that different employments may be allotted to the ſame perſon; as a ſoldier's, a huſband-man's, and an artificer's; as alſo, that others may be both ſenators and judges.

Beſides,

Beſides, every one ſuppoſes himſelf a man of political abilities, and that he is qualified for almoſt every department in the State. But the ſame perſon cannot at once be poor and rich: for which reaſon the moſt obvious diviſion of the City is into two parts, the Poor and Rich; moreover, ſince, for the generality, the one are Few, the other Many, they ſeem of all the parts of a City moſt contrary to each other; ſo that as the one or the other prevail they form different States; and theſe are the Democracy and the Oligarchy. But that there are many different States, and from what cauſes they ariſe, has been already mentioned: and that there are alſo different ſpecies both of Democracies and Oligarchies we will now ſhew. Though this indeed is evident from what we have already ſaid: there are alſo many different ſorts of Common People, and alſo of thoſe who are called Gentlemen. Of the different ſorts of the firſt are huſband-men, artificers, exchange-men, who are employed in buying and ſelling, ſeamen, of which ſome are engaged in war, ſome in traffic, ſome in carrying goods and paſſengers from place to place, others in fiſhing, and of each of theſe there are often many, as fiſher-men at Tarentum and Byzantium, maſters of gallies at Athens, merchants at Ægina and Chios, thoſe who let ſhips on freight at Tenedos; we may add to theſe thoſe who live by their

manual labour, and have but little property; ſo that they cannot live without ſome employ: and alſo thoſe who are not free-born on both ſides, and whatever other ſort of Common People there may be. As for Gentlemen, they are ſuch as are diſtinguiſhed either by their fortune, their birth, their abilities, or their education, or any ſuch-like excellence which is attributed to them. The moſt pure Democracy is that which is ſo called principally from that Equality which prevails in it: for this is what the Law in that State directs; that the Poor ſhall be in no greater ſubjection than the Rich; nor that the ſupreme power ſhall be lodged with either of theſe, but that both ſhall ſhare it. For if Liberty and Equality, as ſome perſons ſuppoſe, are chiefly to be found in a Democracy, it muſt be moſt ſo, by every department of Government being alike open to all; but as the people are the majority, and what they vote is law, it follows, that ſuch a State muſt be a Democracy. This, then, is one ſpecies thereof. Another is, when the Magiſtrates are elected by a certain Cenſus; but this ſhould be but ſmall, and every one who was included in it ſhould be eligible, but as ſoon as he was below it ſhould loſe that right. Another ſort is, in which every Citizen, who is not infamous, has a ſhare in the Government, but where the Government is in the Laws. Another,

where

where every Citizen, without exception, has this right. Another is like theſe in other particulars, but there the People govern, and not the Law: and this takes place when every thing is determined by a Majority of Votes, and not by a Law; which happens when the People are influenced by the Demagogues: for where a Democracy is governed by ſtated Laws, there is no room for them, but men of worth fill the firſt offices in the State: but where the Power is not veſted in the Laws, there Demagogues abound: for there the People rule with kingly power; the Whole compoſing one body; for they are ſupreme, not as individuals, but in their collective capacity. Homer alſo diſcommends the Government of Many; but whether he means this we are ſpeaking of, or where each perſon exerciſes his power ſeparately, is uncertain. When the People poſſeſs this power, they deſire to be altogether abſolute, that they may not be under the controul of the Law, and this is the time when Flatterers are held in repute. Nor is there any difference between ſuch a People and Monarchs in a Tyranny: for their manners are the ſame, and they both hold a deſpotic power over better perſons than themſelves. For their Decrees are like the others Edicts; their Demagogues like the others Flatterers: but their greateſt reſemblance conſiſts in the mutual ſupport

they give to each other, the Flatterer to the Tyrant, the Demagogue to the People: and to them it is owing that the ſupreme power is lodged in the Votes of the People, and not in the Laws; for they bring every thing before them, as their influence is owing to their being ſupreme, whoſe opinions they intirely direct; for theſe are they, whom the Multitude obey. Beſides, thoſe who accuſe the Magiſtrates inſiſt upon it, that the right of determining on their conduct lies in the People, who gladly receive their complaints as the means of deſtroying all their offices. Any one therefore may with great juſtice blame ſuch a Government as being a Democracy, and not a Free State; for where the Government is not in the Laws, then there is no Free State, for the Law ought to be ſupreme over all things; and particular incidents which ariſe, ſhould be determined by the Magiſtrates, or the State. If, therefore, a Democracy is to be reckoned a Free State, it is evident, that any ſuch eſtabliſhment which centers all power in the Votes of the People cannot, properly ſpeaking, be a Democracy: for their Decrees cannot be general in their extent. Thus, then, we may deſcribe the ſeveral ſpecies of Democracies.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

OF the different ſpecies of Oligarchies one is, when the right to the offices is regulated by a certain Cenſus; ſo that the Poor, although the Majority, have no ſhare in it; while all thoſe who are included therein, take part in the management of public affairs. Another ſort is, when the Magiſtrates are men of very ſmall fortune, who upon any vacancy do themſelves fill it up: and if they do this out of the Community at large, the State approaches to an Ariſtocracy; if out of any particular claſs of people, it will be an Oligarchy. Another ſort of Oligarchy is, when the power is an hereditary Nobility. The fourth is, when the power is in the ſame hands as the other, but not under the controul of Law; and this ſort of Oligarchy exactly correſponds to a Tyranny in Monarchies, and to that particular ſpecies of Democracies, which I laſt mentioned, in treating of that State: this has the particular name of a Dynaſty. Theſe are the different ſorts of Oligarchies and Democracies. It ſhould alſo be known, that it often happens that a Free State, where the ſupreme power is in the Laws, may not be democratic, and yet in conſequence of the eſtabliſhed manners, and cuſtoms of the people, may be governed

verned as if it was; ſo, on the other hand, where the Laws may countenance a more democratic form of Government, theſe may make the State inclining to an Oligarchy; and this chiefly happens when there has been any alteration in the Government; for the people do not eaſily change, but love their own antient Cuſtoms; and it is by ſmall degrees only that one thing takes place of another; ſo that the antient Laws will remain, while the power will be in the hands of thoſe who have brought about a Revolution in the State.

CHAP. VI.

IT is evident from what has been ſaid, that there are as many different ſorts of Democracies and Oligarchies as I have reckoned up: for, of neceſſity, either all ranks of the people which I have enumerated muſt have a ſhare in the Government, or ſome only, and others not; for when the huſbandmen, and thoſe only who poſſeſs moderate fortunes, have the ſupreme power, they will govern according to Law; for as they muſt get their livings by their employs, they have but little leiſure for public buſineſs: they will therefore eſtabliſh proper Laws, and never

call public Aſſemblies but when there is a neceſſity for them; and they will readily let every one partake with them in the adminiſtration of public affairs, as ſoon as they poſſeſs that Fortune which the Law requires for their qualification: every one, therefore, who is qualified will have his ſhare in the Government: for to exclude any would be to make the Government an Oligarchy, and for all to have leiſure to attend without they had a ſubſiſtance, would be impoſſible: for theſe reaſons, therefore, this Government is a ſpecies of Democracy. Another ſpecies is diſtinguiſhed by the mode of electing their Magiſtrates, in which every one is eligible, to whoſe birth there are no objections, provided he is ſuppoſed to have leiſure to attend: for which reaſon in ſuch a Democracy the ſupreme power will be veſted in the Laws, as there will be nothing paid to thoſe who go to the public aſſemblies. A third ſpecies is where every Freeman has a right to a ſhare in the Government, which he will not accept for the cauſe already aſſigned; for which reaſon here alſo the ſupreme power will be in the Law. The fourth ſpecies of Democracy, the laſt which was eſtabliſhed in order of time, aroſe when Cities were greatly enlarged to what they were at firſt, and when the public revenue became ſomething conſiderable; for then the Populace, on account of their numbers, were admitted

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to ſhare in the management of public affairs, for then even the pooreſt people were at leiſure to attend to them, as they received wages for ſo doing; nay, they were more ſo than others, as they were not hindered, by having any thing of their own to mind, as the Rich had; for which reaſon theſe laſt very often did not frequent the public Aſſemblies and the Courts of Juſtice: thus the ſupreme power was lodged in the Poor, and not in the Laws. Theſe are the different ſorts of Democracies, and ſuch are the cauſes which neceſſarily gave birth to them.

The firſt ſpecies of Oligarchy is, when the generality of the State are men of moderate and not too large property; for this gives them leiſure for the management of public affairs: and, as they are a numerous body, it neceſſarily follows, that the ſupreme power muſt be in the Laws, and not in Men; for as they are far removed from a Monarchical Government, and have not ſufficient fortune to neglect their private affairs, while they are too many to be ſupported by the public, they will of courſe determine to be governed by the Laws, and not by each other. But if the Men of Property in the State are but few, and their property is large, then an Oligarchy of the ſecond ſort will take place; for thoſe who have moſt power will think, that they have a right to lord it over

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the others; and, to accompliſh this, they will aſſociate to themſelves ſome who have an inclination for public affairs, and as they are not powerful enough to govern without Law, they will make a Law for that purpoſe. And if thoſe Few who have large fortunes ſhould acquire ſtill greater power, the Oligarchy will then alter into one of the third ſort; for they will get all the offices of the State into their own hands by a Law, which directs the Son to ſucceed upon the death of his Father; and, after that, when, by means of their increaſing wealth and powerful connexions, they extend ſtill further their oppreſſion, a Monarchical Dynaſty will directly ſucceed, wherein Men will be ſupreme, and not the Law; and this is the fourth ſpecies of an Oligarchy correſpondent to the laſt-mentioned claſs of Democracies.

CHAP. VII.

THERE are beſides two other States, a Democracy, and an Oligarchy, one of which all ſpeak of, and it is always eſteemed a ſpecies of the four ſorts; and thus they reckon them up; a Monarchy, an Oligarchy, a Democracy, and this fourth which they call an Ariſtocracy. There is alſo a fifth, which bears a name that is alſo common to the other four, namely, A State: but as this is ſeldom to be met with, it has eſcaped thoſe who have endeavoured to enumerate the different ſorts of Governments which they fix at four only, as does Plato in his Republic.

An Ariſtocracy, of which I have already treated in the Firſt Book, is rightly called ſo; for a State governed by the beſt men, upon the moſt virtuous principles, and not upon any hypotheſis, which even good men may propoſe, has alone a right to be called an Ariſtocracy, for it is there only that a man is at once a good Man and a good Citizen; while in other States Men are good only relative to thoſe States. Moreover, there are ſome other States which are called by the ſame name, that differ both from Oligarchies, and Free States, wherein not only the Rich, but alſo the Virtuous have a ſhare in the adminiſtration;

and

and have therefore acquired the name of Ariſtocracies; for in thoſe Governments wherein Virtue is not their common care, there are ſtill Men of Worth and approved Goodneſs. Whatever State, then, like the Carthaginians, favours the Rich, the Virtuous, and the Citizens at large, is a ſort of Ariſtocracy: when only the two latter are held in eſteem, as at Lacedæmon, and the State is jointly compoſed of theſe, it is a virtuous Democracy. Theſe are the two ſpecies of Ariſtocracies after the firſt, which is the beſt of all Governments. There is alſo a third, which is, whenever a Free State inclines to the dominion of a Few.

CHAP. VIII.

IT now remains for us to treat of that Government which is particularly called A Free State, and alſo of a Tyranny; and the reaſon for my chuſing to place that Free State here is, becauſe this, as well as thoſe Ariſtocracies already mentioned, although they do not ſeem exceſſes; yet, to ſpeak true, they have all departed from what a perfect Government is. Nay, they are deviations both of them equally from other forms, as I ſaid at the beginning. It is proper to mention a Tyranny the laſt of all Governments, for it is of all others the leaſt like one: but as my intention is to treat of all Governments in general, for this reaſon that alſo, as I have ſaid, will be taken into conſideration in its proper place. I ſhall now inquire into a Free State, and ſhew what it is; and we ſhall the better underſtand its poſitive nature as we have already deſcribed an Oligarchy and a Democracy; for a Free State is indeed nothing more than a mixture of them, and it has been uſual to call thoſe which incline moſt to a Democracy, a Free State; thoſe which incline moſt to an Oligarchy, an Ariſtocracy, becauſe thoſe who are rich are generally men of family and education; beſides, they enjoy thoſe things which others are often

guilty of crimes to procure: for which reaſon they are regarded as men of worth, and honour and note. Since, then, it is the genius of an Ariſtocracy to allot the larger part of the Government to the beſt Citizens, they therefore ſay, that an Oligarchy is chiefly compoſed of thoſe men who are worthy and honourable: now it ſeems impoſſible, that where the Government is in the hands of the Good, there the Laws ſhould not be good, but bad; or, on the contrary, that where the Government is in the hands of the Bad, there the Laws ſhould be good; nor is a Government well-conſtituted becauſe the Laws are, without at the ſame time care is taken that they are obſerved; for to enforce obedience to the Laws which it makes, is one proof of a good Conſtitution in the State; another is, to have Laws well calculated for thoſe who are to abide by them; for if they are improper they muſt be obeyed: and this may be done two ways, either by their being the beſt relative to the particular State, or the beſt abſolutely. An Ariſtocracy ſeems moſt likely to confer the honours of the State on the Virtuous; for Virtue is the object of an Ariſtocracy, Riches of an Oligarchy, and Liberty of a Democracy; for what is approved of by the Majority will prevail in all, or in each of theſe three different States; and that which is eſteemed by thoſe who compoſe the Community will have

have the ſupreme power: for what is called a State prevails in many Communities, which are generally made up of Rich and Poor, Riches and Liberty: as for the Rich they are uſually ſuppoſed to be among worthy and honourable. As there are three things which claim an equal rank in the State, Freedom, Riches, and Virtue (for as for the fourth, Rank, it is an attendant on two of the others, for Virtue and Riches are the origin of family) it is evident, that the conjuncture of the Rich and the Poor make up a Free State; but that all three tend to an Ariſtocracy more than any other, except that which is truly ſo, which holds the firſt rank. We have already ſeen, that there are Governments different from a Monarchy, a Democracy, and an Oligarchy; and what they are, and wherein they differ from each other; and alſo Ariſtocracies, and States properly ſo called, which are derived from them; and it is evident, that theſe are not much unlike each other.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

WE ſhall next proceed to ſhew how that Government, which is peculiarly called A State, ariſes out of a Democracy and an Oligarchy, and how it ought to be eſtabliſhed; and this will at the ſame time ſhew what are the proper boundaries of both theſe Governments, for we muſt mark out wherein they differ from one another, and then from both theſe compoſe a State of ſuch parts of each of them, as will ſhew from whence they were taken. There are three different ways in which two States may be blended and joined together; for, in the firſt place, all thoſe Rules may be adopted which the Laws of each of them have ordered; as for inſtance, in the Judicial Department, for in an Oligarchy the Rich are fined if they do not come to the court as jurymen, but the Poor are not paid for their attendance; but in Democracies they are, while the Rich are not fined for their neglect. Now theſe things, as being common to both, are fit to be obſerved in a Free State which is compoſed of both. This, then, is one way in which they may be joined together. In the ſecond place, a medium may be taken between the different methods which each State obſerves; for inſtance, in a Democracy the

the right to vote in the public aſſembly is either confined by no Cenſus at all, or limited by a very ſmall one; in an Oligarchy none enjoy it, but thoſe whoſe Cenſus is high: therefore, as theſe two practices are contrary to each other, a Cenſus between each may be eſtabliſhed in ſuch a State. In the third place, different Laws of each Community may be adopted; as for inſtance, as it ſeems correſpondent to the nature of a Democracy, that the Magiſtrates ſhould be choſen by lot, but an Ariſtocracy by vote, and in the one State according to a Cenſus, but not in the other: let, then, an Ariſtocracy, and a Free State copy ſomething from each of them; let them follow an Oligarchy in chuſing their Magiſtrates by vote, but a Democracy in not admitting of any Cenſus, and thus blend together the different cuſtoms of the two Governments. But the beſt proof of a happy mixture of a Democracy and an Oligarchy is this, when a perſon may properly call the ſame State a Democracy and an Oligarchy. It is evident, that thoſe who ſpeak of it in this manner are induced to it, becauſe both theſe Governments are there well blended together: and indeed this is common to all mediums, that the extremes of each ſide ſhould be diſcerned therein, as at Lacedæmon; for many affirm, that it is a Democracy, from the many particulars in which it follows that form of Government;

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as for inſtance, in the firſt place, in the bringing up of their children, for the Rich and Poor are brought up in the ſame manner; and their education is ſuch that the children of the Poor may partake of it; and the ſame rules are obſerved when they are youths and men, there is no diſtinction between a rich perſon, and a poor one; and in their public tables the ſame proviſion is ſerved to all. The rich alſo wear only ſuch clothes as the pooreſt man is able to purchaſe. Moreover, with reſpect to two Magiſtracies of the higheſt rank, one they have a right to elect to, the other to fill; namely, the Senate and the Ephori. Others conſider it as an Oligarchy, the principles of which it follows in many things, as in chuſing all their officers by vote, and not by lot; in there being but a few who have a right to ſit in judgment on capital cauſes, and the like. Indeed, a State which is well compoſed of two other, ought to reſemble them both, and neither. Such a State ought to have its means of preſervation in itſelf, and not without; and when I ſay in itſelf, I do not mean that it ſhould owe this to the forbearance of their neighbours, for this may happen to a bad Government, but to every member of the community's not being willing, that there ſhould be the leaſt alteration in their Conſtitution. Such is the method in which a Free State or an Ariſtocracy ought to be eſtabliſhed.

CHAP. X.

IT now remains to treat of a Tyranny; not that there is much to be ſaid on that ſubject, but as it makes part of our plan, ſince we enumerated it amongſt our different ſorts of Governments. In the beginning of this work we inquired into the nature of Kingly Government, and entered into a particular examination of what was moſt properly called ſo, and whether it was advantageous to a State or not, and what it ſhould be, and how eſtabliſhed; and we divided a Tyranny into two ſpecies, when we were upon this ſubject, becauſe there is ſomething analogous between this and a Kingly Government, for they are both of them eſtabliſhed by Law; for among ſome of the Barbarians they elect a Monarch with abſolute power, and formerly among the Greeks there were ſome ſuch, whom they called Æſumnetes. Now theſe differ from each other; for ſome poſſeſs only Kingly power regulated by Law, and rule thoſe who voluntarily ſubmit to their Government; others rule deſpotically, according to their own will. There is a third ſpecies of Tyranny, moſt properly ſo called, which is the very oppoſite to Kingly power; for this is the Government of One who rules over his equals and ſuperiors, without being accountable for his conduct,

conduct, and whoſe object is his own advantage, and not the advantage of thoſe he governs; for which reaſon he rules by compulſion, for no Freemen will ever willingly ſubmit to ſuch a Government. Theſe are the different ſpecies of Tyrannies, their principles, and their cauſes.

CHAP. XI.

WE proceed now to inquire what form of Government and what manner of life is beſt for Communities in general, not adapting it to that ſuperior Virtue which is above the reach of the Vulgar, or that education which every advantage of nature and fortune only can furniſh, nor to thoſe imaginary plans which may be formed at pleaſure; but to that mode of life which the greater part of mankind can attain to, and that Government which moſt Cities may eſtabliſh: for as to thoſe Ariſtocracies which we have now mentioned, they are either too perfect for a State to ſupport, or one ſo nearly alike to that State we are now going to inquire into, that we ſhall treat of them both as one.

The opinions which we form upon theſe ſubjects muſt depend upon one common principle: for if what I have

ſaid in my Treatiſe on Morals is true, a happy life muſt ariſe from an uninterrupted courſe of virtue; and if virtue conſiſts in a certain medium, the middle life muſt certainly be the happieſt; which medium is attainable by every one. The boundaries of Virtue and Vice in the State muſt alſo neceſſarily be the ſame as in a private perſon; for the form of Government is the life of the City. In every City the People are divided into three ſorts; the very Rich, the very Poor, and thoſe who are between them. If this is univerſally admitted, that the medium is beſt, it is evident, that even in point of fortune, mediocrity is to be preferred; for that ſtate is moſt ſubmiſſive to reaſon; for thoſe who are very handſome, or very ſtrong, or very noble, or very rich; or, on the contrary, thoſe who are very poor, or very weak, or very mean, with difficulty obey it; for the one are capricious and greatly flagitious, the other raſcally and mean, the crimes of each ariſing from their different exceſſes: nor will they go through the different offices of the State; which is detrimental to it: beſides, thoſe who excell in ſtrength, in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know how, nor are willing to ſubmit to command: and this begins at home when they are boys; for there they are brought up too delicately to be accuſtomed to obey their preceptors: as for the very Poor, their general and exceſſive want of

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what the Rich enjoy, reduces them to a ſtate too mean: ſo that the one know not how to command, but to be commanded as Slaves, the others know not how to ſubmit to any command, nor to command themſelves, but with deſpotic power. A City compoſed of ſuch men muſt therefore conſiſt of Slaves and Maſters, not Freemen; where one party muſt hate, and the other deſpiſe, where there could be no poſſibility of friendſhip or political community: for community ſuppoſes affection; for we do not even on the road aſſociate with our enemies. It is alſo the genius of a City to be compoſed as much as poſſible of Equals; which will be moſt ſo when the inhabitants are in the middle ſtate: from whence it follows, that that City muſt be beſt framed which is compoſed of thoſe whom we ſay are naturally its proper members. It is men of this ſtation alſo who will be beſt aſſured of ſafety and protection; for they will neither covet what belongs to others, as the Poor do; nor will others covet what is theirs, as the Poor do what belongs to the Rich; and thus, without plotting againſt any one, or having any one plot againſt them, they will live free from danger: for which reaſon Phocylides wiſely wiſhes for the middle ſtate, as being moſt productive of happineſs. It is plain, then, that the moſt perfect political Community muſt be amongſt thoſe who are in the middle rank, and thoſe

States

States are beſt inſtituted wherein theſe are a larger and more reſpectable part, if poſſible, than both the other; or, if that cannot be, at leaſt than either of them ſeparate; ſo that being thrown into the balance it may prevent either ſcale from preponderating. It is therefore the greateſt happineſs which the Citizens can enjoy, to poſſeſs a moderate and convenient fortune; for when ſome poſſeſs too much, and others nothing at all, the Government muſt either be in the hands of the meaneſt rabble, or elſe a pure Oligarchy; or, from the exceſſes of both, a Tyranny; for this ariſes from a headſtrong Democracy, or an Oligarchy, but very ſeldom when the members of the Community are nearly on an equality with each other. We will aſſign a reaſon for this when we come to treat of the alterations which different States are likely to undergo. The middle ſtate is therefore beſt, as being leaſt liable to thoſe ſeditions and inſurrections which diſturb the Community; and for the ſame reaſon extenſive Governments are leaſt liable to theſe inconveniences; for there thoſe in a middle ſtate are very numerous, whereas in ſmall ones it is eaſy to paſs to the two extremes, ſo as hardly to have any in a medium remaining, but the one half rich, the other poor: and from the ſame principle it is that Democracies are more firmly eſtabliſhed, and of longer continuance than Oligarchies; but even in thoſe when there is a want of a proper number

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of men of middling fortune, the Poor extend their power too far, abuſes ariſe, and the Government is ſoon at an end. We ought to conſider as a proof of what I now advance, that the beſt Lawgivers themſelves were thoſe in the middle rank of life, amongſt whom was Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was not a king, and Charondas, and indeed moſt others. What has been ſaid will ſhew us, why of ſo many Free States, ſome have changed to Democracies, others to Oligarchies: for whenever the number of thoſe in the middle ſtate has been too ſmall, thoſe who were the more numerous, whether the Rich or the Poor, always over-powered them, and aſſumed to themſelves the adminiſtration of public affairs; from hence aroſe either a Democracy or an Oligarchy. Moreover, when in conſequence of their diſputes and quarrels with each other, either the Rich get the better of the Poor, or the Poor of the Rich, neither of them will eſtabliſh a Free State; but, as the record of their Victory, one which inclines to their own principles, and form either a Democracy, or an Oligarchy.

Thoſe who made conqueſts in Greece, having all of them an eye to the reſpective forms of Government in their own Cities, eſtabliſhed either Democracies or Oligarchies, not conſidering what was ſerviceable to the State,

State, but what was ſimilar to their own; for which reaſon a Government has never been eſtabliſhed, where the ſupreme power has been placed amongſt thoſe of the middling rank, or very ſeldom; and, amongſt a few, one man only of thoſe who have yet been conquerors has been perſuaded to give the preference to this order of men: it is indeed an eſtabliſhed cuſtom with the inhabitants of moſt Cities, not to deſire an equality, but either to aſpire to govern, or when they are conquered to ſubmit. Thus we have ſhewn what the beſt State is, and why. It will not be difficult to perceive, of the many States which there are, for we have ſeen that there are various forms both of Democracies and Oligarchies, to which we ſhould give the firſt place, to which the ſecond, and in the ſame manner the next alſo; and to obſerve what are the particular excellencies and defects of each, after we have firſt deſcribed the beſt poſſible; for that muſt be the beſt which is neareſt to this, that worſt which is moſt diſtant from the medium, without any one has a particular plan of his own which he judges by. I mean by this, that it may happen, that although one form of Government may be better than another, yet there is no reaſon to prevent another from being preferable thereunto in particular circumſtances, and for particular purpoſes.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

AFTER what has been ſaid it follows, that we ſhould now ſhow what particular Form of Government is moſt ſuitable for particular perſons; firſt laying this down as a general maxim, that that party which deſires to ſupport the actual adminiſtration of the State, ought always to be ſuperior to that which would alter it. Every City is made up of Quality and Quantity: by Quality I mean liberty, riches, education, and family, and by Quantity its relative populouſneſs: now it may happen, that Quality may exiſt in one of thoſe parts of which the City is compoſed, and Quantity in another; thus, the number of the Ignoble may be greater than the number of thoſe of Family, the number of the Poor than that of the Rich; but not ſo that the Quantity of the one ſhall over-balance the Quality of the other; thoſe muſt be properly adjuſted to each other; for where the number of the Poor exceeds the proportion we have mentioned, there a Democracy will riſe up, and if the Huſbandry ſhould have more power than others, it will be a Democracy of Huſbandmen; and the Democracy will be a particular ſpecies according to that claſs of men which may happen to be moſt numerous: thus,

ſhould theſe be the Huſbandmen, it will be of theſe, and the beſt; if of Mechanics and thoſe who hire themſelves out, the worſt poſſible: in the ſame manner it may be of any other ſet between theſe two. But when the Rich and the Noble prevail more by their Quality, than they are deficient in Quantity, there an Oligarchy enſues; and this Oligarchy may be of different ſpecies, according to the nature of the prevailing party. Every Legiſlator in framing his conſtitution ought to have a particular regard to thoſe in the Middle Rank of life; and if he intends an Oligarchy, theſe ſhould be the object of his Laws; if a Democracy, to theſe they ſhould be entruſted; and whenever their number exceeds that of the two others, or at leaſt one of them, they give ſtability to the Conſtitution; for there is no fear, that the Rich and the Poor ſhould agree to conſpire together againſt them, for neither of theſe will chuſe to ſerve the other. If any one would chuſe to fix the Adminiſtration on the wideſt baſis, he will find none preferable to this; for to rule by turns is what the Rich and the Poor will not ſubmit to, on account of their hatred to each other. It is moreover allowed, that an Arbitrator is the moſt proper perſon for both parties to truſt to; now this Arbitrator is the Middle Rank.

Thoſe who would eſtabliſh Ariſtocratical Governments are miſtaken not only in giving too much power to

to the Rich, but alſo in deceiving the common people; for at laſt, inſtead of an imaginary good, they muſt feel a real evil, for the encroachments of the Rich are more deſtructive to the State than thoſe of the Poor.

CHAP. XIII.

THERE are five particulars, in which, under fair pretences, they craftily endeavour to undermine the Rights of the People, theſe are their public aſſemblies, their offices of State, their courts of juſtice, their military power, and their Gymnaſtic exerciſes. With reſpect to their public aſſemblies; in having them open to all, but in fining the Rich only, or others very little, for not attending: with reſpect to offices, in permitting the Poor to ſwear off, but not granting this indulgence to thoſe who are within the Cenſus; with reſpect to their courts of juſtice, in fining the Rich for non-attendance, but the Poor not at all, or thoſe a great deal, and theſe very little, as was done by the Laws of Charondas. In ſome places every Citizen who was inrolled had a right to attend the public aſſemblies, and to try cauſes; which if they did not do, a very heavy fine was laid upon them;

that through fear of the fine, they might avoid being inrolled, as they were then obliged to do neither the one or the other. The ſame ſpirit of Legiſlation prevailed with reſpect to their bearing arms and their Gymnaſtic exerciſes; for the Poor are excuſed, if they have no arms, but the Rich are fined; the ſame method takes place if they do not attend their Gymnaſtic exerciſes, there is no penalty on one, but there is on the other: the conſequence of which is, that the fear of this penalty induces the Rich to keep the one, and attend the other, while the Poor do neither. Theſe are the deceitful contrivances of Oligarchical Legiſlators. The contrary prevails in a Democracy; for there they make the Poor a proper allowance for attending the aſſemblies and the courts, but give the Rich nothing for doing it: whence it is evident, that if any one would properly blend theſe Cuſtoms together, they muſt extend both the pay, and the fine, to every member of the Community, and then every one would ſhare in it, whereas part only now do. The Citizens of a Free State ought to conſiſt of thoſe only who bear arms: with reſpect to their Cenſus it is not eaſy to determine exactly what it ought to be, but the rule that ſhould direct upon this ſubject ſhould be, to make it as extenſive as poſſible, ſo that thoſe who are inrolled in it make up a greater part of the people

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than thoſe who are not; for thoſe who are poor, although they partake not of the offices of the State, are willing to live quiet, provided that no one diſturbs them in their property: but this is not an eaſy matter; for it may not always happen, that thoſe who are at the head of public affairs are of a humane behaviour. In time of war the Poor are accuſtomed to ſhew no alacrity without they have proviſions found them; when they have, then indeed they are willing to fight. In ſome Governments the power is veſted not only in thoſe who bear arms, but alſo in thoſe who have borne them. Among the Malienſes, the State was compoſed of theſe latter only, for all the officers were ſoldiers who had ſerved their time. And the firſt States in Greece which ſucceeded thoſe, where Kingly power was eſtabliſhed, were governed by the Military. Firſt of all the horſe, for at that time the ſtrength, and excellence of the army depended on the horſe, for as to the heavy-armed foot they were uſeleſs without proper diſcipline; but the art of Tactics was not known to the Antients, for which reaſon their ſtrength lay in their horſe: but when Cities grew larger, and they depended more on their foot, greater numbers partook of the freedom of the City; for which reaſon what we call Republics were formerly called Democracies. The Antient Governments were

properly Oligarchies or Kingdoms; for on account of the few perſons in each State, it would have been impoſſible to have found a ſufficient number of the Middle Rank; ſo theſe being but few, and thoſe uſed to ſubordination, they more eaſily ſubmitted to be governed. We have now ſhewn why there are many ſorts of Governments, and others different from thoſe we have treated of: for there are more ſpecies of Democracies than one, and the like is true of other forms, and what are their differences, and whence they ariſe; and alſo of all others which is the beſt, at leaſt in general; and which is beſt ſuited for particular people.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

WE will now proceed to make ſome general reflections upon all Governments, and alſo to conſider each of them in particular, in the order which follows; beginning with thoſe principles which appertain to each: now there are three things in all States which a careful Legiſlator ought well to conſider, which are of great conſequence to all, and which properly attended to the State muſt neceſſarily be happy; and according to the variation of which the one will differ from the other. The firſt of theſe is the public aſſembly; the ſecond the officers of the State, that is, who they ought to be, and with what power they ſhould be intruſted, and in what manner they ſhould be appointed; the third, the judicial department. Now it is the proper buſineſs of the public aſſembly to determine concerning war and peace, making or breaking off alliances, to enact laws, to ſentence to death, baniſhment, or confiſcation of goods, and to call the Magiſtrates to account for their behaviour when in office. Now theſe powers muſt neceſſarily be intruſted to the Citizens in general, or all of them to ſome; either to one Magiſtrate or more; or ſome to one, and ſome to another, or ſome to all, but others to

ſome:

ſome: to intruſt all to all is in the ſpirit of a Democracy, for the People aim at Equality. There are many methods of delegating theſe powers to the Citizens at large, one of which is, to let them execute them by turn, and not altogether, as was done by Tellecles, the Mileſian, in his State. In others the ſupreme council is compoſed of the different Magiſtrates, and they ſucceed to the offices of the Community by proper diviſions of tribes, wards, and other very ſmall proportions, till every one in his turn goes through them: nor does the whole Community ever meet together, without it is when new Laws are enacted, or ſo menational affair is debated, or to hear what the Magiſtrates have to propoſe to them. Another method is, for the People to meet in a collective body, but only for the purpoſe of holding the Comitia, making Laws, determining concerning war or peace, and inquiring into the conduct of their Magiſtrates, while the remaining part of the public buſineſs is conducted by the Magiſtrates, who have their ſeparate departments, and are choſen out of the whole Community either by vote, or ballot. Another method is, for the People in general to meet for the choice of the Magiſtrates, and to examine into their conduct; and alſo to deliberate concerning war and alliances, and to leave other things to the Magiſtrates, whoever happen to be choſen,

choſen, whoſe particular employments are ſuch, as neceſſarily require perſons well ſkilled therein. A fourth method is, for every perſon to deliberate upon every ſubject in public aſſembly, where the Magiſtrates can determine nothing of themſelves, and have only the privilege of giving their opinions firſt; and this is the method of the moſt pure Democracy, which is analogous to the proceedings in a Dynaſtic Oligarchy, and a Tyrannic Monarchy. Theſe then are the methods in which public buſineſs is conducted in a Democracy. When the power is in the hands of part of the Community only, it is an Oligarchy, and this alſo admits of different cuſtoms; for whenever the officers of the State, are choſen out of thoſe who have a moderate fortune, and theſe from that circumſtance are many, and when they depart not from that line which the Law has laid down, but carefully follow it, and when all within the Cenſus are eligible, certainly it is then an Oligarchy, but founded on true principles of Government from its moderation. When the People in general do not partake of the deliberative power, but certain perſons choſe for that purpoſe, who govern according to Law; this alſo, like the firſt, is an Oligarchy. When thoſe who have the deliberative power elect each other, and the ſon ſucceeds to the father, and when they can ſuperſede the

Laws, ſuch a Government is of neceſſity a ſtrict Oligarchy. When ſome perſons determine on one thing, and others on another, as war and peace, and when all inquire into the conduct of their Magiſtrates, and other things are left to different officers, elected either by vote or lot, then the Government is an Ariſtocracy or a Free State. When ſome are choſen by vote and others by lot, and theſe either from the People in general, or from a certain number elected for that purpoſe, or if both the votes and the lots are open to all, ſuch a State is partly an Ariſtocracy, partly a free Government itſelf. Theſe are the different methods in which the deliberative power is veſted in different States, all of whom follow ſome regulation here laid down.

It is advantageous to a Democracy, in the preſent ſenſe of the word, by which I mean a State wherein the People at large have a ſupreme power, even over the Laws, to hold frequent public aſſemblies; and it will be beſt in this particular to imitate the example of Oligarchies in their courts of juſtice; for they fine thoſe who are appointed to try cauſes, if they do not attend, ſo ſhould they reward the Poor, for coming to the public aſſemblies: and their Counſels will be beſt when all adviſe with each other, the Citizens with the Nobles, the Nobles with the Citizens. It is alſo adviſeable when

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the Council is to be compoſed of part of the Citizens, to elect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both ranks. It is alſo proper, if the Common People in the State are very numerous, either not to pay every one for his attendance, but ſuch a number only, as will make them equal to the Nobles, or to reject many of them by lot. In an Oligarchy they ſhould either call up ſome of the Common People to the Council, or elſe eſtabliſh a court, as is done in ſome other States, whom they call Preadviſers or Guardians of the Laws, whoſe buſineſs ſhould be, to propoſe firſt what they ſhould afterwards enact. By this means the People would have a place in the Adminiſtration of public affairs, without having it in their power to occaſion any diſorder in the Government. Moreover, the People may be allowed to have a vote in whatever bill is propoſed, but may not themſelves propoſe any thing contrary thereto; or they may give their advice, while the power of determining may be with the Magiſtrates only. It is alſo neceſſary to follow a contrary practice to what is eſtabliſhed in Democracies, for the People ſhould be allowed the power of pardoning, but not of condemning, for the cauſe ſhould be referred back again to the Magiſtrates: whereas the contrary takes place in Republics; for the power of pardoning is with the Few, but not of condemning, which is always

referred to the People at large. And thus we determine concerning the deliberative power in any State, and in whoſe hands it ſhall be.

CHAP. XV.

WE now proceed to conſider the Choice of Magiſtrates; for this branch of public buſineſs contains many different parts, as how many there ſhall be, what ſhall be their particular office, and with reſpect to time how long each of them ſhall continue in place; for ſome make it ſix months, others ſhorter, others for a year, others for a much longer time; or whether they ſhould be perpetual, or for a long time, or neither; for the ſame perſon may fill the ſame office ſeveral times, or he may not be allowed to enjoy it even twice, but only once: and alſo with reſpect to the appointment of Magiſtrates, who are to be eligible, who is to chuſe them, and in what manner; for in all theſe particulars we ought properly to diſtinguiſh the different ways which may be followed; and then to ſhow, which of theſe is beſt ſuited to ſuch and ſuch Governments. Now it is not eaſy to determine to whom we ought properly to give

give the name of Magiſtrate, for a Government requires many perſons in office; but every one of thoſe who is either choſen by vote or lot is not to be reckoned a Magiſtrate. The prieſts, for inſtance, in the firſt place; for theſe are to be conſidered as very different from Civil Magiſtrates: to theſe we may add the Choregi, and Heralds; nay, even Embaſſadors are elected: there are ſome civil employments which belong to the Citizens; and theſe are either, when they are all engaged in one thing, as when as ſoldiers they obey their general, or when part of them only are, as in governing the women or educating the youth; and alſo ſome œconomic, for they often elect corn-meters: others are ſervile, and in which, if they are rich, they employ Slaves. But indeed they are moſt properly called Magiſtrates, who are members of the deliberative council, or decide cauſes, or are in ſome command, the laſt more eſpecially, for to command is peculiar to Magiſtrates. But, to ſpeak truth, this queſtion is of no great conſequence, nor is it the province of the judges, to decide between thoſe who diſpute about words; it may indeed be an object of ſpeculative inquiry; but to inquire what officers are neceſſary in a State, and how many, and what, tho' not moſt neceſſary, may yet be advantageous in a well-eſtabliſhed Government, is a much more uſeful employment, and this with reſpect to all

States in general, as well as to ſmall Cities. In extenſive Governments it is proper to allot one employment to one perſon, as there are many to ſerve the public in ſo numerous a ſociety, where ſome may be paſſed over for a long time, and others never be in office but once; and indeed every thing is better done which has the whole attention of one perſon, than when that attion is divided amongſt many; but in ſmall States it is neceſſary that a few of the Citizens ſhould execute many employments; for their numbers are ſo ſmall it will not be convenient to have many of them in office at the ſame time; for where ſhall we find others to ſucceed them in turn? Small States will ſometimes want the ſame Magiſtrates and the ſame Laws as large ones; but the one will not want to employ them ſo often as the other; ſo that different charges may be intruſted to the ſame perſon without any inconvenience, for they will not interfere with each other, and for want of ſufficient members in the Community it will be neceſſary. If we could tell how many Magiſtrates are neceſſary in every City, and how many, though not neceſſary, it is yet proper to have, we could then the better know how many different offices one might aſſign to one Magiſtrate. It is alſo neceſſary to know, what tribunals in different places ſhould have different things under their juriſdiction, and alſo what

things

things ſhould always come under the cognizance of the ſame Magiſtrate; as for inſtance, decency of manners, ſhall the clerk of the market take cognizance of that, if the cauſe ariſes in the market, and another Magiſtrate in another place, or the ſame Magiſtrate every-where: or ſhall there be a diſtinction made of the fact, or the parties? as for inſtance, in decency of manners, ſhall it be one cauſe when it relates to a man, another when it relates to a woman?

In different States, ſhall the Magiſtrates be different or the ſame? I mean, whether in a Democracy, an Oligarchy, an Ariſtocracy, and a Monarchy, the ſame perſons ſhall have the ſame power? or ſhall it vary according to the different formation of the Government? as in an Ariſtocracy the offices of the State are allotted to thoſe who are well educated; in an Oligarchy to thoſe who are rich; in a Democracy to the freemen? Or ſhall the Magiſtrates differ, as the Communities differ? For it may happen that the very ſame may be ſometimes proper, ſometimes otherwiſe: in this State it may be neceſſary that the Magiſtrate have great powers, in that but ſmall. There are alſo certain Magiſtrates peculiar to certain States; as the Preadviſers are not proper in a Democracy, but a Senate is; for one ſuch order is neceſſary, whoſe buſineſs ſhall be to conſider before-hand and prepare thoſe bills which ſhall be

be brought before the People, that they may have leiſure to attend to their own affairs; and when theſe are few in number, the State inclines to an Oligarchy. The Preadviſers indeed muſt always be few; for they are peculiar to an Oligarchy: and where there are both theſe offices in the ſame State, the Preadviſer's is ſuperior to the Senator's, the one having only a Democratical power, the other an Oligarchical: and indeed the power of the Senate is loſt in thoſe Democracies, in which the People, meeting in one public aſſembly, take all the buſineſs into their own hands; and this is likely to happen either when the Community in general are in eaſy circumſtances, or when they are paid for their attendance; for they are then at leiſure often to meet together, and determine every thing for themſelves. A Magiſtrate whoſe buſineſs is to controul the manners of the boys, or women, or who takes any department ſimilar to this, is to be found in an Ariſtocracy, not in a Democracy; for who can forbid the wives of the Poor from appearing in public? neither is ſuch a one to be met with in an Oligarchy; for the women there are too delicate to bear controul. And thus much for this ſubject. Let us endeavour to treat at large of the eſtabliſhment of Magiſtrates, beginning from firſt principles. Now, they differ from each other in three ways, from which, blended together, all the varieties which can

can be imagined ariſe. The firſt of theſe differences is in thoſe who appoint the Magiſtrates, the ſecond conſiſts in thoſe who are appointed, the third in the mode of appointment; and each of theſe three differ in three manners; for either all the Citizens may appoint collectively, or ſome out of their whole body, or ſome out of a particular order in it, according to fortune, family, or virtue, or ſome other rule (as at Megara, where the right of election was amongſt thoſe who had returned together to their country, and had reinſtated themſelves by force of arms) and this either by vote or lot. Again, theſe ſeveral modes may be differently formed together, as ſome Magiſtrates may be choſe by part of the Community, others by the whole; ſome out of part, others out of the whole; ſome by vote, others by lot: and each of theſe different modes admit of a four-fold ſubdiviſion; for either all may elect all by vote, or by lot; and when all elect, they may either proceed without any diſtinction, or they may elect by a certain diviſion of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through the whole Community: and ſome Magiſtrates may be elected one way, and others another. Again, if ſome Magiſtrates are elected either by vote or lot of all the Citizens, or by the vote of ſome and the lot of ſome, or ſome one way and ſome another; that is to ſay, ſome by the vote of

all, others by the lot of all, there will then be twelve different methods of electing the Magiſtrates, without blending the two together. Of theſe there are two adapted to a Democracy; namely, to have all the Magiſtrates choſen out of all the People, either by vote or lot, or both; that is to ſay, ſome of them by lot, ſome by vote. In a Free State the whole Community ſhould not elect at the ſame time, but ſome out of the whole, or out of ſome particular rank; and this either by lot, or vote, or both: and they ſhould elect either out of the whole Community, or out of ſome particular perſons in it, and this both by lot and vote. In an Oligarchy it is proper to chuſe ſome Magiſtrates out of the whole body of the Citizens, ſome by vote, ſome by lot, others by both: by lot is moſt correſpondent to that form of Government. In a Free Ariſtocracy, ſome Magiſtrates ſhould be choſe out of the Community in general, others out of a particular rank, or theſe by choice, thoſe by lot. In a pure Oligarchy, the Magiſtrates ſhould be choſe out of certain ranks, and by certain perſons, and ſome of thoſe by lot, others by both methods; but to chuſe them out of the whole Community is not correſpondent to the nature of this Government. It is proper in an Ariſtocracy for the whole Community to elect their Magiſtrates out of particular perſons, and this by vote.

vote. Theſe then are all the different ways of electing of Magiſtrates; and they have been allotted according to the nature of the different Communities; but what mode of proceeding is proper for different Communities, or how the offices ought to be eſtabliſhed, or with what powers, ſhall be particularly explained. I mean by the powers of a Magiſtrate, what ſhould be his particular province, as the management of the Finances or the Laws of the State; for different Magiſtrates have different powers, as that of the General of the army differs from the Clerk of the market.

CHAP. XVI.

OF the three parts of which a Government is formed, we now come to conſider the Judicial; and this alſo we ſhall divide in the ſame manner as we did the Magiſterial, into three parts. Of whom the Judges ſhall conſiſt, and for what Cauſes, and how. When I ſay, of whom, I mean, whether they ſhall be the whole People, or ſome particulars; by, for what Cauſes, I mean, how many different courts ſhall be appointed; by, how, whether they ſhall be elected by vote or lot. Let us firſt determine, how many different courts there ought to be. Now theſe are eight. The firſt of theſe is the Court of Inſpection, over the behaviour of the Magiſtrates, when they have quitted their office; the ſecond is, to puniſh thoſe who have injured the Public; the third is, to take cognizance of thoſe cauſes in which the State is a party; the fourth is, to decide between Magiſtrates and private perſons, who appeal from a fine laid upon them; the fifth is, to determine diſputes which may ariſe concerning contracts of great value; the ſixth is, to judge between Foreigners, and of murders, of which there are different ſpecies; and theſe may all be tried by the ſame judges, or by different ones; for there are murders of malice

lice prepenſe, and of chance-medley; there is alſo juſtifiable homicide, where the fact is admitted, and the legality of it diſputed. There is alſo another court, called at Athens the Court of Phreattæ, which determines points relating to a murder committed by one who has run away, to decide whether he ſhall return; tho' ſuch an affair happens but ſeldom, and in very large Cities; the ſeventh, to determine cauſes wherein Strangers are concerned, and this, whether they are between Stranger and Stranger, or between a Stranger and a Citizen. The eighth and laſt is, for ſmall actions, from one to five drachma's, or a little more; for theſe ought alſo to be legally determined, but not to be brought before the whole body of the judges. But without entering into any particulars concerning actions for murder, and thoſe wherein Strangers are the parties, let us particularly treat of thoſe courts which have the juriſdiction of thoſe matters which more particularly relate to the affairs of the Community, and which, if not well conducted, occaſion ſeditions and commotions in the State. Now, of neceſſity, either all perſons muſt have a right to judge of all theſe different cauſes, appointed for that purpoſe, either by vote or lot, or all of all, ſome of them by vote, and others by lot, or in ſome cauſes by vote, in others by lot. Thus there will be four ſorts of judges. There will be juſt the ſame

number alſo if they are choſen out of part of the People only; for either all the judges muſt be choſen out of that part either by vote or lot, or ſome by lot and ſome by vote, or the judges in particular cauſes mu t be choſen ſome by vote, others by lot; by which means there will be the ſame number of them alſo as was mentioned. Beſides, different judges may be joined together; I mean, thoſe who are choſen out of the whole People, or part of them, or both; ſo that all three may ſit together in the ſame court, and this either by vote, lot, or both. And thus much for the different ſorts of judges. Of theſe appointments that which admits all the Community to be judges in all cauſes, is moſt ſuitable to a Democracy; the ſecond, which appoints that certain perſons ſhall judge all cauſes, to an Oligarchy; the third, which appoints the whole Community to be judges in ſome cauſes, but particular perſons in others, to an Ariſtocracy or Free State.

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ON

GOVERNMENT.

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

WE have now gone through thoſe particulars we propoſed to ſpeak of; it remains that we next conſider from what cauſes, and how alterations in Government ariſe, and of what nature they are, and to what the deſtruction of each State is owing; and alſo to what form, any form of Polity is moſt likely to ſhift into, and what are the means to be uſed for the general preſervation of Governments, as well as what are applicable to any particular State; and alſo of the remedies which

which are to be applied either to all in general, or to any one conſidered ſeparately, when they are in a ſtate of corruption: and here we ought firſt to lay down this principle, That there are many Governments, all of which approve of what is juſt and what is analogically equal; and yet have failed from attaining thereunto, as we have already mentioned; thus Democracies have aroſe from ſuppoſing, that thoſe who are equal in one thing, are ſo in every other circumſtance; as, becauſe they are equal in liberty, they are equal in every thing elſe; and Oligarchies, from ſuppoſing, that thoſe who are unequal in one thing, are unequal in all; that when men are ſo in point of fortune, that inequality extends to every thing elſe. Hence it follows, that thoſe who in ſome reſpects are equal with others, think it right to endeavour to partake of an equality with them in every thing; and thoſe who are ſuperior to others, endeavour to get ſtill more; and it is this *more* which is the inequality: thus moſt States, tho' they have ſome notion of what is juſt, yet are almoſt totally wrong; and, upon this account, when either party has not that ſhare in the Adminiſtration which anſwers to his expectations, he becomes ſeditious: but thoſe who of all others have the greateſt right to be ſo, are the laſt that are; namely, thoſe who excel in Virtue; for it is moſt reaſonable that their ſuperiority alone

ſhould

ſhould be general. There are too ſome perſons of diſtinguiſhed Families, who, becauſe they are ſo, diſdain to be on an equality with others, for thoſe eſteem themſelves noble who boaſt of their anceſtors merit and fortune: theſe, to ſpeak truth, are the origin and fountain from whence ſeditions ariſe. The alterations which men may propoſe to make in Governments are two; for either they may change the ſtate already eſtabliſhed into ſome other, as when they propoſe to erect an Oligarchy, where there is a Democracy; or a Democracy, or Free State, where there is an Oligarchy, or an Ariſtocracy from theſe, or thoſe from that; or elſe, when they have no objection to the eſtabliſhed Government, which they like very well, but chuſe to have the ſole management in it themſelves; either in the hands of a few, or one only. They will alſo raiſe commotions concerning the degree, in which they would have the eſtabliſhed power; as if, for inſtance, the Government is an Oligarchy, to have it more purely ſo, and in the ſame manner if it is a Democracy, or elſe to have it leſs ſo; and, in like manner, whatever may be the nature of the Government, either to extend, or contract its powers; or elſe to make ſome alterations in ſome parts of it; as to eſtabliſh, or aboliſh a particular Magiſtracy, as ſome perſons ſay Lyſander endeavoured to aboliſh the Kingly

power in Sparta; and Pauſanias, that of the Ephori. Thus in Epidamnus there was an alteration in one part of the Conſtitution, for inſtead of the Philarchi they eſtabliſhed a Senate. It is alſo neceſſary for all the Magiſtrates at Athens to attend in the court of Elæa when any new Magiſtrate is created: the power of the Archon alſo in that State partakes of the nature of an Oligarchy: Inequality is always the occaſion of ſedition, but not when thoſe who are unequal, are treated in a different manner correſpondent to that inequality. Thus Kingly power is unequal, when exerciſed over equals. Upon the whole, thoſe who aim after an equality are the cauſe of ſeditions. Equality is twofold, either in number, or value. Equality in number is when two things contain the ſame parts, or the ſame quantity; Equality in value is, by proportion, as two exceeds one, and three two by the ſame number; thus by proportion four exceeds two, and two one in the ſame degree, for two is the ſame part of four, that one is of two; that is to ſay, half. Now, all agree in what is abſolutely and ſimply juſt; but, as we have already ſaid, they diſpute concerning proportionate value; for ſome perſons, if they are equal in one reſpect, think themſelves equal in all; others, if they are ſuperior in one thing, think they may claim the ſuperiority in all; from whence chiefly

chiefly ariſe two ſorts of Governments, a Democracy and an Oligarchy; for Nobility and Virtue are to be found only amongſt a few; the contrary, amongſt the many; there being in no place a hundred of the firſt to be met with, but enough of the laſt, every where. But to eſtabliſh a Government, intirely upon either of theſe equalities, is wrong, and this the example of thoſe ſo eſtabliſhed makes evident, for none of them have been ſtable; and for this reaſon, that it is impoſſible that whatever is wrong at the firſt, and in its principles ſhould not at laſt meet with a bad end: for which reaſon in ſome things an equality of Numbers ought to take place, in others an equality in Value. However, a Democracy is ſafer and leſs liable to ſedition than an Oligarchy; for in this latter it may ariſe from two cauſes, for either the few in power may conſpire againſt each other, or againſt the People; but in a Democracy only one; namely, againſt the Few who aim at excluſive power; but there is no inſtance worth ſpeaking of, of a ſedition of the People againſt themſelves. Moreover, a Government compoſed of men of moderate fortunes comes much nearer to a Democracy than an Oligarchy, and is the ſafeſt of all ſuch States.

CHAP. II.

SINCE we are inquiring into the cauſes of ſeditions and revolutions in Governments, we muſt begin intirely with the firſt principles from whence they ariſe. Now theſe, ſo to ſpeak, are nearly three in number; which we muſt firſt diſtinguiſh in general from each other, and endeavour to ſhew, in what ſituation people are who begin a Sedition; and for what cauſes; and, thirdly, what are the beginnings of political troubles and mutual quarrels with each other. Now, that cauſe which of all others moſt univerſally inclines men to deſire to bring about a change in Government, is that which I have already mentioned; for thoſe who aim at equality will be every ready for Sedition, if they ſee thoſe whom they eſteem their equals poſſeſs more than they do, as well as thoſe alſo who are not content with equality but aim at ſuperiority, if they think, that while they deſerve more than, they have only equal with, or leſs than, their inferiors. Now, what they aim at may be either juſt or unjuſt; juſt, when thoſe who are inferior are ſeditious, that they may be equal; unjuſt, when thoſe who are equal, are ſo, that they may be ſuperior. Theſe then, are the ſituations in which men will be ſeditious: the cauſes for which they will be

ſo are profit and honour; and their contrary: for, to avoid diſhonour or loſs of fortune by mulcts, either on their own account or their friends, they will raiſe a commotion in the State. The original cauſes which diſpoſe men to the things which I have mentioned, are, taken in one manner, ſeven in number, in another they are more; two of which are the ſame with thoſe that have been already mentioned: but influencing in a different manner; for profit and honour ſharpen men againſt each other; not to get the poſſeſſion of them for themſelves (which was what I juſt now ſuppoſed) but when they ſee others, ſome juſtly, others unjuſtly, engroſſing them. The other cauſes are, haughtineſs, fear, eminence, contempt, envy of one who has a fortune beyond his rank. There are alſo other things which in a different manner will occaſion Revolutions in Governments; as when very low people combine together to manage the State, neglect, want of numbers, a too-great diſſimilarity of circumſtances.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

WHAT influence ill-treatment and profit have for this purpoſe, and how they may be the cauſes of Sedition, is almoſt ſelf-evident; for when the Magiſtrates are haughty, and endeavour to make greater profits than their office gives them, they not only occaſion Seditions amongſt each other, but againſt the State alſo who gave them their power; and this their avarice has two objects, either private property, or the property of the State. What influence Honours have, and how they may occaſion Sedition, is evident enough; for thoſe who are themſelves unhonoured while they ſee others honoured, will be ready for any diſturbance: and theſe things are done unjuſtly, when any one is either honoured or diſcarded contrary to their deſerts, juſtly when they are, according to them. Exceſſive honours are alſo a cauſe of Sedition, when one perſon or more are greater than the State, and the power of the Government can permit; for then a Monarchy, or a Dynaſty are uſually eſtabliſhed: on which account the Oſtraciſm was introduced in ſome places, as at Argos and Athens: though it is better to guard againſt ſuch exceſſes in the founding of a State, than when they have been permitted to take

place,

place, to correct them afterward. Thoſe who have been guilty of crimes will be the cauſe of Sedition, through fear of puniſhment; as will thoſe alſo who expect an injury, that they may prevent it; as was the caſe at Rhodes, when the Nobles conſpired againſt the People, on account of the decrees they expected would paſs againſt them. Contempt alſo is a cauſe of Sedition and conſpiracies; as in Oligarchies, where there are many who have no ſhare in the Adminiſtration. The Rich alſo even in Democracies, deſpiſing the diſorder and anarchy which will ariſe, hope to better themſelves by the ſame means, which happened at Thebes, after the battle of Oenophiton, where, in conſequence of bad adminiſtration, the Democracy was deſtroyed; as it was at Megara, where the power of the People was loſt, through anarchy and diſorder; the ſame thing happened at Syracuſe, before the tyranny of Galon; and at Rhodes there was the ſame Seditions before the Popular Government was overthrown. Revolutions in State will alſo ariſe from a diſproportionate increaſe; for as the body conſiſts of many parts, it ought to increaſe proportionably to preſerve its ſymmetry, which would otherwiſe be deſtroyed; as if the foot was to be four cubits long, and the reſt of the body but two palms; it might otherwiſe be changed into

into an animal of a different form, if it increaſe beyond proportion not only in quantity, but alſo in diſpoſition of parts; ſo alſo a City conſiſts of parts, ſome of which may often increaſe without notice, as the number of Poor in Democracies and Free States. They will alſo ſometimes happen by accident, as at Tarentum, a little after the Medeian war, where ſo many of the Nobles were killed in a battle by the Japigi, that from a Free State, the Government was turned into a Democracy; and at Argos, where ſo many of the Citizens were killed by Cleomenes the Spartan, that they were obliged to admit ſeveral huſbandmen to the Freedom of the State: and at Athens, through the unfortunate event of the war by land, the number of the Nobles were reduced, by their being choſen into the troops in the Lacedæmonian wars. Revolutions alſo ſometimes take place in a Democracy, though ſeldomer; for where the Poor increaſe faſter than Men of Property, they become Oligarchies or Dynaſties. Governments alſo ſometimes alter without Seditions, by a combination of the meaner people; as at Heræa: for which purpoſe they changed the mode of election from votes to lots, and thus got themſelves choſen: and by negligence, as when the Citizens admit thoſe who are not friends to the Conſtitution into the chief offices of the State, which happened at Orus,

when

when the Oligarchy of the Archons was put an end to at the election of Heracleodorus, who changed that form of Government into a Democratic Free State. By little and little, I mean by this, that very often great alterations ſilently take place in the Form of Government, from people's overlooking ſmall matters; as at Ambracia, where the Cenſus was originally ſmall, but at laſt became nothing at all, as if a little and nothing at all were nearly or entirely alike. That State alſo is liable to Seditions which is compoſed of different nations, till their differences are blended together and undiſtinguiſhable; for as a City cannot be compoſed of every multitude, ſo neither can it in every given time; for which reaſon all thoſe Republics which have hitherto been originally compoſed of different people, or afterwards admitted their neighbours to the freedom of their City, have been moſt liable to Revolutions; as when the Achæans joined with the Træzenians in founding Sybaris; for ſoon after, growing more powerful than the Træzenians, they expelled them from the City; from whence came the proverb of Sybarite wickedneſs: and again, diſputes from a like cauſe happened at Thurium, between the Sybarites and thoſe who had joined with them in building the City; for they aſſuming upon theſe, on account of the country being their own, were driven

out. And at Byzantium the new Citizens, being detected in plots againſt the State, were driven out of the City by force of arms. The Antiſſeans alſo, having taken in thoſe who were baniſhed from Chios, afterwards did the ſame thing; and alſo the Zancleans, after having taken in the people of Samos. The Appolloniats, in the Euxine Sea, having admitted their Sojourners to the Freedom of their City, were troubled with Seditions: and the Syracuſians, after the expulſion of their Tyrants, having enrolled Strangers and Mercenaries amongſt their Citizens, quarrelled with each other and came to an open rupture: and the people of Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chaluſians, were the greater part of them driven out of the City by them. Many perſons occaſion Seditions in Oligarchies, becauſe they think themſelves ill uſed in not ſharing the honours of the State with their equals, as I have already mentioned; but in Democracies the principal people do the ſame, becauſe they have not more than an equal ſhare with others who are not equal to them. The ſituation of the place will alſo ſometimes occaſion diſturbances in the State, when the ground is not well adapted for one City; as at Clazomene, where the people who lived in that part of the town called Chytrum quarrelled with them who lived in the Iſland, and

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the Cholophonians with the Notians. At Athens too the diſpoſition of the Citizens is not the ſame, for thoſe who live in the Pyræus are more attached to a popular Government, than thoſe who live in the City, properly ſo called; for as the interpoſition of a rivulet, however ſmall, will occaſion the line of the phalanx to fluctuate, ſo any trifling diſagreement will be the cauſe of Seditions; but they will not ſo ſoon flow from any thing elſe, as from the diſagreement between Virtue and Vice, and next to that between Poverty and Riches, and ſo on in order, one cauſe having more influence than another; one of which that I laſt mentioned.

CHAP. IV.

BUT Seditions in Government do not ariſe for little things, but from them; for their immediate cauſe is ſomething of moment. Now, trifling quarrels are attended with the greateſt conſequences, when they ariſe between perſons of the firſt diſtinction in the State, as was the caſe with the Syracuſians in a remote period; for a Revolution in the Government was brought about by a quarrel between two young men who were in office, upon a love affair; for one of them being abſent, the other ſeduced his miſtreſs; he in his turn, offended with this, perſwaded his friend's wife to come and live with him; and upon this the whole City took part either with the one or the other, and the Government was overturned: therefore every one at the beginning of ſuch diſputes ought to take care to avoid the conſequences; and to ſmother up all quarrels which may happen to ariſe amongſt thoſe in power, for the miſchief lies in the beginning; for the beginning is ſaid to be half of the buſineſs, ſo that what was then but a little fault, will be found afterwards to bear its full proportion to what follows. Moreover, diſputes between men of note involve the whole City in their conſequences; as in Heſtiæa,

after the Median war: two brothers having a diſpute about their paternal eſtate; he who was the poorer, from the other's having concealed part of the effects, and ſome money which his father had found, engaged the popular party on his ſide, while the other, who was rich, the men of faſhion. And at Delphos, a quarrel about a wedding was the beginning of all the Seditions that afterwards aroſe amongſt them; for the Bridegroom, being terrified by ſome unlucky omen, upon waiting upon the Bride, went away without marrying her; which her relations reſenting, contrived ſecretly to convey ſome ſacred money into his pocket while he was ſacrificing, and then killed him as an impious perſon. At Mitylenè alſo, a diſpute, which aroſe concerning a Right of Heritage, was the beginning of great evils, and a war with the Athenians, in which Paches took their City, for Tymophanes, a man of fortune, leaving two daughters, Doxander, who was circumvented in procuring them in marriage for his two ſons, began a Sedition, and excited the Athenians to attack them, being the Hoſt of that State. There was alſo a diſpute at Phocea, concerning a right of inheritance, between Mnaſis, the father of Mnaſis, and Euthucrates, the father of Onomarchus, which brought on the Phoceans the Sacred war. The Government too of Epidamnus

was

was changed from a quarrel that aroſe from an intended marriage; for a certain man having contracted his daughter in marriage, the father of the young perſon to whom ſhe was contracted, being Archon, puniſhes him, upon which account he, reſenting the affront, aſſociated himſelf with thoſe who were excluded from any ſhare in the Government, and brought about a Revolution.—— A Government may be changed either into an Oligarchy, Democracy, or a Free State; when the Magiſtrates, or any part of the City acquire great credit, or are increaſed in power, as the Court of Areopagus at Athens, having procured great credit during the Median war, added firmneſs to their Adminiſtration; and, on the other hand, the maritime force, compoſed of the Commonalty, having gained the victory at Salamis, by their power at ſea, got the lead in the State, and ſtrengthened the popular party: and at Argos, the Nobles, having gained great credit by the battle of Mantinea againſt the Lacedæmonians, endeavoured to diſſolve the Democracy. And at Syracuſe, the victory in their war with the Athenians being owing to the common people, they changed their Free State into a Democracy: and at Chalcis, the People having taken off the tyrant Phocis, together with the Nobles, immediately ſeized the Government: and at Ambracia alſo, the People, having expelled the tyrant Periander, with

with his party, placed the ſupreme power in themſelves. And this in general ought to be known, that whoſoever has been the occaſion of a State being powerful, whether private perſons, or Magiſtrates, a certain tribe, or any particular part of the Citizens, or the multitude, be they who they will, will be the cauſe of diſputes in the State. For either ſome perſons, who envy them the honours they have acquired, will begin to be ſeditious, or they, on account of the dignity they have acquired, will not be content with their former equality. A State is alſo liable to commotions, when thoſe parts of it which ſeem to be oppoſite to each other approach to an equality, as the Rich and the Common People; ſo that the part which is between them both is either nothing all, or too little to be noticed; for if one party is ſo much more powerful than the other, as to be evidently ſtronger, that other will not be willing to hazard the danger: for which reaſon thoſe who are ſuperior in Excellence and Virtue will never be the cauſe of Seditions; for they will be too few for that purpoſe when compared to the many. In general, the beginning and the cauſes of Seditions in all States are ſuch as I have now deſcribed, and Revolutions therein are brought about in two ways, either by Violence or Fraud: if by Violence, either at firſt, or compelling them to ſubmit to the change when it is made.

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It may alſo be brought about by Fraud in two different ways, either when the People, being at firſt deceived, willingly conſent to an alteration in their Government, and are afterwards obliged by Force to abide by it: as for inſtance, when the Four hundred impoſed upon the People, by telling them, that the King of Perſia would ſupply them with money for the war againſt the Lacedæmonians; and after they had been guilty of this falſity, they endeavoured to keep poſſeſſion of the ſupreme power; or when they are at firſt perſuaded, and afterwards conſent to be governed: and by one of theſe methods which I have mentioned are all Revolutions in Governments brought about.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

WE ought now to inquire into thoſe events, which will ariſe from theſe cauſes, in every ſpecies of Government. Democracies will be moſt ſubject to Revolutions from the diſhoneſty of their Demagogues; for partly, by informing againſt men of property, they induce them to join together through ſelf-defence, for a common fear will make the greateſt enemies unite; and partly by ſetting the common people againſt them: and this is what any one may continually ſee practiſed in many States. In the iſland of Cos, for inſtance, the Democracy was ſubverted by the wickedneſs of the Demagogues, for the Nobles enter'd into a combination with each other. And at Rhodes, the Demagogues, by diſtributing of bribes, prevented the People from paying the Trierarchs what was owing to them, who were obliged by the number of actions they were harraſſed with, to conſpire together and deſtroy the Popular State. The ſame thing was brought about at Heraclea, ſoon after the ſettlement of the City, by the ſame perſons; for the Citizens of note, being ill treated by them, quitted the City, but afterwards joining together they returned, and overthrew the Popular State. Juſt in the ſame

manner the Democracy was deſtroyed in Megara; for there the Demagogues, to procure money by confiſcations, drove out the Nobles, till the number of thoſe who were baniſhed was conſiderable, who, returning, got the better of the People in a battle, and eſtabliſhed an Oligarchy. The like happened at Cumè, during the time of the Democracy, which Thraſymachus deſtroyed; and whoever conſiders what has happened in other States may perceive the ſame Revolutions to have aroſe from the ſame cauſes. The Demagogues, to curry favour with the People, drive the Nobles to conſpire together, either by dividing their eſtates, or obliging them to ſpend them on public ſervices, or by baniſhing them, that they may confiſcate the fortunes of the Wealthy. In former times, when the ſame perſon was both Demagogue and General, the Democracies were changed into Tyrannies; and indeed moſt of the antient Tyrannies aroſe from thoſe States: a reaſon for which then ſubſiſted, but not now; for at that time the Demagogues were of the ſoldiery; for they were not then powerful by their eloquence; but, now the art of oratory is cultivated, the able ſpeakers are at preſent the Demagogues; but, as they are unqualified to act in a military capacity, they cannot impoſe themſelves on the People as Tyrants, if we except in one

one or two trifling inſtances. Formerly too, Tyrannies were more common than now, on account of the very extenſive powers with which ſome Magiſtrates were intruſted: as the Prytanes at Miletus; for they were ſupreme in many things of the laſt conſequence; and alſo becauſe at that time the Cities were not of that very great extent, the People in general living in the country, and being employed in huſbandry, which gave them, who took the lead in public affairs, an opportunity, if they had a turn for war, to make themſelves Tyrants; which they all did when they had gained the confidence of the People; and this confidence was their hatred to the Rich. This was the caſe of Piſiſtratus at Athens, when he oppoſed the Pediaci: and of Theaganes in Megara, who ſlaughtered the cattle belonging to the Rich, after he had ſeized thoſe who kept them by the river ſide. Theagenes alſo, for accuſing Daphnæus, and the Rich, was thought worthy of being raiſed to a Tyranny, from the confidence which the People had of his being a popular man, in conſequence of theſe enmities. A Government ſhall alſo alter from its antient and approved Democratic form into one intirely new, if there is no Cenſus to regulate the Election of Magiſtrates; for, as the election is with the People, the Demagogues who are deſirous of being in office, to flatter them, will endeavour with

all their power to make the People ſuperior even to the Laws. To prevent this intirely, or at leaſt in a great meaſure, the Magiſtrates ſhould be elected by the Tribes, and not by the People at large. Theſe are nearly the Revolutions to which Democracies are liable, and alſo the cauſes from whence they ariſe.

CHAP. VI.

THERE are two things which of all others moſt evidently occaſion a Revolution in an Oligarchy; one is, when the People are ill uſed, for then every individual is ripe for Sedition; more particularly if one of the Oligarchy ſhould happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis, at Naxus, who was afterwards Tyrant of that iſland. Seditions alſo which ariſe from different cauſes will differ from each other; for ſometimes a Revolution is brought about by the Rich, who have no ſhare in the adminiſtration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and this happened at Maſſilia, Iſter, Heraclea, and other Cities; for thoſe who had no ſhare in the Government ceaſed not to raiſe diſputes, till they were admitted to it: firſt the Elder brothers, and then the Younger

Younger alſo: for in ſome places, the Father and Son are never in office at the ſame time; in others, the Elder and Younger brother: and where this is obſerved the Oligarchy partakes ſomething of a Free State. At Iſter it was changed into a Democracy; in Heraclea, inſtead of being in the hands of a few, it conſiſted of Six hundred. At Cnidus, the Oligarchy was deſtroyed by the Nobles quarrelling with each other, becauſe the Government was in the hands of ſo few: for there, as we have juſt mentioned, if the Father was in office, the Son could not; or, if there were many Brothers, the Eldeſt only; for the People, taking advantage of their diſputes, elected one of the Nobles for their General, and got the victory: for where there are Seditions, Government is weak. And formerly at Erithria, during the Oligarchy of the Baſilides, although the State flouriſhed greatly under their excellent management, yet becauſe the People were diſpleaſed that the power ſhould be in the hands of ſo few, they changed the Government. Oligarchies alſo are ſubject to Revolutions, from thoſe who are in office therein, from the quarrels of the Demagogues with each other. The Demagogues are of two ſorts; one who flatter the Few when they are in power: for even theſe have their Demagogues; ſuch was Charicles at Athens, who had great influence over the Thir-

ty;

ty; and, in the ſame manner, Phrynicus over the Four hundred. The others are thoſe Demagogues who have a ſhare in the Oligarchy, and flatter the People: ſuch were the State-guardians at Lariſſa; who flattered the People, becauſe they were elected by them. And this will always happen in every Oligarchy where the Magiſtrates do not elect themſelves, but are choſe out of men either of great fortune or certain ranks, by the Soldiers or by the People; as was the cuſtom at Abydos. And when the Judicial department is not in the hands of the ſupreme power, the Demagogues, favouring the People in their cauſes, overturn the Government; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus: and alſo when ſome deſire to contract the power of the Oligarchy into fewer hands; for thoſe who endeavour to ſupport an Equality, are obliged to apply to the People for aſſiſtance. An Oligarchy is alſo ſubject to Revolutions, when the Nobility ſpend their fortunes by luxury; for ſuch perſons are deſirous of innovations, and either endeavour to be Tyrants themſelves, or to ſupport others in being ſo, as Hypparinus ſupported Dioniſius of Syracuſe. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a Colony of Chalcidians, and when they came ſet them to quarrel with the Rich: and at Ægina, a certain perſon who brought an action againſt Chares, attempted on that account

account to alter the Government. Sometimes they will try to raiſe commotions, ſometimes they will rob the public, and then quarrel with each other, or elſe fight with thoſe who endeavour to detect them; which was the caſe at Apollonia in Pontus. But if the members of an Oligarchy agree among themſelves, the State is not very eaſily deſtroyed without ſome external force. Pharſalus is a proof of this, where, though the place is ſmall, yet the Citizens have great power, from the prudent uſe they make of it. An Oligarchy alſo will be deſtroyed when they create another Oligarchy under it; that is, when the management of public affairs is in the hands of a few, and not equally, but when all of them do not partake of the ſupreme power, as happened once at Elis, where the ſupreme power in general was in the hands of a very Few, out of whom a Senate was choſen, conſiſting but of Ninety, who held their places for life; and their mode of election was calculated to preſerve the power amongſt each others families, like the Senators at Lacedæmon. An Oligarchy is liable to a Revolution both in time of war and peace; in war, becauſe, through a diſtruſt in the Citizens, the Government is obliged to employ mercenary troops, and he to whom they give the command of the army will very often aſſume the Tyranny, as Tymophanes did at Corinth; and if they appoint more than one

one General, they will very probably eſtabliſh a Dynaſty: and ſometimes, through fear of this, they are forced to let the People in general have ſome ſhare in the Government, becauſe they are obliged to employ them. In peace, from their want of confidence in each other, they will entruſt the Guardianſhip of the State to Mercenaries and their General, who will be an Arbiter between them, and ſometimes become maſter of both, which happened at Leriſſa, when the Haleuadæ had the chief power at Samos. The ſame thing happened at Abydos, during the time of the aſſociation, of which Iphiades was one. Commotions alſo will happen in an Oligarchy from one party's overbearing and inſulting another, or from their quarrelling about their law-ſuits or marriages. How their marriages, for inſtance, will have that effect has been already ſhewn: and in Eretria, Diagoras deſtroyed the Oligarchy of the Knights upon the ſame account. A Sedition alſo aroſe at Heraclea, from a certain perſon being condemned by the Court; and at Thebes, in conſequence of a man's being guilty of adultery; the puniſhment indeed which Eurytion ſuffered at Heraclea was juſt, yet it was illegally executed: as was that at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have them publicly bound in the pillory. Many Revolutions alſo have been brought about in Oligarchies, by thoſe who

who could not brook the deſpotiſm which thoſe perſons aſſumed who were in power, as at Cnidus and Chios. Changes alſo may happen by accident in what we call a Free State and in an Oligarchy; whereſoever the Senators, Judges, and Magiſtrates are choſen according to a certain Cenſus; for it often happens, that what was fixed at firſt as the higheſt Cenſus, ſo that a Few only could have a ſhare in the Government, in an Oligarchy, and thoſe of Moderate Fortunes in a Free State, when the City grows rich, through peace, or ſome other happy cauſe, becomes ſo little, that every one's fortune is equal to the Cenſus, ſo that the whole Community may partake of all the honours of Government; and this change ſometimes happens by little and little, and inſenſible approaches, ſometimes quicker. Theſe are the Revolutions and Seditions that ariſe in Oligarchies, and the cauſes to which they are owing: and indeed both Democracies and Oligarchies ſometimes alter, not into Governments of a contrary form, but into thoſe of the ſame Government; as for inſtance, from having the ſupreme power in the Law, to veſt it in the Ruling Party, or the contrary wiſe.

CHAP. VII.

COMMOTIONS alſo ariſe in Ariſtocracies, from there being ſo few perſons in power (as we have already obſerved they do in Oligarchies, for in this particular an Ariſtocracy is moſt near an Oligarchy, for in both theſe States the adminiſtration of public affairs is in the hands of a Few; not that this ariſes from the ſame cauſe in both, though herein they chiefly ſeem alike): and theſe will neceſſarily be moſt likely to happen when the generality of the people are high-ſpirited, and think themſelves equal to each other in merit; ſuch were thoſe at Lacedæmon, called the Partheniæ (for theſe were, as well as others, deſcendants of Citizens) who being detected in a conſpiracy againſt the State, were ſent to found Tarentum. They will happen alſo when ſome great men are diſgraced by thoſe who have received higher honours than themſelves, to whom they are no ways inferior in abilities, as Lyſander, by the Kings: or when an ambitious man cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the reign of Ageſilaus, was chief in a conſpiracy againſt the Spartans: and alſo when ſome are too poor and others too rich, which will moſt frequently happen in time of war; as at Lacedæmon, during the

the Meſſenian war, which is proved by a poem of Tyrtæus, called Eunomia; for ſome perſons being reduced thereby, deſired that the lands might be divided: and alſo when ſome perſon of very high rank might ſtill be higher if he could rule alone, which ſeemed to be Pauſanias's intention at Lacedæmon, when he was their general in the Median war, and Anno's, at Carthage. But Free States and Ariſtocracies are moſtly deſtroyed from want of a fixed adminiſtration of public affairs; the cauſe of which evil ariſes at firſt, from want of a due mixture of the Democratic and the Oligarchic parts, in a Free State; and in an Ariſtocracy from the ſame cauſes, and alſo from Virtue not being properly joined to power; but chiefly from the two firſt, I mean, the undue mixture of the Democratic and Oligarchic parts; for theſe two are what all Free States endeavour to blend together, and many of thoſe which we call Ariſtocracies, in this particular theſe States differ from each other, and on this account the one of them is leſs ſtable than the other, for that State, which inclines moſt to an Oligarchy, is called an Ariſtocracy, and that which inclines moſt to a Democracy is called a Free State; on which account this latter is more ſecure than the former, for the wider the foundation the ſecurer the building, and it is ever beſt to live where equality prevails. But the Rich, if the

Community gives them rank, very often endeavour to inſult and tyrannize over others. On the whole, which ever way a Government inclines, in that it will ſettle, each party ſupporting their own. Thus a Free State will become a Democracy; an Ariſtocracy, an Oligarchy; or the contrary, an Ariſtocracy many change into a Democracy (for the Poor, if they think themſelves injured, directly take part with the contrary ſide) and a Free State into an Oligarchy. The only firm State is that where every one enjoys that equality he has a Right to, and fully poſſeſſes what is his own. And what I have been ſpeaking of happened to the Thurians; for the Magiſtrates being elected according to a very high Cenſus, it was altered to a lower, and they were ſubdivided into more Courts, but in conſequence of the Nobles poſſeſſing all the land, contrary to law; the State was too much of an Oligarchy, which gave them an opportunity of encroaching greatly on the reſt of the people; but theſe, after they had been well enured to war, ſo far got the better of their guards, as to expell every one out of the country, who poſſeſſed more than he ought. Moreover, as all Ariſtocracies are Free Oligarchies, the Nobles therein endeavour to have rather too much power, as at Lacedæmon, where property is now in the hands of a Few, and the Nobles have too much Liberty to do as they pleaſe, and make

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ſuch alliances as they pleaſe. Thus the City of the Locrians was ruined from an alliance with Dioniſius; which State was neither a Democracy nor well-tempered Ariſtocracy. But an Ariſtocracy chiefly approaches to a ſecret change by its being deſtroyed by degrees, as we have already ſaid of all Governments in general; and this happens from the cauſe of the alteration being trifling; for whenever any thing which in the leaſt regards the State is treated with contempt, after that, ſomething elſe, and this of a little more conſequence, will be more eaſily altered, until the whole fabric of Government is entirely ſubverted, which happened in the Government of Thurium; for the Law being, that they ſhould continue ſoldiers for five years, ſome young men of a martial diſpoſition, who were in great eſteem amongſt their officers, deſpiſing thoſe who had the management of public affairs, and imagining they could eaſily accompliſh their intention, firſt endeavoured to aboliſh this Law, with a view of having it lawful to continue the ſame perſon perpetually in the military, perceiving that the People would readily appoint them. Upon this, the Magiſtrates who are called Counſellors firſt joined together, with an intention to oppoſe it, but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief, that if that Law was not repealed they would permit the management of

all

all other public affairs to remain in their hands; but afterwards, when they endeavoured to reſtrain ſome freſh alterations that were making, they found, that they could do nothing, for the whole form of Government was altered into a Dynaſty of thoſe who firſt introduced the innovations. In ſhort, all Governments are liable to be deſtroyed either from within, or from without; from without, when they have for their neighbour a State whoſe policy is contrary to theirs, and indeed if it has great power, the ſame thing will happen if it is not their neighbour; of which both the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians are a proof; for the one, when conquerors, every where deſtroyed the Oligarchies; the other the Democracies. Theſe are the chief cauſes of Revolutions, and Diſſentions in Governments.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

WE are now to conſider upon what the preſervation of Governments in general, and of each State in particular depends; and, in the firſt place, it is evident, that if we are right in the cauſes we have aſſigned for their deſtruction, we know alſo the means of their preſervation; for things contrary produce contraries: but deſtruction, and preſervation are contrary to each other. In well-tempered Governments it requires as much care as any thing whatſoever, that nothing be done contrary to law: and this ought chiefly to be attended to in matters of ſmall conſequence; for an illegality that approaches inſenſibly, approaches ſecretly, as in a family, ſmall expences continually repeated, conſume a man's income; for the underſtanding is deceived thereby, as by this falſe argument; if every part is little, then the whole is little: now, this in one ſenſe is true, in another, is falſe, for the whole and all the parts together are large, though made up of ſmall parts. The firſt therefore of any thing is what the State ought to guard againſt. In the next place, no credit ought to be given to thoſe who endeavour to deceive the People, with falſe pretences; for they will be confuted by facts.

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The different ways in which they will attempt to do this, have been already mentioned. You may often perceive both Ariſtocracies and Oligarchies continuing firm, not from the ſtability of their forms of Government, but from the wiſe conduct of the Magiſtrates, both towards thoſe who have a part in the management of public affairs, and thoſe alſo who have not: towards thoſe who have not, by never injuring them; and alſo introducing thoſe who are of moſt conſequence amongſt them into office; nor diſgracing thoſe who are deſirous of honour; or encroaching on the property of individuals; towards thoſe who have, by behaving to each other upon an equality; for that equality which the favourers of a Democracy deſire to have eſtabliſhed in the State, is not only juſt, but convenient alſo, amongſt thoſe who are of the ſame rank: for which reaſon, if the Adminiſtration is in the hands of many, thoſe rules which are eſtabliſhed in Democracies will be very uſeful; as to let no one continue in office longer than ſix months: that all thoſe who are of the ſame rank may have their turn; for between theſe there is a ſort of Democracy: for which reaſon Demagogues are moſt likely to ariſe up amongſt them, as we have already mentioned: beſides, by this means both Ariſtocracies and Democracies will be the leſs liable to be corrupted into Dynaſties, becauſe

it will not be ſo eaſy for thoſe who are Magiſtrates for a little, to do as much miſchief as they could in a long time: for it is from hence that Tyrannies ariſe in Democracies and Oligarchies; for either thoſe who are moſt powerful in each State eſtabliſh a Tyranny, as the Demagogues in the one, the Dynaſtics in the other, or the chief Magiſtrates who have been long in power. Governments are ſometimes preſerved, not only by having the means of their corruption at a great diſtance, but alſo by its being very near them; for thoſe who are alarmed at ſome impending evil, keep a ſtricter hand over the State; for which reaſon it is neceſſary for thoſe who have the Guardianſhip of the Conſtitution to be able to awaken the fears of the People, that they may preſerve it, and not like a night-guard to be remiſs in protecting the State, but to make the diſtant danger appear at hand. Great care ought alſo to be uſed to endeavour to reſtrain the quarrels and diſputes of the Nobles, by Laws, as well as to prevent thoſe who are not already engaged in them, from taking a part therein; for to perceive an evil at its very firſt approach, is not the lot of every one, but of the politician. To prevent any alteration taking place in an Oligarchy or Free State, on account of the Cenſus, if that happens to continue the ſame, while the quantity of money is increaſed, it will be uſeful to take

a general account of the whole amount of it in former times, to compare it with the preſent, and to do this every year in thoſe Cities where the Cenſus is yearly, in larger Communities once in three or five years; and if the whole ſhould be found much larger or much leſs than it was at the time when the Cenſus was firſt eſtabliſhed in the State, let there be a Law either to extend or contract it, doing both theſe according to its increaſe or decreaſe; if it increaſes making the Cenſus larger, if it decreaſes ſmaller: and if this latter is not done in Oligarchies, and Free States, you will have a Dynaſty ariſe in the one, an Oligarchy in the other: if the former is not, Free States will be changed into Democracies, and Oligarchies into Free States or Democracies. It is a general maxim in Democracies, Oligarchies, Monarchies, and indeed in all Governments, not to let any one acquire a rank far ſuperior to the reſt of the Community, but rather to endeavour to confer moderate honours for a continuance, than great ones for a ſhort time; for theſe latter ſpoil men, for it is not every one who can bear proſperity: but if this rule is not obſerved, let not thoſe honours which were conferred all at once, be all at once taken away, but rather by degrees. But, above all things, let this regulation be made by the Law, that no one ſhall have too much power, either by means of his

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fortune or friends; but, if he has, for his exceſs therein, let it be contrived that he ſhall quit the country. Now, as many perſons promote innovations, that they may enjoy their own particular manner of living, there ought to be a particular officer to inſpect the manners of every one, and ſee that theſe are not contrary to the Genius of the State in which he lives, whether it may be an Oligarchy, a Democracy, or any other Form of Government; and, for the ſame reaſon, thoſe ſhould be guarded againſt who are moſt proſperous in the City: the means of doing which is by appointing thoſe who are otherwiſe, to the buſineſs, and the offices of the State. I mean, to oppoſe Men of Account, to the Common People, the Poor, to the Rich, and to blend both theſe into one body, and to increaſe the numbers of thoſe who are in the Middle Rank; and this will prevent thoſe Seditions which ariſe from an inequality of condition. But above all, in every State, it is neceſſary both by the laws, and every other method poſſible, to prevent thoſe who are employed by the Public, from being venal, and this particularly in an Oligarchy; for then the People will not be ſo much diſpleaſed from ſeeing themſelves excluded from a ſhare in the Government (nay, they will rather be glad to have leiſure to attend their private affairs) as at ſuſpecting that the Officers of the State ſteal the public money,

then indeed they are afflicted with double concern, both becauſe they are deprived of the honours of the State, and pillaged by thoſe who enjoy them. There is one method of blending together a Democracy and an Ariſtocracy, if any one ſhould chuſe to form ſuch a State; by which means both the Rich and the Poor will enjoy what they deſire; for to admit all to a ſhare in the Government is democratical; that the Rich ſhould be in office, is ariſtocratical. This muſt be done, by letting no public employment whatſoever be attended with any emolument; for the Poor will not deſire to be in office when they can get nothing by it, but had rather attend to their own affairs: but the Rich will chuſe it, as they want nothing of the Community. Thus the Poor will increaſe their fortunes, by being wholly employed in their own concerns; and the principal part of the People will not be governed by the Lower Sort. To prevent the Exchequer from being defrauded, let all public money be delivered out openly in the face of the whole City, and let copies of the accounts be depoſited in the different wards, tribes, and diviſions. But, as the Magiſtrates are to execute their offices without any advantages, the Law ought to provide proper honours for thoſe who execute them well. In Democracies alſo it is neceſſary, that the Rich ſhould be protected, by not

permitting their lands to be divided, nor even the produce of them, which in ſome States is done unperceivably. It would be alſo better if the People would prevent them, when they offer to exhibit a number of unneceſſary, and yet expenſive public entertainments of plays, muſic, proceſſions, and the like. In an Oligarchy it is neceſſary to take great care of the Poor, and allot them public employments which are gainful; and, if any of the Rich inſult them, to let their puniſhment be ſeverer than if they inſulted one of their own rank; and to let eſtates paſs by affinity, and not gift: nor to permit any perſon to have more than one; for by this means property will be more equally divided, and the greater part of the Poor get into better circumſtances. It is alſo ſerviceable in a Democracy and an Oligarchy, to allot thoſe who take no part in public affairs, an equality, or a preference in other things; the Rich in a Democracy, to the Poor in an Oligarchy: but ſtill all the principal offices in the State to be filled only by thoſe who are beſt qualified to diſcharge them.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

THERE are three qualifications neceſſary for thoſe who fill the firſt departments in Government; firſt of all, an Affection for the eſtabliſhed Conſtitution; ſecond place, Abilities every way completely equal to the buſineſs of their office; in the third, Virtue and Juſtice correſpondent to the nature of that particular State they are placed in; for if Juſtice is not the ſame in all States, it is evident, that there muſt be different ſpecies thereof. There may be ſome doubt, when all theſe qualifications do not meet in the ſame perſons, in what manner the choice ſhall be made; as for inſtance, ſuppoſe that one perſon is an accompliſhed General, but a bad man, and no friend to the Conſtitution; another is juſt, and a friend to it, which ſhall one prefer? we ſhould then conſider of two qualities, which of them the generality poſſeſs in a greater degree, which in a leſs; for which reaſon in the choice of a General we ſhould regard his Courage more than his Virtue, as the more uncommon quality; as there are fewer capable of conducting an army than there are good men: but, to protect the State or manage the Finances, the contrary rule ſhould be followed; for theſe require greater Virtue than the generality are poſſeſſed of, but only that knowledge which is common to all.

all. It may be aſked, if a man has abilities equal to his appointment in the State, and is affectionate to the Conſtitution, what occaſion is there for being Virtuous, ſince theſe two things alone are ſufficient to enable him to be uſeful to the Public? it is, becauſe thoſe who poſſeſs thoſe qualities are often deficient in prudence; for, as they often neglect their own affairs, though they know them, and love themſelves, ſo nothing will prevent their ſerving the Public in the ſame manner. In ſhort, whatſoever the Laws contain, which we allow to be uſeful to the State, contributes to its preſervation: but its firſt and principal ſupport is (as has been often inſiſted upon) to have the number of thoſe who deſire to preſerve it greater than thoſe who wiſh to deſtroy it. Above all things that ought not to be forgot, which many Governments now corrupted neglect; namely, to preſerve a Medium. For many things ſeemingly favourable to a Democracy, deſtroy a Democracy, and many things ſeemingly favourable to an Oligarchy, deſtroy an Oligarchy. Thoſe, who think this the only Virtue, extend it to exceſs, not conſidering that as a noſe which varies a little from perfect ſtraitneſs, either towards a hook noſe, or a flat one, may yet be beautiful, and agreeable to look at; but if this particularity is extended beyond meaſure, firſt of all the properties of the part is loſt, but at laſt

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it can hardly be admitted to be a noſe at all, on account of the exceſs of the riſe or ſinking: thus it is with other parts of the human body; ſo alſo the ſame thing is true with reſpect to States; for both an Oligarchy and a Democracy may ſomething vary from their moſt perfect form, and yet be well conſtituted; but if any one endeavours to extend either of them too far, at firſt he will make the Government the worſe for it, but at laſt there will be no Government at all remaining. The Lawgiver and the Politician therefore ſhould know well what preſerves and what deſtroys a Democracy, or an Oligarchy, for neither the one or the other can poſſibly continue without Rich and Poor: but that whenever an intire equality of circumſtances prevails, the State muſt neceſſarily become of another form; ſo that thoſe who deſtroy theſe Laws, which authorize an inequality in property, deſtroy the Government. It is alſo an error in Democracies, for the Demagogues to endeavour to make the Common People ſuperior to the Laws; and thus by ſetting them at variance with the Rich, dividing one City into two; whereas they ought rather to ſpeak in favour of the Rich. In Oligarchies, on the contrary, it is wrong to ſupport thoſe who are in Adminiſtration againſt the People. The oaths alſo which they take in an Oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they now are; for, at preſent,

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in ſome places they ſwear, "I will be adverſe to the Com-"mon People, and contrive all I can againſt them;" whereas they ought rather to ſuppoſe and pretend the contrary; expreſſing in their Oaths, that they will not injure the People. But of all things which I have mentioned, that which contributes moſt to preſerve the State, is, what is now moſt deſpiſed, to educate your Children for the State; for the moſt uſeful Laws, and moſt approved by every Stateſman, will be of no ſervice, if the Citizens are not accuſtomed to, and brought up in the Principles of the Conſtitution; of a Democracy, if that is by Law eſtabliſhed; of an Oligarchy, if that is; for if there are bad morals in one man, there are in the City. But to educate a Child fit for the State, it muſt not be done in the manner which would pleaſe either thoſe who have the power in an Oligarchy, or thoſe who deſire a Democracy, but ſo, as they may be able to conduct either of theſe forms of Governments. But now the Children of the Magiſtrates in an Oligarchy are brought up too delicately, and the Children of the Poor hardy with exerciſe and labour; ſo that they are both deſirous of, and able to promote innovations. In Democracies of the pureſt form, they purſue a method which is contrary to their welfare; the reaſon of which is, that they define Liberty wrong: now, there are two things which ſeem to

be the objects of a Democracy, that the People in general ſhould poſſeſs the ſupreme power, and all enjoy Freedom; for that which is juſt ſeems to be equal, and what the People think equal, that is a Law: now, their Freedom and Equality conſiſts in every one's doing what they pleaſe: that is in ſuch a Democracy every one may live as he likes; *as his inclination guides*, in the words of Euripides: but this is wrong, for no one ought to think it Slavery, to live in ſubjection to Government, but Protection. Thus I have mentioned the cauſes of corruption in different States, and the means of their preſervation.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

IT now remains that we ſpeak of Monarchies, their cauſes of corruption, and means of preſervation; and indeed almoſt the ſame things which have been ſaid of other Governments happen to Kingdoms and Tyrannies; for a Kingdom partakes of an Ariſtocracy, a Tyranny of the worſt ſpecies of an Oligarchy and Democracy; for which reaſon it is the worſt that man can ſubmit to, as being compoſed of two, both of which are bad, and collectively retains all the corruptions and all the defects of both theſe States. Theſe two ſpecies of Monarchies ariſe from principles contrary to each other: a Kingdom is formed to protect the better ſort of People againſt the Multitude, and Kings are appointed out of thoſe; who are choſen either for their ſuperior Virtue, and actions flowing from Virtuous Principles, or elſe from their Noble deſcent; but a Tyrant is choſen out of the meaneſt populace; an enemy to the Better Sort, that the Common People may not be oppreſſed by them. That this is true experience convinces us; for the generality of Tyrants were indeed mere Demagogues, who gained credit with the People by oppreſſing the Nobles. Some Tyrannies were eſtab-

liſhed in this manner, after the Cities were conſiderably enlarged; others, before that time, by Kings who exceeded the power which their country allowed them, from a deſire of governing deſpotically: others were founded by thoſe who were elected to the ſuperior offices in the State; for formerly the People appointed officers for life, who came to be at the head of civil and religious affairs, and theſe choſe one out of their body, in whom the ſupreme power over all the Magiſtrates was placed. By all theſe means it was eaſy to eſtabliſh a Tyranny, if they choſe it; for their power was ready at hand, either by their being Kings, or elſe by enjoying the honours of the State; thus Phidon at Argos and other Tyrants, enjoyed originally the Kingly power; Phalaris, and others in Ionia, the honours of the State. Panætius at Leontium, Cypſelus at Corinth, Piſiſtratus at Athens, Dioniſius at Syracuſe, and others, acquired theirs by having been Demagogues. A Kingdom, as we have ſaid, partakes much of the nature of an Ariſtocracy, and is beſtowed according to worth, as either Virtue, Family, Beneficent Actions, or theſe joined with power; for thoſe who have been benefactors to Cities and States, or have it in their powers to be ſo, have acquired this honour, and thoſe who have prevented a People from falling into Slavery by

by war, as Codrus, or thoſe who have freed them from it, as Cyrus, or the Founders of Cities, or Settlers of Colonies, as the Kings of Sparta, Macedon, and Moloſſus. A King deſires to be the guardian of his People, that thoſe who have property may be ſecure in the poſſeſſion of it, and that the People in general meet with no injury; but a Tyrant, as has been often ſaid, has no regard to the common good, except for his own advantage; his only object is Pleaſure, but a King's is Virtue: what a Tyrant therefore is ambitious of engroſſing is Wealth, but a King rather Honour. The guards too of a King are Citizens, a Tyrant's Foreigners. That a Tyranny contains all that is bad both in a Democracy and an Oligarchy is evident; with an Oligarchy, it has for its end, gain, as the only means of providing the Tyrant with guards, and the luxuries of life; like that it places no confidence in the People; and therefore deprives them of the uſe of arms: it is alſo common to them both to perſecute the Populace, to drive them out of the City, and their own habitations. With a Democracy, it quarrels with the Nobles, and deſtroys them both publicly and privately, or drives them into baniſhment, as rivals, and an impediment to the Government; hence naturally ariſe conſpiracies both amongſt thoſe who deſire to govern, and thoſe who deſire not to be Slaves;

hence aroſe Periander's advice to Thraſibulus to take off the talleſt ſtalks, hinting thereby, that it was neceſſary to make away with the eminent Citizens. We ought then in reaſon, as has been already ſaid, to account for the changes which ariſe in a Monarchy, from the ſame cauſes which produce them in other States: for, through injuſtice received, fear, and contempt, many of thoſe who are under a Monarchical Government conſpire againſt it; but of all ſpecies of injuſtice, injurious contempt has moſt influence on them for that purpoſe: ſometimes it is owing to their being deprived of their private fortunes. The diſſolution too of a Kingdom and a Tyranny are generally the ſame; for Monarchs abound in wealth and honour, which all are deſirous to obtain. Of plots: ſome aim at the life of thoſe who govern, others at their Government; the firſt ariſes from hatred to their perſons; which hatred may be owing to many cauſes, either of which will be ſufficient to excite their anger, and the generality of thoſe who are under the influence of that paſſion will join in a conſpiracy, not for the ſake of their own advancement, but for revenge. Thus the plot againſt the Children of Piſiſtratus aroſe from their injurious treatment of Hermodius's ſiſter, and inſulting him alſo; for Hermodius reſenting the injury done to his ſiſter, and Ariſtogiton the injury done to Hermodius. Periander,

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the Tyrant of Ambracia, alſo loſt his life by a conſpiracy, for ſome improper liberties he took with a boy in his cups: and Philip was ſlain by Pauſanias, for neglecting to revenge him of the affront he had received from Attalus; as was Amintas the Little, by Darda, for inſulting him on account of his age; and the Eunuch, by Evagoras the Cyprian, in revenge for having taken his ſon's wife away from him. * * * * * * * *.

Many alſo who have had their bodies ſcourged with ſtripes have, through reſentment, either killed thoſe who cauſed them to be inflicted or conſpired againſt them, even when they had Kingly power, as, at Mitylenæ, Magacles, joining with his friends, killed the Penthelidæ, who uſed to go about ſtriking thoſe they met with clubs. Thus, in later times, Smendes killed Penthilus, for whipping him, and permitting his wife to drag him by the feet. Decamnichus alſo was the chief cauſe of the conſpiracy againſt Anchelaus, for he urged others on: the occaſion of his reſentment was his having delivered him to Euripides the poet to be ſcourged; for Euripides was greatly offended with him, for having ſaid ſomething of the foulneſs of his breath. And many others have been killed or conſpired againſt on the ſame account. Fear too is a cauſe which produces the ſame effects, as well in Monarchies as in other States: thus Artabanes conſpired

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againſt Xerxes through fear of puniſhment, for not having hanged Darius according to his orders, whom he ſuppoſed he intended to pardon, as they were given without recollection at ſupper-time. Some Kings alſo have been dethroned and killed in conſequence of the contempt they were held in by the People; as ſome one conſpired againſt Sardanapalus, having ſeen him ſpinning with his wife, if what is related of him is true, or if not of him, it may very probably be true of ſome one elſe. Dion alſo conſpired againſt Dioniſius the Younger, ſeeing his ſubjects deſirous of a conſpiracy, and that he himſelf was always drunk: and even a man's friends will do this if they deſpiſe him; for from the confidence he places in them, they think that they ſhall not be found out. Thoſe alſo who think they ſhall gain his throne will conſpire againſt a King, through contempt; for as they are powerful themſelves, and deſpiſe the danger, on account of their own ſtrength, they will readily attempt it. Thus a General at the head of his army will endeavour to dethrone the Monarch, as Cyrus did Aſtiages, deſpiſing both his manner of life and his forces; his forces for want of action, his life for its effeminacy: thus Suthes, the Thracian, who was General to Amadocus, conſpired againſt him. Sometimes more than one of theſe cauſes will excite men to enter into

into conſpiracies, as contempt and deſire of gain; as in the inſtance of Mithridates, againſt Ariobarzanes. Thoſe alſo who are of a bold diſpoſition, and have gained military honours amongſt Kings, will of all others be moſt like to engage in Sedition; for ſtrength and courage united inſpire great bravery: whenever, therefore, theſe join in one perſon, he will be very ready for conſpiracies, as he will eaſily conquer. Thoſe who conſpire againſt a Tyrant through love of glory and honour, have a different motive in view from what I have already mentioned; for, like all others who embrace danger, they have only glory and honour in view, and think, not as ſome do, of the wealth and pomp they may acquire, but engage in this, as they would in any other noble action, that they may be illuſtrious and diſtinguiſhed, and deſtroy a Tyrant, not to ſucceed in his Tyranny, but to acquire renown. No doubt but the number of thoſe who act upon this principle is ſmall, for we muſt ſuppoſe they regard their own ſafety as nothing in caſe they ſhould not ſucceed, and muſt embrace the opinion of Dion, (which few can do) when he made war upon Dioniſius with a very few troops; for he ſaid, that let the advantage he made be ever ſo little it would ſatisfy him to have gained it; and that, ſhould it be his lot to die the moment he had gained footing in his country, he

ſhould think his death ſufficiently glorious. A Tyranny alſo is expoſed to the ſame deſtruction, as all other States are, from too powerful neighbours: for it is evident, that an oppoſition of principles will make them deſirous of ſubverting it; and what they deſire, all who can, do: and there is a principle of oppoſition in one State to another, as a Democracy againſt a Tyranny, as ſays Heſiod, *a potter againſt a potter*; for the extreme of a Democracy is a Tyranny; a Kingly power againſt an Ariſtocracy, from their different forms of Government: for which reaſon the Lacedæmonians deſtroyed many Tyrannies; as did the Syracuſians, during the proſperity of their State. Nor are they only deſtroyed from without, but alſo from within, when thoſe who have no ſhare in the power bring about a Revolution, as happened to Gelon, and lately to Dioniſius; to the firſt, by means of Thraſibulus, the brother of Hiero, who flattered Geo's ſon, and induced him to lead a life of pleaſure, that he himſelf might govern; but the family joined together, and endeavoured to ſupport the Tyranny and expel Thraſibulus; but thoſe whom they made of their party ſeized the opportunity and expelled the whole family. Dion made war againſt his relation Dioniſius, and being aſſiſted by the People, firſt expelled, and then killed him. As there are two cauſes which

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chiefly induce men to conſpire againſt Tyrants, Hatred and Contempt; one of theſe, namely Hatred, ſeems inſeparable from them. Contempt alſo is often the cauſe of their deſtruction: for though, for inſtance, thoſe who raiſed themſelves to the ſupreme power, generally preſerved it; but thoſe who received it from them have, to ſpeak truth, almoſt immediately all of them loſt it; for, falling into an effeminate way of life, they ſoon grew deſpicable, and generally fell victims to conſpiracies. Part of their Hatred may be very fitly aſcribed to Anger; for in ſome caſes this is their motive to action: for it is often a cauſe which impels them to act more powerfully than Hatred, and they proceed with greater obſtinacy againſt thoſe whom they attack, as this paſſion is not under the direction of Reaſon. Many perſons alſo indulge this paſſion through Contempt; which occaſioned the fall of the Piſiſtrati, and many others. But Hatred is more powerful than Anger; for Anger is accompanied with Grief, which prevents the entrance of Reaſon; but Hatred is free from it. In ſhort, whatever cauſes may be aſſigned as the deſtruction of a pure Oligarchy unmixed with any other Government, and an extreme Democracy, the ſame may be applied to a Tyranny; for theſe are divided Tyrannies. Kingdoms are ſeldom deſtroyed by any outward attack; for

which reaſon they are generally very ſtable; but they have many cauſes of ſubverſion within; of which two are the principal; one is, when thoſe who are in power excite a Sedition, the other when they endeavour to eſtabliſh a Tyranny, by aſſuming greater power than the Law gives them. A Kingdom, indeed, is not what we ever ſee erected in our times, but rather Monarchies and Tyrannies; for a Kingly Government is one that is voluntarily ſubmitted to, and its ſupreme power admitted upon great occaſions: but where many are equal, and there are none in any reſpect ſo much better than another as to be qualified for the greatneſs and dignity of Government over them, then theſe equals will not willingly ſubmit to be commanded; but if any one aſſumes the Government, either by force or fraud, this is a Tyranny. To what we have already ſaid we ſhall add, the cauſes of Revolutions in an Hereditary Kingdom. One of theſe is, that many of thoſe who enjoy it are naturally proper objects of contempt only: another is, that they are inſolent while their power is not deſpotic; but they poſſeſs Kingly honours only. Such a State is ſoon deſtroyed; for a King exiſts but while the People are willing to obey, as their ſubmiſſion to him is voluntary, but to a Tyrant involuntary. Theſe and ſuch-like are the cauſes of the deſtruction of Monarchies.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

MONARCHIES, in a word, are preſerved by means contrary to what I have already mentioned as the cauſe of their deſtruction; but to ſpeak to each ſeparately: the ſtability of a Kingdom will depend upon the power of the King's being kept within moderate bounds; for by how much the leſs extenſive his power is, by ſo much the longer will his Government continue; for he will be leſs depſotic, and more upon an equality of condition with thoſe he governs; who, on that account, will envy him the leſs. It was on this account that the Kingdom of the Moloſſi continued ſo long; and the Lacedæmonians, from their Government's being from the beginning divided into two parts, and alſo by the moderation introduced into the other parts of it, by Theopompus, and his eſtabliſhment of the Ephori; for by taking ſomething from the power he increaſed the duration of the Kingdom, ſo that in ſome meaſure he made it not leſs, but bigger; as they ſay he replied to his wife, who aſked him, if he was not aſhamed to deliver down his Kingdom to his children reduced from what he received it from his anceſtors? No, ſays he, I give it him more laſting. Tyrannies are preſerved two

ways moſt oppoſite to each other, one of which is, when the power is delegated from one to the other, and in this manner many Tyrants govern in their States. Report ſays, that Periander founded many of theſe. There are alſo many of them to be met with amongſt the Perſians. What has been already mentioned is as conducive as any thing can be to preſerve a Tyranny; namely, to keep down thoſe who are of an aſpiring diſpoſition, to take off thoſe who will not ſubmit, to allow no public meals, no clubs, no education, nothing at all, but to guard againſt every thing that gives riſe to high ſpirits, or mutual confidence; nor to ſuffer the learned meetings of thoſe who are at leiſure to hold converſation with each other; and to endeavour by every means poſſible to keep all the people ſtrangers to each other; for knowledge increaſes mutual confidence; and to oblige all Strangers to appear in public, and to live near the city-gate, that all their actions may be ſufficiently ſeen; for thoſe who are kept like Slaves ſeldom entertain any noble thoughts: in ſhort, to imitate every thing which the Perſians, and Barbarians do, for they all contribute to ſupport ſlavery; and to endeavour to know what every one, who is under their power does, and ſays; and for this purpoſe to employ ſpies: ſuch were thoſe women whom the Syracuſians, called

called Ποταγωγίδες. Hiero alſo uſed to ſend out liſteners, where-ever there was any meeting or converſation; for the People dare not ſpeak with freedom for fear of ſuch perſons; and if any one does, there is the leſs chance of its being concealed; and to endeavour that the whole Community ſhould mutually accuſe and come to blows with each other, Friend with Friend, the Commons with the Nobles, and the Rich with each other. It is alſo advantageous for a Tyranny that all thoſe who are under it ſhould be oppreſſed with poverty, that they may not be able to compoſe a guard; and that, being employed in procuring their daily bread, they may have no leiſure to conſpire againſt their Tyrants. The Pyramids of Egypt are a proof of this, and the Votive Edifices of the Cypoclidæ, and the Temple of Jupiter Olympus, built by the Pyſiſtratidæ, and the Works of Polycrates at Samos; for all theſe produced one end, the keeping the People poor. It is neceſſary alſo to multiply taxes, as at Syracuſe; where Dioniſius in the ſpace of five years collected all the private property of his ſubjects into his own coffers. A Tyrant alſo ſhould endeavour to engage his ſubjects in a war, that they may have employment, and continually depend upon their General. A King is preſerved by his friends, but a Tyrant is of all perſons the man who can place no confidence in friends, as every one has it in his

deſire,

deſire, and theſe chiefly in their power to deſtroy him. All theſe things alſo which are done in an extreme Democracy ſhould be done in a Tyranny, as permitting great licentiouſneſs to the Women in the houſe, that they may reveal their huſbands ſecrets; and ſhewing great indulgence to Slaves alſo, for the ſame reaſon; for Slaves and Women conſpire not againſt Tyrants: but when they are treated with kindneſs, both of them are abettors of Tyrants, and extreme Democracies alſo; and the People too in ſuch a State deſire to be deſpotic. For which reaſon flatterers are in repute in both theſe: the Demagogue in the Democracy, for he is the proper flatterer of the People; among Tyrants, he who will ſervilely adapt himſelf to their humours; for this is the buſineſs of flatterers. And for this reaſon Tyrants always love the worſt of wretches, for they rejoice in being flattered, which no man of a liberal ſpirit will ſubmit to; for they love the Virtuous, but flatter none. Bad men too are fit for bad purpoſes; *like to like*, as the proverb ſays. A Tyrant alſo ſhould ſhew no favour to a man of Worth or a Freeman; for he ſhould think, that no one deſerved to be thought theſe but himſelf; for he who ſupports his dignity, and is a friend to freedom, encroaches upon the ſuperiority, and the deſpotiſm of the Tyrant: ſuch men, therefore, they naturally hate,

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as deſtructive to their Government. A Tyrant alſo ſhould rather admit Strangers to his table and familiarity, than Citizens, as theſe are his enemies, but the others have no deſign againſt him. Theſe and ſuch-like are the ſupports of a Tyranny, for it comprehends whatſoever is wicked. But all theſe things may be comprehended in three diviſions, for there are three objects which a Tyranny has in view; one of which is, that the Citizens ſhould be of poor abject diſpoſitions; for ſuch men never propoſe to conſpire againſt any one. The ſecond is, that they ſhould have no confidence in each other; for while they have not this, the Tyrant is ſafe enough from deſtruction. For which reaſon they are always at enmity with thoſe of merit, as hurtful to their Government; not only as they ſcorn to be governed deſpotically, but alſo becauſe they can rely upon each other's fidelity, and others can rely upon theirs, and becauſe they will not inform againſt their aſſociates, nor any one elſe. The third is, that they ſhall be totally without the means of doing any thing; for no one undertakes what is impoſſible for him to perform: ſo that without power a Tyranny can never be deſtroyed. Theſe then are the three objects which the inclinations of Tyrants deſire to ſee accompliſhed; for all their tyrannical plans tend to promote one of theſe three ends, that their people may neither

have mutual confidence, power, or ſpirit. This, then, is one of the two methods of preſerving Tyrannies: the other proceeds in a way, quite contrary to what has been already deſcribed, and which may be diſcerned, from conſidering to what the deſtruction of a Kingdom is owing; for as one cauſe of that is, making the Government approach near to a Tyranny, ſo the ſafety of a Tyranny conſiſts in making the Government nearly Kingly; preſerving only one thing, namely, power, that not only the willing, but the unwilling alſo muſt be obliged to ſubmit; for if this is once loſt, the Tyranny is at an end. This, then, as the foundation, muſt be preſerved: in other particulars carefully do and affect to ſeem like a King; firſt, appear to pay a great attention to what belongs to the Public; nor make ſuch profuſe preſents, as will offend the People; while they are to ſupply the money, out of the hard labour of their own hands, and ſee it given in profuſion to miſtreſſes, foreigners, and fidlers; keeping an exact account both of what you receive and pay; which is a practice ſome Tyrants do actually follow, by which means they ſeem rather fathers of families than Tyrants: nor need you ever fear the want of money, while you have the ſupreme power of the State in your own hands. It is alſo much better for thoſe Tyrants, who quit their kingdom, to do this

this than to leave behind them money they have hoarded up; for their Regents will be much leſs deſirous of making innovations, and they are more to be dreaded by abſent Tyrants than the Citizens; for ſuch of them as he ſuſpects he takes with him, but theſe Regents muſt be left behind. He ſhould alſo endeavour to appear to collect ſuch taxes and require ſuch ſervices as the exigencies of the State demand, that whenever they are wanted they may be ready in time of war; and particularly, to take care that he appear to collect and keep them not as his own property, but the Public's. His appearance alſo ſhould not be ſevere, but reſpectable, ſo that he ſhould inſpire thoſe who approach him with veneration, and not fear; but this will not be eaſily accompliſhed if he is deſpiſed. If, therefore, he will not take the pains to acquire any other, he ought to endeavour to be a man of political abilities, and to fix that opinion of himſelf, in the judgment of his ſubjects. He ſhould alſo take care not to appear to be guilty of the leaſt offence againſt modeſty, nor to ſuffer it in thoſe under him: nor to permit the women of his Family to treat others haughtily; for the haughtineſs of women has been the ruin of many Tyrants. With reſpect to the pleaſures of ſenſe, he ought to do directly contrary to the practice of ſome Tyrants at preſent; for

they do not only continually indulge themſelves in them for many days together, but they ſeem alſo to deſire to have other witneſſes of it, that they may wonder at their happineſs; whereas he ought really to be moderate in theſe, and, if not, to appear to others to avoid them; for it is not the ſober man who is expoſed either to plots, or contempt, but the Drunkard; not the Early-riſer, but the Sluggard. His conduct in general ſhould alſo to be contrary of what is reported of former Tyrants; for he ought to improve and adorn his City, ſo as to ſeem a Guardian and not a Tyrant; and, moreover, always to ſeem particularly attentive to the worſhip of the Gods; for from perſons of ſuch a character men entertain leſs fears of ſuffering any thing illegal, while they ſuppoſe that he who governs them is religious and reverences the Gods; and they will be leſs inclined to raiſe inſinuations againſt ſuch a one, as being peculiarly under their protection: but this muſt be ſo done as to give no occaſion for any ſuſpicion of Hypocriſy. He ſhould alſo take care to ſhew ſuch reſpect to men of merit in every particular, that they ſhould not think they could be treated with greater diſtinction by their Fellow Citizens in a Free State. He ſhould alſo let all Honours flow immediately from himſelf, but every Cenſure from his ſubordinate officers, and judges.

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It is alſo a common protection of all Monarchies not to make one perſon too great, or, certainly, not many; for they will ſupport each other: but, if it is neceſſary to entruſt any large powers to one perſon, to take care, that it is not one of an ardent ſpirit; for this diſpoſition is upon every opportunity moſt ready for a Revolution: and, if it ſhould ſeem neceſſary to deprive any one of his power, to do it by degrees, and not reduce him all at once. It is alſo neceſſary to abſtain from all kinds of Inſolence; more particularly from Corporal Puniſhment; which you muſt be moſt cautious never to exerciſe over thoſe who have a delicate ſenſe of honour; for, as thoſe who love money are touched to the quick when any thing affects their property, ſo are men of honour and principle, when they receive any diſgrace: therefore, either never employ perſonal puniſhment, or, if you do, let it be only in the manner in which a father would correct his ſon, and not with contempt; and, upon the whole, make amends for any ſeeming diſgrace, by beſtowing greater Honours. But of all perſons who are moſt likely to entertain deſigns againſt the perſon of a Tyrant, thoſe are chiefly to be feared and guarded againſt, who regard as nothing the loſs of their own lives, ſo that they can but accompliſh their purpoſe: be very careful therefore of thoſe who either think themſelves,

ſelves affronted, or thoſe who are dear to them; for thoſe who are excited by anger to revenge, regard as nothing their own perſons: for, as Heraclitus ſays, it is dangerous to fight with an angry man, who will purchaſe with his life the thing he aims at. As all Cities are compoſed of two ſorts of perſons, the Rich and the Poor, it is neceſſary that both theſe ſhould find equal protection from him who governs them, and that the one party ſhould not have it their power to injure the other; but that the Tyrant ſhould attach to himſelf that party which is the moſt powerful; which, if he does, he will have no occaſion either to make his Slaves free, or to deprive Citizens of their arms; for the ſtrength of either of the parties added to his own forces will render him ſuperior to any conſpiracy.——It would be ſuperfluous to go through all particulars; for the rule of conduct which the Tyrant ought to purſue is evident enough, and that is, to affect to appear not the Tyrant, but the King; the Guardian of thoſe he governs, not their Plunderer, but their Protector, and to affect the middle rank in life, not one ſuperior to all others: he ſhould, therefore, aſſociate his Nobles with him, and ſooth his People; for his Government will not only be neceſſarily more honourable, and worthy of imitation, as it will be over men of worth, and not abject wretches, who

who perpetually both hate and fear him; but it will be alſo more durable. Let him alſo frame his life ſo that his manners may be conſentaneous to virtue, or at leaſt let half of them be ſo, that he may not be altogether wicked, but only ſo in part.

CHAP. XII.

INDEED an Oligarchy and a Tyranny are of all Governments of the ſhorteſt duration. The Tyranny of Syria, it is true, continued longer then Orthagonus and his family exiſted, an hundred years: the reaſon for which was, that they uſed their power with moderation, and were in many particulars obedient to the Laws; and, as Chliſtenes was an able General, he never fell into contempt, and by the care he took that in many particulars his Government ſhould be popular. He is reported alſo to have preſented a perſon with a crown, who adjudged the Victory to another; and ſome ſay, that it is the ſtatue of that judge which is placed in the Forum.

They ſay alſo, that Piſiſtratus ſubmitted to be ſummoned into the Court of the Areopagites. The ſecond that we ſhall mention is the Tyranny of the Cypſelidæ,

at

Corinth, which continued ſeventy-ſeven years and ſix months; for Cypſelus was Tyrant there thirty years, Periander forty-four, and Pſamſneticus, the ſon of Georgias, three years; the reaſon for which was, that Cypſelus was a popular man, and governed without guards. Periander indeed ruled like a Tyrant, but then he was an able General. The third was that of the Piſiſtradidæ at Athens; but it was not continual: for Piſiſtratus himſelf was twice expelled; ſo that out of thirty-three years he was only fifteen in power, and his Son eighteen; ſo that the whole time was thirty-three years. Of the reſt we ſhall mention that of Hiero, and Gelo at Syracuſe; and this did not continue long, for both their reigns were only eighteen years; for Gelo died in the eighth year of his Tyranny, and Hiero in his tenth. Thraſibulus fell in his eleventh month, and many other Tyrannies have continued a very ſhort time. We have now gone through the general caſes of Corruption and Means of Preſervation both in Free States and Monarchies. In Plato's Republic, Socrates is introduced treating upon the changes, which different Governments are liable to: but his diſcourſe is faulty; for he does not particularly mention what changes the beſt and firſt Governments are liable to; for he only aſſigns the general cauſe, of nothing being immutable, but that in time every thing will alter

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be any change in it; or if not, to what cauſe it will be owing; or, if there is, into what other State it will alter: but the reaſon of this is, that a Tyranny is an indeterminate Government; and, according to him, every State ought to alter into the firſt, and moſt perfect, thus the continuity, and circle would be preſerved. But one Tyranny often changed into another; as at Syria, from Muro's to Cliſthenes'; or into an Oligarchy, as was Antileo's at Chalcas; or into a Democracy, as was Gelo's at Syracuſe; or into an Ariſtocracy, as was Charilaus's at Lacedæmon, and at Carthage. An Oligarchy is alſo changed into a Tyranny; ſuch was the riſe of moſt of the antient Tyrannies in Sicily; at Leontium, into the Tyranny of Panætius; at Gela, into that of Cleander; at Rhegium, into that of Anaxilaus; and the like in many other Cities. It is abſurd alſo to ſuppoſe, that a State is changed into an Oligarchy, becauſe thoſe who are in power are avaritious, and greedy of money, and not becauſe thoſe, who are by far richer than their fellow citizens, think it unfair, that thoſe who have nothing, ſhould have an equal ſhare in the Rule of the State with themſelves, who poſſeſs ſo much; for in many Oligarchies it is not allowable to be employed in money-getting, and there are many laws to prevent it. But in Carthage, which is a Democracy, money-getting is creditable,

ditable, and yet their Form of Government remains unaltered. It is alſo abſurd to ſay, that in an Oligarchy there are two cities, one of the Poor, and another of the Rich; for why ſhould this happen to them, more than to the Lacedæmonians, or any other State where all poſſeſs not equal property, or where all are not equally good? for though no one member of the Community ſhould be poorer than he was before, yet a Democracy might nevertheleſs change into an Oligarchy; if the Rich ſhould be more powerful than the Poor, and the one too negligent, and the other attentive: and though theſe changes are owing to many cauſes, yet he mentions but one only, that the Citizens become poor by luxury, and paying intereſt-money; as if at firſt they were all rich, or the greater part of them: but this is not ſo, but when ſome of thoſe, who have the principal management of public affairs, loſe their fortunes, they will endeavour to bring about a Revolution; but when others do, nothing of conſequence will follow, nor when ſuch States do alter, is there any more reaſon for their altering into a Democracy, than any other. Beſides, though ſome of the members of the community may not have ſpent their Fortunes, yet if they ſhare not in theHonours of the State, or if they are ill-uſed and inſulted, they will endeavour to raiſe Seditions, and bring about a Re-

volution, that they may be allowed to do as they like; which, Plato ſays, ariſes from too much Liberty. Although there are many Oligarchies and Democracies, yet Socrates, when he is treating of the changes they may undergo, ſpeaks of them as if there was but one of each ſort.

A TREA-

A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT.

BOOK VI.

CHAP. I.

WE have already ſhewn, what is the nature of the Supreme Council in the State, and wherein one may differ from another, and how the different Magiſtrates ſhould be regulated; and alſo the Judicial Department, and what is beſt ſuited to what State; and alſo to what cauſes both the Deſtruction and Preſervation of Governments are owing.

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As there are very many ſpecies of Democracies, as well as of other States, it will not be amiſs to conſider at the ſame time, any thing which we may have omitted to mention concerning either of them, and to allot to each, that mode of conduct which is peculiar to, and advantageous for them; and alſo to enquire into the combinations of all theſe different modes of Government which we have mentioned; for as theſe are blended together the Government is altered, as from an Ariſtocracy to be an Oligarchy, and from a Free State to be a Democracy. Now, I mean by thoſe combinations of Government (which I ought to examine into, but have not yet done;) namely, whether the Deliberative department, and the Election of Magiſtrates is regulated in a manner correſpondent to an Oligarchy, or the Judicial to an Ariſtocracy, or the Deliberative part only to an Oligarchy, and the Election of Magiſtrates to an Ariſtocracy, or whether, in any other manner, every thing is not regulated according to the Nature of the Government. But we will firſt conſider, what particular ſort of Democracy is fitted to a particular City, and alſo what particular Oligarchy to a particular People; and of other States, what is advantageous to what. It is alſo neceſſary to ſhew clearly, not only which of theſe Governments is beſt for a State, but alſo how it ought to be eſtabliſhed

eſtabliſhed there, and other things we will treat of briefly. And, firſt, we will ſpeak of a Democracy; and this will at the ſame time ſhew clearly the nature of its oppoſite, which ſome perſons call an Oligarchy; and in doing this we muſt examine into all the parts of a Democracy, and every thing that is connected therewith; for from the manner in which theſe are compounded together, different ſpecies of Democracies ariſe: and hence it is that they are more than one, and of various natures. Now, there are two cauſes which occaſion there being ſo many Democracies; one of which is that which we have already mentioned; namely, there being different ſorts of people; for in one country the majority are Huſbandmen, in another Mechanics, and Hired-ſervants; if the firſt of theſe is added to the ſecond, and the third to both of them, the Democracy will not only differ in the particular of better or worſe, but in this, that it will be no longer the ſame Government; the other is that which we will now ſpeak of. The different things which are connected with Democracies and ſeem to make part of theſe States, do, from their being joined to them, render them different from others: this attending a few, that more, and another all. It is neceſſary, that he who would found any State which he may happen to approve of, or correct one, ſhould be acquainted with

with all theſe particulars. All Founders of States endeavour to comprehend within their own plan every thing of nearly the ſame kind with it; but in doing this they err, in the manner I have already deſcribed in treating of the Preſervation and Deſtruction of Governments. I will now ſpeak of theſe firſt principles and manners, and whatever elſe a Democratical State requires.

CHAP. II.

NOW, the foundation of a Democratical State is Liberty, and people have been accuſtomed to ſay this, as if here only Liberty was to be found; for they affirm, that this is the end propoſed by every Democracy. But one part of Liberty is, to govern and be governed alternately; for, according to Democratical juſtice, Equality is meaſured by Numbers, and not by Worth: and, this being juſt, it is neceſſary, that the ſupreme power ſhould be veſted in the People at large; and that what the majority determine ſhould be final: ſo that in a Democracy the Poor ought to have more power than the Rich, as being the greater number; for this is one mark of Liberty, which all Framers of a Democracy

mocracy lay down as a criterion of that State; another is, to live as every one likes; for this, they ſay, is a Right which Liberty gives, ſince he is a Slave who muſt live as he likes not. This, then, is another criterion of a Democracy. Hence ariſes the claim to be under no command whatſoever to any one, upon any account, any otherwiſe than by rotation, and that juſt as far only, as that perſon is, in his turn, under his alſo. This alſo is conducive to that Equality which Liberty demands. Theſe things being premiſed, and ſuch being the Government, it follows, that ſuch rules as the following ſhould be obſerved in it, that all the Magiſtrates ſhould be choſen out of all the People, and all to command each, and each in his turn all: that all the Magiſtrates ſhould be choſe by lot, except to thoſe offices only which required ſome particular knowledge and ſkill: that no Cenſus, or a very ſmall one, ſhould be required to qualify a man for any office: that none ſhould be in the ſame employment twice, or very few, and very ſeldom, except in the army: that all their appointments ſhould be limited to a very ſhort time, or at leaſt as many as poſſible: that the whole Community ſhould be qualified to judge in all cauſes whatſoever, let the object be ever ſo extenſive, ever ſo intereſting, or of ever ſo high a nature; as at Athens, where the People at large judge the Magiſtrates

when they come out of office, and decide concerning public affairs, as well as private contracts: that the Supreme Power ſhould be in the Public Aſſembly; and that no Magiſtrate ſhould be allowed any diſcretionary power, but in a few inſtances, and of no conſequence to public buſineſs. Of all Magiſtrates a Senate is beſt ſuited to a Democracy, where the whole Community is not paid for giving their attendance; for in that caſe it loſes its power; for then the people will bring all cauſes before them, by appeal, as we have already mentioned in a former book. In the next place, there ſhould, if poſſible, be a fund to pay all the Citizens who have any ſhare in the management of public affairs, either as members of the aſſembly, judges, and magiſtrates; but, if this cannot be done, at leaſt the magiſtrates, the the judges, the ſenators, and members of the ſupreme aſſembly, and alſo thoſe officers who are obliged to eat at a common table, ought to be paid. Moreover, as an Oligarchy is ſaid to be a Government, of men of family, fortune, and education; ſo, on the contrary, a Democracy is a Government in the hands of men of no birth, indigent circumſtances, and mechanical employments. In this State alſo no office ſhould be for life; and, if any ſuch ſhould remain after the Government has been long changed into a Democracy, they ſhould endeavour by degrees

degrees to diminiſh the power; and alſo elect by lot, inſtead of vote. Theſe things, then, appertain to all Democracies; namely, to be eſtabliſhed on that principle of juſtice which is homogeneous to thoſe Governments; that is, that all the members of the State, by number, ſhould enjoy an Equality, which ſeems chiefly to conſtitute a Democracy, or Government of the People: for it ſeems perfectly equal, that the Rich ſhould have no more ſhare in the Government than the Poor, nor be alone in power; but that all ſhould be equal, according to number; for thus, they think, the Equality and Liberty of the State beſt preſerved.

CHAP. III.

IN the next place, we muſt enquire, how this Equality is to be procured. Shall the fortune of five hundred be divided amongſt a thouſand, and theſe thouſand to have equal power with the five hundred? or ſhall we not eſtabliſh our Equality in this manner? but divide indeed thus, and afterwards taking an equal number both out of the five hundred and the thouſand, inveſt them with the power of creating the Magiſtrates and Judges. Is this State then eſtabliſhed according to perfect Democratical juſtice, or rather that which is guided by numbers only? For the defenders of a Democracy ſay, that that is juſt which the majority approve of: but the favourers of an Oligarchy ſay, that that is juſt which thoſe who have moſt, approve of; and that we ought to be directed by the value of property. Both the propoſitions are unjuſt; for if we agree with what the few propoſe, we erect a Tyranny: for if it ſhould happen, that an individual ſhould have more than the reſt, who are rich, according to Oligarchical juſtice, this man alone has a right to the ſupreme power; but if ſuperiorty of numbers is to prevail, injuſtice will then be done, by confiſcating the property of the Rich, who

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are few, as we have already ſaid. What then that equality is, which both parties will admit, muſt be collected from the definition of right which is common to them both; for they both ſay, that what the majority of the State approves of ought to be eſtabliſhed. Be it ſo; but not entirely: but, ſince a City happens to be made up of two different ranks of people, the Rich and the Poor, let that be eſtabliſhed which is approved of by both theſe, or the greater part: but, ſhould there be oppoſite ſentiments, let that be eſtabliſhed which ſhall be approved of by the greater part: but let this be according to the Cenſus; for inſtance, if there ſhould be ten of the Rich and twenty of the Poor, and ſix of the firſt, and fifteen of the laſt ſhould agree upon any meaſure, and the remaining four of the Rich ſhould join with the remaining five of the Poor in oppoſing it, that party whoſe Cenſus when added together, ſhould determine which opinion ſhould be Law, and ſhould theſe happen to be equal, it ſhould be regarded as a caſe ſimilar to an Aſſembly or Court of Juſtice dividing equally upon any queſtion that comes before them, who either determine it by lot or ſome ſuch method. But although, with reſpect to what is equal and juſt, it may be very difficult to eſtabliſh the truth, yet it is much eaſier to do, than to perſuade thoſe who have it in their power

to encroach upon others, to be guided thereby; for the weak always desire what is equal and just, but the powerful, pay no regard thereunto.

CHAP. IV.

THERE are four kinds of Democracies. The best is that which is composed of those first in order, as we have already said, and this also is the most antient of any. I call that the first which every one would place so, was he to divide the people; for the best part of these are the husbandmen. We see, then, that a Democracy may be framed where the majority live by tillage, or pasturage: for, as their property is but small, they will not be at leisure perpetually to hold public assemblies, but will be continually employed in following their own business, not having otherwise the means of living; nor will they be desirous of what another enjoys, but will rather like to follow their own business than meddle with State-affairs, and accept the offices of government, which will be attended with no great profit; for the major part of mankind are rather desirous of riches than honour; (a proof of this is, that they submitted to the Tyrannies

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in antient times, and do now ſubmit to the Oligarchies, if no one hinders them in their uſual occupations, or deprives them of their property; for ſome of them ſoon get rich, others are removed from poverty); beſides, their having the right of election, and calling their magiſtrates to account for their conduct, when they come out of office, will ſatisfy their deſire of honours, if any of them entertain that paſſion: for in ſome States, though the Commonalty have not the right of electing the magiſtrates, yet it is veſted in part of that body choſen to repreſent them: and it is ſufficient for the People at large to poſſeſs the Deliberative power: and this ought to be conſidered as a ſpecies of Democracy; ſuch was that formerly at Mantinæa: for which reaſon it is proper for the Democracy we have been now treating of, to have a power (and it has been uſual for them to have it) of cenſuring their magiſtrates when out of office, and ſitting in judgment upon all cauſes: but that the chief magiſtrates ſhould be elected, and according to a certain Cenſus, which ſhould vary with the rank of their office, or elſe not by a Cenſus, but according to their abilities for their reſpective appointments. A State thus conſtituted, muſt be well conſtituted; for the magiſtracies will be always filled with the beſt men, with the approbation of the People; who will

will not envy their ſuperiors: and theſe and the Nobles ſhould be content with this part in the adminiſtration; for they will not be governed by their inferiors. They will be alſo careful to uſe their power with moderation, as there are others to whom full power is delegated to cenſure their conduct; for it is very ſerviceable to the State to have them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do whatſoever they chuſe; for with ſuch a liberty there would be no check to that evil particle there is in every one: therefore it is neceſſary and moſt for the benefit of the State that the offices thereof ſhould be filled by the principal perſons in it, whoſe characters are unblemiſhed, and that the People are not oppreſſed. It is now evident, that this is the beſt ſpecies of Democracy, and on what account; becauſe the People are ſuch, and have ſuch powers as they ought to have. To eſtabliſh a Democracy of Huſbandmen ſome of thoſe Laws, which were obſerved in many antient States, are univerſally uſeful; as, for inſtance, on no account to permit any one to poſſeſs more than a certain quantity of land, or within a certain diſtance from the City. Formerly alſo, in ſome States, no one was allowed to ſell their original lot of land. They alſo mention a Law of one Oxylus, which forbid any one to add to their patrimony by uſury. We ought alſo to follow the Law of

the Aphutæans, as uſeful, to direct us in this particular we are now ſpeaking of; for they having but very little ground, while they were a numerous people, and at the ſame time were all Huſbandmen, did not include all their lands within the Cenſus, but divided them in ſuch a manner, that, according to the Cenſus, the Poor had more power than the Rich. Next to the Commonalty of Huſbandmen is one of Shepherds and Herdſmen; for they have many things in common with them, and, by their way of life, are excellently qualified to make good ſoldiers, ſtout in body, and able to continue in the open air all night. The generality of the people, of whom other Democracies are compoſed, are much worſe than theſe; for their lives are wretched, nor have they any buſineſs with Virtue in any thing they do; theſe are your mechanics, your exchange-men, and hired-ſervants; as all theſe ſorts of men frequent the exchange, and the citadel, they can readily attend the public aſſembly; whereas the huſbandmen, being more diſperſed in the country, cannot ſo eaſily meet together; nor are they equally deſirous of doing it, with theſe others. When a country happens to be ſo ſituated, that a great part of the land lies at a diſtance from the City, there it is eaſy to eſtabliſh a good Democracy, or a Free State, for the people in general will be obliged to live

in the country; ſo that it will be neceſſary in ſuch a Democracy, though there may be an exchange-mob at hand, never to allow a legal aſſembly without the inhabitants of the country attend. We have ſhewn in what manner the firſt and beſt Democracy ought to be eſtabliſhed, and it will be equally evident as to the reſt, for from theſe we ſhould proceed as a guide, and always ſeparate the meaneſt of the people from the reſt. But the laſt and worſt which gives to every Citizen without diſtinction a ſhare in every part of the adminiſtration, is, what few Citizens can bear, nor is it eaſy to preſerve for any long time, unleſs well ſupported by Laws and Manners. We have already noticed almoſt every cauſe that can deſtroy either this or any other State. Thoſe who have taken the lead in ſuch a Democracy have endeavoured to ſupport it, and make the People powerful, by collecting together as many perſons as they could, and giving them their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally born, and alſo if either of their Parents were Citizens, that is to ſay, if either their Father or Mother; and this method is better ſuited to this State than any other: and thus the Demagogues have uſually managed. They ought, however, to take care, and do this no longer than the Common People are ſuperior to the Nobles and thoſe of the Middle Rank,

and then ſtop; for, if they proceed ſtill further, they will make the State diſorderly, and the Nobles will ill brook the power of the Common People, and be full of reſentment againſt it; which was the cauſe of an inſurrection at Cyrenè: for a little evil is overlooked, but when it becomes a great one, it ſtrikes the eye. It is moreover very uſeful, in ſuch a State, to do as Clyſthenes did at Athens, when he was deſirous of increaſing the power of the People, and as thoſe did who eſtabliſhed the Democracy in Cyrenè; that is, to inſtitute many tribes and fraternities, and to make the religious rites of private perſons few, and thoſe common; and every means is to be contrived to aſſociate and blend the People together as much as poſſible; and that all former cuſtoms be broke through. Moreover, whatſoever is practiſed in a Tyranny ſeems adapted to a Democracy of this ſpecies; as for inſtance, the licentiouſneſs of the ſlaves, the women, and the children; for this to a certain degree is uſeful in ſuch a State; and alſo to overlook every one's living as they chooſe; for many will ſupport ſuch a Government: for it is more agreeable to many to live without any controul, than as Prudence would direct.

CHAP. V.

IT is alſo the buſineſs of the Legiſlator and all thoſe who would ſupport a Government of this ſort, not to make it too great a work, or too perfect; but to aim only to render it ſtable: for, let a State be conſtituted ever ſo badly, there is no difficulty in its continuing a few days: they ſhould therefore endeavour to procure its ſafety, by all thoſe ways which we have deſcribed, in aſſigning the cauſes of the Preſervation, and Deſtruction of Governments; avoiding what is hurtful, and by framing ſuch Laws, written and unwritten, as contain thoſe things which chiefly tend to the Preſervation of the State; nor to ſuppoſe that, that is uſeful either for a Democratic or an Oligarchic form of Government, which contributes to make them more purely ſo, but what will contribute to their duration: but our Demagogues at preſent, to flatter the People, occaſion frequent confiſcations in the courts; for which reaſon thoſe who have the welfare of the State really at heart ſhould act directly oppoſite to what they do, and enact a Law to prevent forfeitures from being divided amongſt the People or paid into the treaſury, but to have them ſet apart for ſacred uſes: for thoſe who are of a bad diſpoſition would not

not then be the leſs cautious, as their puniſhment would be the ſame; and the Community would not be ſo ready to condemn thoſe whom they ſat in judgment on, when they were to get nothing by it: they ſhould alſo take care that the cauſes which are brought before the Public ſhould be as few as poſſible, and puniſh with the utmoſt ſeverity thoſe who raſhly brought an action againſt any one; for it is not the Commons but the Nobles who are generally proſecuted: for in all things the Citizens of the ſame State ought to be affectionate to each other, at leaſt not to treat thoſe who have the chief power in it as their enemies. Now, as the Democracies which have been lately eſtabliſhed are very numerous, and it is difficult to get the Common People to attend the public aſſemblies, without they are paid for it, this, when there is not a ſufficient public revenue, is fatal to the Nobles; for the deficiencies therein muſt be neceſſarily made up by taxes, confiſcations, and fines impoſed by corrupt courts of juſtice: which things have already deſtroyed many Democracies. Whenever, then, the revenues of the State are ſmall, there ſhould be but few public aſſemblies, and but few courts of juſtice: theſe however ſhould have very extenſive juriſdictions, but ſhould continue ſitting a few days only, for by this means, the Rich would not fear the expence, although they

they ſhould receive nothing for their attendance, though the Poor did; and judgment alſo would be given much better; for the Rich will not chooſe to be long abſent from their own affairs, but will willingly be ſo for a ſhort time: and, when there are ſufficient revenues, a different conduct ought to be purſued from what the Demagogues at preſent follow; for now they divide the ſurplus of the public money amongſt the Poor; theſe receive it, and again want the ſame ſupply, while the giving it, is like pouring water into a ſieve: but the true patriot in a Democracy ought to take care that the majority of the Community are not too poor, for this is the cauſe of rapacity in that Government; he therefore ſhould endeavour that they may enjoy perpetual plenty; and, as this alſo is advantageous to the Rich, what can be ſaved out of the public money ſhould be put by, and then divided at once amongſt the Poor, if poſſible, in ſuch a quantity as may enable every one of them to purchaſe a little field, and, if that cannot be done, at leaſt to give each of them enough to procure the implements of trade, and huſbandry; and if there is not enough for all to receive ſo much at once, then to divide it according to tribes, or any other allotment. In the mean time let the Rich pay them for neceſſary ſervices, but not be obliged to find them in uſeleſs amuſements. And

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ſomething like this was the manner in which they managed at Carthage, and preſerved the affections of the People; for, by continually ſending ſome of their Community into Colonies, they procured plenty. It is alſo worthy of a ſenſible and generous Nobility to divide the Poor amongſt them, and ſupplying them with what is neceſſary, induce them to work; or to imitate the conduct of the People at Tarentum: for they, permitting the Poor to partake in common of every thing which is needful for them, gain the affections of the Commonalty. They have alſo two different ways of electing their Magiſtrates; for ſome are choſe by vote, others by lot; by the laſt, that the People at large may have ſome ſhare in the adminiſtration; by the former, that the State may be well governed: the ſame may be accompliſhed, if, of the ſame Magiſtrates you chuſe ſome by vote, others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which Democracies ought to be eſtabliſhed.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

WHAT has been already ſaid will almoſt of itſelf ſufficiently ſhew how an Oligarchy ought to be founded; for he who would frame ſuch a State ſhould have in his view a Democracy, to oppoſe it; for every ſpecies of Oligarchy ſhould be founded on principles diametrically oppoſite to ſome ſpecies of Democracy.

The firſt and beſt framed Oligarchy is that which approaches near to what we call a Free State; in which there ought to be two different Cenſus, the one high, the other low: from thoſe who are within the latter, the ordinary officers of the State ought to be choſen; from the former, the ſupreme Magiſtrates: nor ſhould any one be excluded from a part of the Adminiſtration who was within the Cenſus; which ſhould be ſo regulated that the Commonalty who are included in it ſhould, by means thereof, be ſuperior to thoſe who have no ſhare in the Government; for thoſe who are to have the management of public affairs ought always to be choſen out of the better ſort of the People. Much in the ſame manner ought that Oligarchy to be eſtabliſhed which is next in order: but as to that which is moſt oppoſite to a pure Democracy, and approaches neareſt

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to a Dynaſty, and a Tyranny, as it is of all others the worſt, ſo it requires the greateſt care and caution to preſerve it: for as bodies of ſound and healthy conſtitutions, and ſhips which are well-manned and well-found for ſailing, can bear many injuries without periſhing, while a diſeaſed body, or a leaky ſhip with an indifferent crew, cannot ſupport the leaſt ſhock; ſo the worſt-eſtabliſhed Governments want moſt looking after. A number of Citizens is the preſervation of a Democracy; for theſe are oppoſed to thoſe rights which are founded in rank: on the contrary, the preſervation of an Oligarchy depends upon the due regulation of the different Orders in the Society.

CHAP. VII.

AS the greater part of the Community are divided into four ſorts of people; huſbandmen, mechanics, traders, and hired-ſervants; and, as thoſe who are employed in war may likewiſe be divided into four; the horſemen, the heavy-armed ſoldier, the light-armed, and the ſailor, where the nature of the country can admit a great number of horſe; there a powerful Oligarchy may be eaſily eſtabliſhed: for the ſafety of the inhabitants depends upon a force of that ſort; but thoſe who can ſupport the expence of horſemen muſt be perſons of ſome conſiderable fortune. Where the troops are chiefly heavy-armed, there an Oligarchy, inferior in power to the other, may be eſtabliſhed; for the heavy-armed are rather made up of Men of Subſtance than the Poor: but the light-armed, and the ſailors always contribute to ſupport a Democracy: but where the number of theſe is very great, and a ſedition ariſes, the other parts of the Community fight at a diſadvantage; but a remedy for this evil is to be learned from ſkilful generals, who always mix a proper number of light-armed ſoldiers with their horſe and heavy-armed: for it is with thoſe that the populace get the better of the men of fortune in an in-

inſurrection; for, theſe being lighter, are eaſily a match for the horſe and the heavy-armed: ſo that for an Oligarchy to form a body of troops from theſe is to form it againſt itſelf: but as a City is compoſed of perſons of different ages, ſome young, and ſome old, the fathers ſhould teach their ſons, while they were very young, a light and eaſy exerciſe; but, when they are grown up, they ſhould be perfect in every warlike exerciſe. Now, the admiſſion of the People to any ſhare in the Government ſhould either be (as I ſaid before) regulated by a Cenſus, or elſe, as at Thebes, allowed to thoſe who for a certain time have ceaſed from any mechanic employment, or as at Maſſalia, where they are choſen according to their worth, whether Citizens or Foreigners. With reſpect to the Magiſtrates of the higheſt rank, which it may be neceſſary to have in a State, the ſervices they are bound to do the Public ſhould be expreſly laid down, to prevent the Common People from being deſirous of accepting their employments, and alſo to induce them to regard their Magiſtrates with favour, when they know what a price they pay for their honours. It is alſo neceſſary that the Magiſtrates, upon entering into their offices, ſhould make magnificent ſacrifices, and erect ſome public ſtructure, that the People partaking of the entertainment, and ſeeing the City orna-

mented with votive gifts in their temples and public ſtructures, may ſee with pleaſure the ſtability of the Government: add to this alſo, that the Nobles will have their generoſity recorded: but now this is not the conduct, which thoſe who are at preſent at the head of an Oligarchy purſue, but the contrary; for they are not more deſirous of honour than of gain; for which reaſon ſuch Oligarchies may more properly be called Little Democracies. Thus we have explained on what principles a Democracy and an Oligarchy ought to be eſtabliſhed.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

AFTER what has been ſaid I proceed next to treat particularly of the Magiſtrates; of what nature they ſhould be, how many, and for what purpoſe, as I have already mentioned: for without neceſſary Magiſtrates no State can exiſt, nor without thoſe, which contribute to its dignity and good order, can exiſt happily: now it is neceſſary, that in ſmall States the Magiſtrates ſhould be few; in a large one, many: alſo to know well what offices may by joined together, and what ought to be ſeparated.

The firſt thing neceſſary is, to eſtabliſh proper regulators in the markets; for which purpoſe a certain Magiſtrate ſhould be appointed, to inſpect their contracts, and preſerve good order; for, of neceſſity, in almoſt every City there muſt be both buyers and ſellers, to ſupply each others mutual wants: and this is what is moſt productive of the comforts of life; for the ſake of which men ſeem to have joined together in one Community. A ſecond care, and nearly related to the firſt, is, to have an eye both to the public and private edifices in the City, that they may be an ornament; and alſo to take care of all buildings which are likely to fall:

fall: and to ſee that the highways are kept in proper repair; and alſo that the land-marks between different eſtates are preſerved, that there may be no diſputes on that account; and all other buſineſs of the ſame nature. Now, this buſineſs may be divided into ſeveral branches, over each of which in populous Cities they appoint a ſeparate perſon; one to inſpect the buildings, another the fountains, another the harbours; and they are called the Inſpectors of the City. A third, which is very like the laſt, and converſant nearly about the ſame objects, only in the country, is to take care of what is done out of the City. The officers who have this employment we call Inſpectors of the Lands, or Inſpectors of the Woods; but the buſineſs of all three of them is the ſame. There muſt alſo be other officers appointed to receive the public revenue, and to deliver it out to thoſe, who are in the different departments of the State: theſe are called Receivers or Quæſtors. There muſt alſo be another, before whom all private contracts and ſentences of courts ſhould be enrolled, as well as proceedings, and declarations. Sometimes this employment is divided amongſt many, but there is one ſupreme over the reſt; theſe are called Proctors, Notaries, and the like. Next to theſe is an officer whoſe buſineſs is of all others the moſt neceſſary, and yet moſt difficult; namely,

namely, to take care, that ſentence is executed upon thoſe who are condemned; and that every one pays the fines laid on him; and alſo to have the charge of thoſe who are in priſon. This office is very diſagreeable, on account of the odium attending it, ſo that no one will engage therein without it is made very profitable, or, if they do, will they be willing to execute it according to law; but it is moſt neceſſary, as it is of no ſervice to paſs judgment in any cauſe, without that judgment is carried into execution: for without this human ſociety could not ſubſiſt: for which reaſon it is beſt that this office ſhould not be executed by one perſon, but by ſome of the Magiſtrates of the other courts. In like manner, the taking care that thoſe fines which are ordered by the Judges are levied, ſhould be divided amongſt different perſons. And, as different Magiſtrates judge different cauſes, let the cauſes of the young be heard by the young: and as to thoſe which are already brought to a hearing, let one perſon paſs ſentence, and another ſee it executed: as, for inſtance, let the Magiſtrates who have the care of the public buildings execute the ſentence which the inſpectors of the markets have paſſed, and the like in other caſes: for by ſo much the leſs odium attends thoſe who carry the Laws into execution, by ſo much the eaſier will they be properly put in force:

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force: therefore for the ſame perſons to paſs the ſentence, and to execute it, will ſubject them to general hatred; and, if they paſs it upon all, they will be conſidered as the enemies of all. Thus, one perſon has often the cuſtody of the priſoner's body, while another ſees the ſentence againſt him executed, as the Eleven did at Athens: for which reaſon it is prudent to ſeparate theſe offices, and to give great attention thereunto as equally neceſſary with any thing we have already mentioned; for it will certainly happen, that men of character will decline accepting this office, and worthleſs perſons cannot properly be intruſted with it, as having themſelves rather an occaſion for a guard, than being qualified to guard others. This, therefore, ought by no means to be a ſeparate office from others; nor ſhould it be continually allotted to any individuals, but the young men; where there is a city-guard, the youths ought in turns to take theſe offices upon them. Theſe, then, as the moſt neceſſary Magiſtrates, ought to be firſt mentioned: next to theſe are others no leſs neceſſary, but of much higher rank, for they ought to be men of great ſkill and fidelity. Theſe are they who have the guard of the City, and provide every thing that is neceſſary for war; whoſe buſineſs it is, both in war and peace, to defend the walls, and the gates, and to take care to muſter and marſhal the Citizens.

Citizens. Over all theſe there are ſometimes more officers, ſometimes fewer: thus, in little Cities there is only one, whom they call either General or Polemarch; but where there are horſe and light-armed troops, and bowmen, and ſailors, they ſometimes put diſtinct commanders over each of theſe; who again have others under them, according to their different diviſions; all of which join together to make one military body: and thus much for this department. Since ſome of the Magiſtrates, if not all, have buſineſs with the public money, it is neceſſary, that there ſhould be other officers, whoſe employment ſhould be nothing elſe than to take an account of what they have; and correct any miſmanagement therein. But, beſides, all theſe Magiſtrates there is one who is ſupreme over them all, who very often has in his own power the diſpoſal of the public revenue and taxes; who preſides over the People, when the ſupreme power is in them; for there muſt be ſome Magiſtrate who has a power to ſummon them together, and to preſide as Head of the State. Theſe are ſometimes called Preadviſers; but, where there are many, more properly a Council. Theſe are nearly the Civil Magiſtrates, which are requiſite to a Government: but there are other perſons, whoſe buſineſs is confined to Religion; as the prieſts, and thoſe who are to take care

of the Temples, that they are kept in proper repair, or, if they fall down, that they may be rebuilt; and whatever elſe belongs to public worſhip. This charge is ſometimes entruſted to one perſon, as in very ſmall Cities: in others it is delegated to many, and theſe diſtinct from the Prieſthood, as the builders or keepers of holy places, and officers of the ſacred revenue. Next to theſe are thoſe who are appointed to have the general care of all thoſe public ſacrifices, to the tutelar God of the State, which the Laws do not entruſt to the prieſts: and theſe in different States have different appellations. To enumerate in few words the different departments of all thoſe Magiſtrates who are neceſſary: theſe are either religion, war, taxes, expenditures, markets, public buildings, harbours, highways. Belonging to the courts of juſtice there are ſcribes, to inroll private contracts; and there muſt alſo be guards ſet over the priſoners, others to ſee the Law is executed, council on either ſide, and alſo others to watch over the conduct of thoſe who are to decide the cauſes. Amongſt the Magiſtrates alſo may finally be reckoned thoſe who are to give their advice in public affairs. But ſeparate States, who are peculiarly happy and have leiſure to attend to more minute particulars, and are very attentive to good order, require particular Magiſtrates for themſelves; ſuch as thoſe who have the govern-

government of the women; who are to ſee the Laws are executed; who take care of the boys, and preſide over their education. To theſe may be added, thoſe who have the care of their Gymnaſtic exerciſes, their theatres, and every other public ſpectacle which there may happen to be. Some of theſe however are not of general uſe; as the governors of the women: for the Poor are obliged to employ their wives and children in ſervile offices, for want of ſlaves. As there are three Magiſtrates to whom ſome States entruſt the ſupreme power; namely, Guardians of the Laws, Preadviſers, and Senators; Guardians of the Laws ſuit beſt to an Ariſtocracy, Preadviſers to an Oligarchy, and a Senate to a Democracy. And thus much briefly concerning all Magiſtrates.

A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT.

BOOK VII.

CHAP. I.

HE who propoſes to make that inquiry which is neceſſary concerning what Government is beſt, ought firſt to determine what manner of living is moſt eligible; for while this remains uncertain, it will alſo be equally uncertain what Government is beſt: for, provided no unexpected accidents interfere, it is highly probable, that thoſe who enjoy the beſt Government, will live the moſt happily according to their circumſtances.

cumſtances; he ought, therefore, firſt to know what manner of life is moſt deſirable for all; and afterwards whether this life is the ſame to the Man, and the Citizen, or different. As I imagine that I have already ſufficiently ſhewn what ſort of life is beſt, in my Popular Diſcourſes on that ſubject, I think I may very properly repeat the ſame here; as moſt certainly no one ever called in queſtion the propriety of one of the diviſions; namely, that as what is good, relative to Man, may be divided into three ſorts, what is external, what appertains to the body, and what to the ſoul, it is evident, that all theſe muſt conſpire to make a Man happy: for no one would ſay, that a Man was happy who had no fortitude, no temperance, no juſtice, no prudence; but was afraid of the flies that flew round him: nor would abſtain from the meaneſt theft, if he was either hungry or dry, or would murder his deareſt friend for a farthing; and alſo was in every particular as wanting in his underſtanding as an infant, or an ideot. Theſe truths are ſo evident, that all muſt agree to them; though ſome may diſpute about the quantity and the degree: for they may think, that a very little virtue is ſufficient for happineſs; but for riches, property, power, honour, and all ſuch things, they endeavour to increaſe them without bounds: but to ſuch we reply, that it is eaſy to

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prove from what experience teaches us in theſe caſes, that theſe external goods produce not Virtue, but Virtue them. As to an happy life, whether it is to be found in Pleaſure or Virtue, or both, certain it is, that thoſe whoſe morals are moſt pure, and whoſe underſtandings are beſt cultivated, will enjoy more of it, although their fortune is but moderate, than thoſe do who own an exuberance of wealth, are deficient in thoſe; and this utility any one who reflects may eaſily convince himſelf of; for whatſoever is external has its boundary, as a machine, and whatſoever is uſeful, in its exceſs is either neceſſarily hurtful, or at beſt uſeleſs to the poſſeſſor; but every good quality of the ſoul, the higher it is in degree, ſo much the more uſeful it is, if it is permitted on this ſubject to uſe the word uſeful, as well as noble. It is alſo very evident, that the accidents of each ſubject take place of each other, as the ſubjects themſelves, of which we allow they are accidents, differ from each other in value; ſo that if the ſoul is more noble than any outward poſſeſſion, as the body, both in itſelf and with reſpect to us, it muſt be admitted of courſe that the beſt accidents of each, muſt follow the ſame analogy. Beſides, it is for the ſake of the Soul that theſe things are deſirable; and it is on this account that wiſe men ſhould deſire them, not the Soul for them.

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Let us therefore be well aſſured, that every one enjoys as much Happineſs as he poſſeſſes Virtue and Wiſdom, and acts according to their dictates; ſince for this we have the example of GOD himſelf, WHO IS COMPLETELY HAPPY, NOT FROM ANY EXTERNAL GOOD; BUT IN HIMSELF, AND BECAUSE SUCH IS HIS NATURE. For good fortune is ſomething different from happineſs, as every good which depends not on the mind is owing to chance or fortune; but it is not from fortune that any one is wiſe and juſt: hence it follows, that that City is happieſt which is the beſt, and acts beſt: for no one can do well, who acts not well; nor can the deeds either of Man, or City, be praiſe-worthy without Virtue and Wiſdom; for whatſoever is juſt, or wiſe, or prudent in a Man, the ſame things are juſt, wiſe, and prudent in a City.

Thus much by way of introduction; for I could not but juſt touch upon this ſubject, though I could not go through a compleat inveſtigation of it, as it properly belongs to another queſtion: let us at preſent ſuppoſe ſo much, that a man's happieſt life, both as an individual and as a Citizen, is, a life of Virtue, accompanied with thoſe enjoyments which Virtue uſually procures. If there are any who are not convinced by what I have ſaid, their doubts ſhall be anſwered hereafter, at preſent we ſhall proceed according to our intended method.

CHAP. II.

IT now remains for us to ſay, whether the happineſs of any individual Man and the City is the ſame or different: but this alſo is evident; for whoſoever ſuppoſes, that riches will make a perſon happy, muſt place the happineſs of the City in riches, if it poſſeſſes them; thoſe who prefer a life which enjoys a tyrannic power over others will alſo think, that the City which has many others under its command is moſt happy: thus alſo, if any one approves a Man for his Virtue, he will think the moſt worthy City the happieſt: but here there are two particulars which require conſideration, one of which is, whether it is the moſt eligible life to be a member of the Community and enjoy the rights of a Citizen, or whether to live as a ſtranger, without interfering in public affairs; and alſo what form of Government is to be preferred, and what diſpoſition of the State is beſt; whether the whole Community ſhould be eligible to a ſhare in the Adminiſtration, or only the greater part, and ſome only: as this, therefore, is a ſubject of political examination and ſpeculation, and not what concerns the individual; and the firſt of theſe is what we are at preſent engaged in, the

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one of theſe I am not obliged to ſpeak to, the other is the proper buſineſs of my preſent deſign. It is evident, that Government muſt be the beſt, which is ſo eſtabliſhed, that every one therein may have it in his power to act virtuouſly, and live happily: but ſome, who admit, that a life of virtue is moſt eligible, ſtill doubt, which is preferable, a public life of active virtue, or one entirely diſengaged from what is without, and ſpent in contemplation; which ſome ſay is the only one worthy of a philoſopher; and one of theſe two different modes of life both now and formerly ſeem to have been choſe, by all thoſe who were the moſt virtuous men; I mean the public or philoſophic. And yet it is of no little conſequence on which ſide the truth lies; for a man of ſenſe muſt naturally incline to the better choice; both as an Individual and a Citizen. Some think, that a tyrannic government over thoſe near us is the greateſt injuſtice; but that a political one is not unjuſt: but that ſtill is a reſtraint on the pleaſures and tranquillity of life. Others hold the quite contrary opinion, and think, that a public and active life is the only life for man: for that private perſons have no opportunity of practiſing any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged in public life, the management of the State. Theſe are their ſentiments; others ſay, that a tyrannical and de-

ſpotical mode of Government is the only happy one; for even amongſt ſome Free States the object of their Laws ſeems to be, to tyrannize over their neighbours: ſo that the generality of political inſtitutions, whereſoever diſperſed, if they have any one common object in view, have all of them this, to conquer, and govern. It is evident, both from the Laws of the Lacedæmonians and Cretans, as well as by the manner in which they educated their children, that all which they had in view was to make them ſoldiers: beſides, among all nations, thoſe who have power enough and reduce others to ſervitude, are honoured on that account; as were the Scythians, Perſians, Thracians, and Gauls: with ſome there are Laws to heighten the virtue of courage; thus they tell us, that at Carthage they allowed every perſon to wear as many rings for diſtinction as he had ſerved campaigns. There was alſo a Law at Lacedæmon, that a man, who had not himſelf killed an enemy, ſhould be obliged to wear an halter; among the Scythians, at a feſtival, none were permitted to drink out of the cup which was carried about who had not done the ſame thing. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, they fixed as many columns upon a man's tomb as he had ſlain enemies: and among different nations different things of this ſort prevail, ſome of them eſtabliſhed by Law, others by Cuſtom.

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Probably it may ſeem too abſurd to thoſe who are willing to take this ſubject into their conſideration to inquire, whether it is the buſineſs of a Legiſlator, to be able to point out by what means a State may govern and tyrannize over its neighbours, whether they will, or will not: for how can that belong either to the Politician or Legiſlator which is unlawful? for that cannot be lawful, which is done not only juſtly, but unjuſtly alſo: for a conqueſt may be unjuſtly made. But we ſee nothing of this in the Arts: for it is the buſineſs neither of the Phyſician, or the Pilot to uſe either perſuaſion or force, the one to his Patients, the other to his Paſſengers: and yet many ſeem to think a Deſpotic Government is a Political one, and what they would not allow to be juſt, or proper, if exerciſed over themſelves, they will not bluſh to exerciſe over others; for they endeavour to be wiſely governed themſelves, but think it of no conſequence whether others are ſo or not: but a deſpotic power is abſurd, except only where Nature has framed the one party for dominion, the other for ſubordination; and therefore no one ought to aſſume it over all in general, but thoſe only which are the proper objects thereof: thus no one ſhould hunt men either for food or ſacrifice, but what is fit for thoſe purpoſes, and theſe are wild animals which are eatable.

Now, a City which is well governed might be very happy in itſelf, while it enjoyed a good ſyſtem of Laws, altho' it ſhould happen to be ſo ſituated as to have no connection with any other State, tho' its conſtitution ſhould not be framed for war or conqueſt; for it would then have no occaſion for theſe. It is evident therefore that the buſineſs of war is to be conſidered as commendable, not as a final end, but as the means of procuring it. It is the duty of a good Legiſlator to examine carefully into his State; and the nature of the people, and how they may partake of every intercourſe, of a good life, and of the happineſs which reſults from it: and in this reſpect ſome Laws and Cuſtoms differ from others. It is alſo the duty of a Legiſlator, if he has any neighbouring States, to conſider in what manner he ſhall oppoſe each of them, or what good offices he ſhall ſhew them. But what ſhould be the final end of the beſt Governments, will be conſidered hereafter.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

WE will now ſpeak to thoſe who while they agree that a life of Virtue is moſt eligible, yet differ in the uſe of it, addreſſing ourſelves to both theſe parties; for there are ſome who diſapprove of all political Governments, and think, that the life of one who is really free, is different from the life of a Citizen, and of all others moſt eligible: others again think, that the Citizen is the beſt; and that it is impoſſible for him who does nothing, to be well employed; but that virtuous activity and happineſs are the ſame thing. Now both parties in ſome particulars ſay what is right, in others what is wrong, thus, that the life of a Freeman is better than the life of a Slave, is true, for a Slave, as a Slave, is employed in nothing honourable; for the common ſervile employments which he is commanded to perform have nothing virtuous in them; but, on the other hand, it is not true, that a ſubmiſſion to all ſorts of Governments is Slavery; for the Government of Freemen differs not more from the Government of Slaves, than Slavery and Freedom differ from each other in their nature; and how they do has been already mentioned. To prefer doing of nothing to virtuous activity

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is alſo wrong, for happineſs conſiſts in action, and many noble ends are produced by the actions of the juſt, and wiſe. From what we have already determined on this ſubject, ſome one probably may think, that Supreme Power is of all things beſt, as that will enable a man to command very many uſeful ſervices from others; ſo that he who can obtain this ought not to give it up to another, but rather to ſeize it: and, for this purpoſe, the Father ſhould have no attention or regard for the Son, or the Son for the Father, or Friend for Friend; for what is beſt is moſt eligible: but to be a member of the community, and be in felicity is beſt. What theſe perſons advance might probably be true, if the Supreme Good was certainly theirs who plunder and uſe violence to others: but it is moſt unlikely that it ſhould be ſo; for it is a mere ſuppoſition: for it does not follow, that their actions are honourable who thus aſſume the Supreme Power over others, without they were by Nature as ſuperior to them as a Man to a Woman, a Father to a Child, a Maſter to a Slave: ſo that he who ſo far forſakes the paths of Virtue can never return back from whence he departed from them: for amongſt equals whatever is fair and juſt ought to be reciprocal; for this is equal and right; but that equals ſhould not partake of what is

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equal, or like to like, is contrary to nature: but whatever is contrary to nature is not right; therefore, if there is any one ſuperior to the reſt of the Community in Virtue, and abilities for active life, him it is proper to follow, him it is right to obey, but the one alone will not do, but muſt be joined to the other alſo: and, if we are right in what we have now ſaid, it follows, that Happineſs conſiſts in Virtuous Activity, and that both with reſpect to the Community, as well as the Individual an active life is the happieſt: not that an active life muſt neceſſarily refer to other perſons, as ſome think, or that thoſe ſtudies alone are practical, which are purſued to teach others what to do; for thoſe are much more ſo whoſe final object is in themſelves, and to improve the judgment and underſtanding of the man; for virtuous activity has an end, therefore is ſomething practical; nay, thoſe who contrive the plan which others follow are more particularly ſaid to act, and are ſuperior to the workmen who execute their deſigns. But it is not neceſſary, that States which chuſe to have no intercourſe with others ſhould remain inactive; for the ſeveral members thereof may have mutual intercourſe with each other; for there are many opportunities for this among the different Citizens; the ſame thing is true of every individual: for, was it otherwiſe, neither could the Deity or

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the Univerſe be perfect; to neither of whom can any thing external ſeparately exiſt. Hence it is evident, that that very ſame life which is happy for each individual, is happy alſo for the State, and every member of it.

CHAP. IV.

AS I have now finiſhed what was introductory to this ſubject, and conſidered at large the nature of other States, it now remains that I ſhould firſt ſay what ought to be the eſtabliſhment of a City, which one ſhould form according to one's wiſh; for no good State can exiſt without a moderate proportion of what is neceſſary. Many things therefore ought to be forethought of as deſirable, but none of them ſuch as are impoſſible: I mean relative to the number of Citizens, and the extent of the Territory: for as other artificers, ſuch as the Weaver and the Shipwright, ought to have ſuch materials as are fit for their work, ſince ſo much the better they are, by ſo much ſuperior will the work itſelf neceſſarily be; ſo alſo ought the Legiſlator and Politician endeavour to procure proper materials for the buſineſs they have in hand.

hand. Now the firſt and principal inſtrument of the Politician is the number of the People; he ſhould therefore know how many, and what they naturally ought to be: in like manner, the Country, how large, and what it is. Moſt perſons think, that it is neceſſary for a City to be large, to be happy: but, ſhould this be true, they cannot tell what is a large one, and what a ſmall one; for according to the multitude of the inhabitants they eſtimate the greatneſs of it; but they ought rather to conſider its ſtrength than its numbers; for a State has a certain object in view, and from the power which it has in itſelf of accompliſhing it, its greatneſs ought to be eſtimated; as a perſon might ſay, that Hippocrates was a greater phyſician, tho' not a greater man than one that exceeded him in the ſize of his body: but if it was proper to determine the ſtrength of the City from the number of the inhabitants, it ſhould never be collected from the multitude in general who may happen to be in it; for in a City there muſt neceſſarily be many Slaves, Sojourners, and Foreigners; but from thoſe who are really part of the City, and properly conſtitute its members; a multitude of theſe is indeed a proof of a large City, but in a State where a large number of mechanics inhabit, and but few ſoldiers, ſuch a State cannot be great; for the greatneſs of the City, and the number of men in it, are not the ſame thing. This

too is evident from fact, that it is very difficult, if not impoſſible, to govern properly a very numerous body of men; for of all the States which appear well governed we find not one where the rights of a Citizen are open to an indiſcriminate multitude. And this is alſo evident from the nature of the thing; for as Law is a certain order, ſo good Law is of courſe a certain good order: but too large a multitude are incapable of this, unleſs under the Government of that DIVINE POWER which comprehends the Univerſe. Not but that, as quantity and variety are uſually eſſential to beauty, the perfection of a City conſiſts in the largeneſs of it as far as that largeneſs is conſiſtent with that order already mentioned: but ſtill there is a determinate ſize to all Cities, as well as every thing elſe, whether animals, plants, or machines, for each of theſe, if they are neither too little, nor too big, have their proper powers; but when they have not their due growth, or are badly conſtructed, as a ſhip a ſpan long is not properly a ſhip, nor one of two furlongs length, but when it is of a fit ſize; for either from its ſmallneſs or from its largeneſs, it may be quite uſeleſs: ſo is it with a City; one that is too ſmall has not in itſelf the power of ſelf-defence, but this is eſſential to a City: one that is too large is capable of ſelf-defence in what is neceſſary; but then it is a Nation,

Nation, and not a City: for it will be very difficult to accommodate a Form of Government to it: for who would chuſe to be the General of ſuch an unweildly multitude, or who could be their Herald but a Stentor? The firſt thing therefore neceſſary, is, that a City ſhould conſiſt of ſuch numbers as will be ſufficient to enable the inhabitants to live happily in their political community: and it follows, that the more the inhabitants exceed that neceſſary number, the greater will the City be: but this muſt not be, as we have already ſaid, without bounds; but what is its proper limit, experience will eaſily ſhew, and this experience is to be collected from the actions both of the Governors and the Governed. Now, as it belongs to the firſt to direct the inferior Magiſtrates, and to act as judges, it follows that they can neither determine cauſes with juſtice, or iſſue their orders with propriety without they know the characters of their fellow Citizens: ſo that whenever this happens not to be done in theſe two particulars, the State muſt of neceſſity be badly managed; for in both of them it is not right to determine too haſtily, and without proper knowlege, which muſt evidently be the caſe where the number of the Citizens is too many: beſides, it is more eaſy for Strangers and Sojourners to aſſume the rights of Citizens, as they will eaſily eſcape detec-

tion in ſo great a multitude. It is evident then, that the beſt boundary for a City is that wherein the numbers are the greateſt poſſible, that they may be the better able to be ſufficient in themſelves, while at the ſame time they are not too large to be under the eye, and government of the Magiſtrates. And thus let us determine the extent of a City.

CHAP. V.

WHAT we have ſaid concerning a City may nearly be applied to a Country; for as to what ſoil it ſhould be, every one evidently will commend it, if it is ſuch as is ſufficient in itſelf to furniſh what will make the inhabitants happy; for which purpoſe it muſt be able to ſupply them with all the neceſſaries of life; for it is the having theſe in plenty, without any want, which makes them content. As to its extent, it ſhould be ſuch as may enable the inhabitants to live at their eaſe with freedom and temperance. Whether we have done right or wrong, in fixing this limit to the territory ſhall be conſidered more minutely hereafter, when we come particularly to inquire into property, and what fortune is requiſite

ſite for a man to live on, and how and in what manner they ought to employ it; for there are many doubts upon this queſtion, while each party inſiſts upon their own plan of life being carried to an exceſs, the one of ſeverity, the other of indulgence. What the ſituation of the country ſhould be it is not difficult to determine, in ſome particulars reſpecting that, we ought to be adviſed by thoſe who are ſkilful in military affairs. It ſhould be difficult of acceſs to an enemy, but eaſy to the inhabitants: and as we ſaid, that the number of inhabitants ought to be ſuch as can come under the eye of the Magiſtrate, ſo ſhould it be with the Country; for then it is eaſily defended. As to the poſition of the City, if one could place it to one's wiſh, it is convenient to fix it on the ſea-ſide: with reſpect to the Country, one ſituation which it ought to have has been already mentioned, namely, that it ſhould be ſo placed as eaſily to give aſſiſtance to all places, and alſo to receive the neceſſaries of life from all parts, and alſo wood, or any other materials which may happen to be in the Country.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

BUT with reſpect to placing a City in the neighbourhood of the ſea, there are ſome who have many doubts, whether it is ſerviceable or hurtful to a well-regulated State; for they ſay, that the reſort of perſons brought up under a different ſyſtem of Government is diſſerviceable to the State, as well by impeding the Laws, as by their numbers; for a multitude of merchants muſt neceſſarily ariſe from their trafficking backward and forward upon the ſeas, which will hinder the well-governing of the City: but if this inconvenience ſhould not ariſe, it is evident, that it is better both on account of ſafety and alſo for the eaſier acquiſition of the neceſſaries of life, that both the City and the Country ſhould be near the ſea; for it is neceſſary that thoſe who are to ſuſtain the attack of the enemy ſhould be ready with their aſſiſtance both by land and by ſea, and to oppoſe any inroad, both ways if poſſible, but if not, at leaſt where they are moſt powerful, which they may do while they poſſeſs both. A maritime ſituation is alſo uſeful for receiving from others, what your own country will not produce, and exporting thoſe neceſſaries of your own growth, which are more than you have occaſion for; but

a City

a City ought to traffic to ſupply its own wants, and not the wants of others; for thoſe who themſelves furniſh an open market for every one, do it for the ſake of gain; which it is not proper for a well-eſtabliſhed State to do, neither ſhould they encourage ſuch a commerce. Now, as we ſee that many places, and cities have docks and harbours lying very convenient for the city, while thoſe who frequent them have no communication with the citadel, and yet they are not too far off, but are ſurrounded by walls and ſuch-like fortifications, it is evident, that if any good ariſes from ſuch an intercourſe the city will receive it, but if any thing hurtful, it will be eaſy to reſtrain it by a Law, declaring and deputing whom the State will allow to have an intercourſe with each other, and whom not. As to a Naval Power, it is by no means doubtful, that it is neceſſary to have one to a certain degree; and this not only for the ſake of the city itſelf, but alſo becauſe it may be neceſſary to appear formidable to ſome of the neighbouring States, or to be able to aſſiſt them as well by ſea as by land; but to know how great that force ſhould be, the health of the State ſhould be inquired into, and if that appears vigorous and enables her to take the lead of other Communities, it is neceſſary that her force ſhould correſpond with her actions. As for that multitude of people which a maritime power creates, they

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are by no means neceſſary to a State, nor ought they to make a part of the Citizens; for the mariners and infantry, who have the command, are freemen, and upon theſe depends a naval engagement: but when there are many ſervants and huſbandmen, there they will always have a number of ſailors, as we now ſee happens to ſome States, as in Heraclea, where they man many Triremes, though the extent of their City is much inferior to ſome others. And thus we determine concerning the Country, the Port, the City, the Sea, and a Maritime Power: as to the number of the Citizens, what that ought to be we have already ſaid.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

WE now proceed to point out what natural diſpoſition the Members of the Community ought to be of: but this any one will eaſily perceive who will caſt his eye over the States of Greece, of all others the moſt celebrated, and alſo the other different Nations of this habitable world. Thoſe who live in cold countries, as the North of Europe, are full of courage, but wanting in underſtanding, and the arts: therefore they are very tenacious of their liberty; but, not being politicians, they cannot reduce their neighbours under their power: but the Aſiatics, whoſe underſtandings are quick, and who are converſant in the arts, are deficient in courage; and therefore are always conquered, and the Slaves of others: but the Grecians, placed as it were between theſe two boundaries, ſo partake of them both as to be at the ſame time both courageous and ſenſible; for which reaſon Greece continues free, and governed in the beſt manner poſſible, and capable of commanding the whole World, could they agree upon one Syſtem of Policy. Now this is the difference between the Grecians, and other Nations, that the latter have but one of theſe qualities, whereas in the former they are both happily blended

together. Hence it is evident, that thoſe perſons ought to be both ſenſible and courageous who will readily obey a Legiſlator, the object of whoſe Laws is Virtue.—— As to what ſome perſons ſay, that the Military muſt be mild and tender to thoſe they know, but ſevere and cruel to thoſe they know not, it is Courage which makes any one lovely; for that is the faculty of the ſoul which we moſt admire: as a proof of this, our reſentment riſes higher againſt our friends and acquaintance than againſt thoſe we know not: for which reaſon Archilaus accuſing his friends ſays, very properly to himſelf, Shall my friends inſult me? The Spirit of Freedom and Command alſo is what all inherit, who are of this diſpoſition; for Courage is commanding and invincible. It alſo is not right for any one to ſay, that you ſhould be ſevere to thoſe you know not; for this behaviour is proper for no one: nor are thoſe who are of a noble diſpoſition harſh in their manners, excepting only to the wicked; and when they are particularly ſo, it is, as has been already ſaid, againſt their friends, when they think they have injured them; which is agreeable to reaſon: for when thoſe who think they ought to receive a favour from any one do not receive it, beſide the injury done them, they conſider what they are deprived of: hence the ſaying, *Cruel are the wars*

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of brothers: and this, *Thoſe, who have greatly loved, do greatly hate.* And thus we have nearly determined how many the inhabitants of a City ought to be, and what their natural diſpoſition, as alſo the Country how large, and of what ſort is neceſſary; I ſay nearly, becauſe it is needleſs to endeavour at as great accuracy in thoſe things which are the objects of the ſenſes, as in thoſe which are inquired into by the underſtanding only.

CHAP. VIII.

AS in natural bodies thoſe things are not admitted to be parts of them without which the whole would not exiſt, ſo alſo it is evident that in a Political State every thing that is neceſſary thereunto is not to be conſidered as a part of it, nor any other Community, from whence one whole is made; for one thing ought to be common, and the ſame to the Community, whether they partake of it equally or unequally, as for inſtance, food, land, or the like; but when one thing is for the benefit of one perſon, and another for the benefit of another, in this there is nothing like a Community, excepting that one makes it and the other uſes it; as for inſtance, be-

tween any inſtrument employed in making any work, and the workmen, as there is nothing common between the houſe and the builder, but the art of the builder is employed on the houſe. Thus Property is neceſſary for States, but Property is no part of the State, though many ſpecies of it have life; but a City is a community of equals, for the purpoſe of enjoying the beſt life poſſible: but the happieſt life is the beſt, which conſiſts in the perfect practice of Virtuous Energies: as therefore ſome perſons have great, others little or no opportunity of being employed in theſe, it is evident, that this is the cauſe of the difference there is between the different Cities and Communities there are to be found; for while each of theſe endeavour to acquire what is beſt, by various and different means, they give riſe to different modes of living, and different forms of Government. We are now to conſider what thoſe things are without which a City cannot poſſibly exiſt; for what we call parts of the City muſt of neceſſity inhere in it: and this we ſhall plainly underſtand, if we know the number of things neceſſary to a City: firſt, the inhabitants muſt have Food: ſecondly, Arts, for many inſtruments are neceſſary in life: thirdly, Arms, for it is neceſſary that the community ſhould have an armed force within themſelves, both to ſupport their Government againſt

thoſe of their own body who might refuſe obedience to it, and alſo to defend it from thoſe who might attempt to attack it from without: fourthly, a certain Revenue, as well for the internal neceſſities of the State, as for the buſineſs of war: fifthly, which is indeed the chief concern, a Religious Eſtabliſhment: ſixthly in order, but firſt of all in neceſſity, a Court to determine both Criminal and Civil cauſes. Theſe things are abſolutely neceſſary, ſo to ſpeak, in every State; for a City is a number of people, not accidentally met together, but with a purpoſe of inſuring to themſelves ſufficient independency, and ſelf-protection; and if any thing neceſſary for theſe purpoſes is wanting, it is impoſſible that in ſuch a ſituation theſe ends can be obtained. It is neceſſary therefore that a City ſhould be capable of acquiring all theſe things: for this purpoſe a proper number of huſbandmen are neceſſary to procure food, alſo artificers and ſoldiers, and rich men, and prieſts, and judges, to determine what is right and proper.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

HAVING determined thus far, it remains that we conſider whether all theſe different employments ſhall be open to all; for it is poſſible to continue the ſame perſons always huſbandmen, artificers, judges, or counſellors; or ſhall we appoint different perſons to each of thoſe employments which we have already mentioned; or ſhall ſome of them be appropriated to particulars, and others of courſe common to all? but this does not take place in every State, for, as we have already ſaid, it is poſſible that all may be common to all, or not, but only common to ſome; and this is the difference between one Government and another: for in Democracies the whole Community partakes of every thing, but in Oligarchies it is different.

Since we are inquiring what is the beſt Government poſſible, and it is admitted to be that in which the Citizens are happy; and that, as we have already ſaid, it is impoſſible to obtain Happineſs without Virtue; it follows, that in the beſt governed States, where the Citizens are really men of intrinſic, and not relative goodneſs, none of them ſhould be permitted to exerciſe any mechanic employment or follow merchandize, as being

ignoble

ignoble and deſtructive to Virtue; neither ſhould they be huſbandmen, that they may be at leiſure to improve in Virtue and perform the duty they owe to the State. With reſpect to the employments of a ſoldier, a ſenator, and a judge, which are evidently neceſſary to the Community, ſhall they be allotted to different perſons, or ſhall the ſame perſon execute both? This queſtion too is eaſily anſwered: for in ſome caſes the ſame perſons may execute them, in others they ſhould be different, where the different employments require different abilities, as when Courage is wanting for one, Judgment for the other, there they ſhould be allotted to different perſons; but when it is evident, that it is impoſſible to oblige thoſe who have arms in their hands, and can inſiſt on their own terms, to be always under command; there theſe different employments ſhould be truſted to one perſon; for thoſe who have arms in their hands have it in their option, whether they will or will not aſſume the ſupreme power: to theſe two (namely, thoſe who have Courage and Judgment) the Government muſt be entruſted; but not in the ſame manner, but as Nature directs; what requires Courage, to the Young, what requires Judgment, to the Old; for with the Young is Courage, with the Old is Wiſdom: thus each will be allotted the part they are fit for according to their different

ferent merits. It is alſo neceſſary that the landed property ſhould belong to theſe men; for it is neceſſary that the Citizens ſhould be rich, and theſe are the men proper for Citizens; for no Mechanic ought to be admitted to the rights of a Citizen, nor any other ſort of people, whoſe employment is not entirely noble, honourable, and virtuous; this is evident from the principle we at firſt ſet out with; for to be happy it is neceſſary to be virtuous; and no one ſhould ſay that a City is happy, while he conſiders only one part of its Citizens, but for that purpoſe he ought to examine into all of them. It is evident therefore, that the landed property ſhould belong to theſe, tho' it may be neceſſary for them to have Huſbandmen, either Slaves, Barbarians, or Servants. There remains of the different claſſes of the people whom we have enumerated, the Prieſts, for theſe evidently compoſe a rank by themſelves; for neither are they to be reckoned amongſt the Huſbandmen, or the Mechanics; for Reverence to the Gods is highly becoming every State: and ſince the Citizens have been divided into orders, the Military and the Council, and it is proper to offer due worſhip to the Gods, and ſince it is neceſſary that thoſe who are employed in their ſervice ſhould have nothing elſe to do, let the buſineſs of the Prieſthood be allotted to thoſe who are in years.

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We have now ſhewn what is neceſſary to the exiſtence of a City, and of what parts it conſiſts, and that Huſbandmen, Mechanics, and Mercenary Servants are neceſſary to a City; but that the parts of it are Soldiers and Sailors, and that theſe are always different from thoſe, but from each other only occaſionally.

CHAP. X.

IT ſeems neither now, nor very lately to have been known to thoſe Philoſophers who have made Politics their ſtudy, that a City ought to be divided by families into different orders of men; and that the Huſbandmen and Soldiers ſhould be kept ſeparate from each other; which cuſtom is even to this day preſerved in Egypt, and in Crete; alſo Seſoſtris having founded it in Egypt, Minos in Crete. Common Meals ſeem alſo to have been an antient regulation, and to have been eſtabliſhed in Crete, during the reign of Minos, and in a ſtill more remote period in Italy; for thoſe who are the beſt judges in that country ſay, that one Italus being king of Ænotria, from whom the people, changing their names, were called Italians inſtead of Ænotrians, and that part of Europe was

called Italy, which is bounded by the Scylletic Gulph on the one ſide, and the Lametic on the other, the diſtance between which is about half a day's journey. This Italus, they relate, made the Ænotrians, who were formerly ſhepherds, huſbandmen, and gave them different Laws from what they had before, and to have been the firſt who eſtabliſhed Common Meals, for which reaſon ſome of his deſcendants ſtill uſe them, and obſerve ſome of his Laws. The Opici inhabit that part which lies towards the Tyrrhenian ſea, who both now are and formerly were called Auſonians. The Claonians inhabited the part toward Iapigia and the Ionian ſea, which is called Syrtis. Theſe Claonians were deſcended from the Ænotrians. Hence aroſe the cuſtom of Common Meals, but the ſeparation of the Citizens into different families, from Egypt: for the reign of Seſoſtris is of much higher antiquity than that of Minos. As we ought to think that moſt other things were found out in a long, nay, even in a boundleſs time (reaſon teaching us that want would make us firſt invent that which was neceſſary, and, when that was obtained, then thoſe things which were requiſite for the conveniencies, and ornament of life) ſo ſhould we conclude the ſame with reſpect to a Political State; now every thing in Egypt bears the marks of the moſt remote antiquity, for theſe

People

People ſeem to be the moſt antient of all others, and to have acquired Laws, and Political Order; we ſhould therefore make a proper uſe of what is told us of them, and endeavour to find out what they have omitted. We have already ſaid, that the landed property ought to belong to the Military, and thoſe who partake of the Government of the State; and that therefore the Huſbandmen ſhould be a ſeparate Order of People; and how large, and of what nature, the country ought to be: we will firſt treat of the diviſion of the Land, and of the Huſbandmen, how many, and of what ſort they ought to be; ſince we by no means hold, that Property ought to be common, as ſome perſons have ſaid, only thus far, in friendſhip, it ſhould be their Cuſtom, to let no Citizen want ſubſiſtence. As to Common Meals, it is in general agreed, that they are proper in well regulated Cities; my reaſons for approving of them ſhall be mentioned hereafter: they are what all the Citizens ought to partake of; but it will not be eaſy for the Poor, out of what is their own, to furniſh as much as they are ordered to do, and ſupply their own houſe beſides. The expence alſo of Religious Worſhip ſhould be defrayed by the whole State. Of neceſſity therefore the Land ought to be divided into two parts, one of which ſhould belong to the Commu-

nity in general, the other to the Individuals ſeparately; and each of theſe parts ſhould again be ſubdivided into two: half of that which belongs to the Public ſhould be appropriated to maintain the Worſhip of the Gods, the other half to ſupport the Common Meals. Half of that which belongs to the Individuals ſhould be at the extremity of the Country, the other half near the City, ſo that theſe two portions being allotted to each Perſon, all would partake of land in both places, which would be both equal and right; and induce them to act in concert with greater harmony, in any war with their neighbours: for when the land is not divided in this manner, one party neglects the inroads of the enemy on the borders, the other makes it a matter of too much conſequence, and more than is neceſſary; for which reaſon, in ſome places there is a Law, which forbids the inhabitants of the borders, to have any vote in the council when they are debating upon a war, which is made againſt them, as their private intereſt might prevent their voting impartially. Thus therefore the Country ought to be divided, and for the reaſons before-mentioned. Could one have one's choice, the Huſbandmen ſhould by all means be Slaves, not of the ſame nation, or men of any ſpirit; for thus they would be laborious in their buſineſs, and ſafe from attempting any novelties: next to theſe, Barbarian Servants

vants are to be preferred, ſimilar in natural diſpoſition to theſe we have already mentioned. Of theſe let thoſe who are to cultivate the private property of the Individual, belong to that Individual, and thoſe who are to cultivate the Public territory belong to the Public. In what manner theſe Slaves ought to be uſed, and for what reaſon it is very proper that they ſhould have the promiſe of their Liberty made them, as a reward for their ſervices, ſhall be mentioned hereafter.

CHAP. XI.

WE have already mentioned, that both the City and all the Country ſhould communicate both with the ſea and the continent, as much as poſſible: There are theſe four things which we ſhould be particularly deſirous of in the poſition of the City with reſpect to itſelf: in the firſt place, Health is to be conſulted as the firſt thing neceſſary: now a City which fronts the eaſt and receives the winds which blow from thence is eſteemed moſt healthful; next to this that which has a northern poſition is to be preferred, as beſt in winter. It ſhould next be contrived, that it may have a pro-

a proper ſituation for the buſineſs of Government, and for defence in War: that in war the Citizens may have eaſy acceſs to it; but that it may be difficult of acceſs to, and hardly to be taken by, the enemy. In the next place particularly, that there may be plenty of water, and rivers near at hand: but if thoſe cannot be found, very large ciſterns muſt be prepared to ſave rain-water, ſo that there may be no want of it in caſe they ſhould be drove into the town in time of war. And as great care ſhould be taken of the health of the inhabitants, the firſt thing to be attended to is, that the City ſhould have a good ſituation, and a good poſition; the ſecond is, that they may have good water to drink; and this not be negligently taken care of; for what we chiefly and moſt frequently uſe, for the ſupport of the body, muſt principally influence the Health of it; and this influence is what the Air and Water naturally have: for which reaſon in all wiſe Governments, the Waters ought to be appropriated to different purpoſes, and if they are not equally good; and, if there is not a plenty of neceſſary Water, that which is to drink ſhould be ſeparated from that which is for other uſes. As to Fortified Places, what is proper for ſome Governments is not proper for all; as for inſtance, a lofty Citadel is proper for a Monarchy and an Oligarchy; a City built upon a Plain ſuits a Democracy;

neither

neither of theſe for an Ariſtocracy, but rather many Strong Places. As to the Form of private Houſes, thoſe are thought to be beſt, and moſt uſeful for their different purpoſes, which are diſtinct and ſeparate from each other, and built in the modern manner, after the plan of Hippodamus: but for ſafety in time of war, on the contrary, they ſhould be built as they formerly were; for they were ſuch that ſtrangers could not eaſily find their way out of them, and the method of acceſs to them ſuch as an enemy could with difficulty find out, if he propoſed to beſiege them. A City therefore ſhould have both theſe ſorts of buildings, which may eaſily be contrived, if any one will ſo regulate them as the planters do their rows of vines; not that the buildings throughout the City ſhould be detached from each other, only in ſome parts of it; thus elegance and ſafety will be equally conſulted. With reſpect to Walls, thoſe who ſay, that a courageous people ought not to have any, pay too much reſpect to obſolete notions; particularly, as we may ſee thoſe who pride themſelves therein continually confuted by facts. It is indeed diſreputable for thoſe who are equal, or nearly ſo to the enemy, to endeavour to take refuge within their Walls; but ſince it very often happens, that thoſe who make the attack are too powerful for the Bravery and Courage of thoſe few who oppoſe them to

reſiſt,,

reſiſt, if you would not ſuffer the calamities of war, and the inſolence of the enemy, it muſt be thought the part of a good ſoldier, to ſeek for ſafety under the ſhelter and protection of Walls, more eſpecially ſince ſo many miſſile weapons, and machines have been moſt ingeniouſly invented to beſiege Cities with. Indeed to neglect ſurrounding a City with a Wall would be ſimilar to chuſing a Country which is eaſy of acceſs to an enemy, or leveling the eminences of it; or as if an individual ſhould not have a wall to his houſe, leſt it ſhould be thought that the owner of it was a coward: nor ſhould this be left unconſidered, that thoſe who have a City ſurrounded with Walls, may act both ways, either as if it had, or as if it had not; but where it has not, they cannot do this. If this is true, it is not only neceſſary to have Walls, but care muſt be taken that they may be a proper ornament to the City, as well as a defence in time of war; not only according to the old methods, but the modern improvements alſo: for as thoſe who make offenſive war endeavour by every way poſſible to gain advantages over their adverſaries, ſo ſhould thoſe who are upon the defenſive employ all the means already known, and ſuch new ones as Philoſophy can invent, to defend themſelves: for thoſe who are well-prepared are ſeldom firſt attacked.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

AS the Citizens in general are to eat at Public Tables, in certain Companies, and it is neceſſary that the Walls ſhould have Bulwarks and Towers in proper places, and at proper diſtances, it is evident, that it will be very neceſſary to have ſome of theſe, in the Towers: let the buildings for this purpoſe be made the ornaments of the Walls. As to Temples for public worſhip, and the Hall for the public tables of the chief Magiſtrates, they ought to be built in proper places, and contiguous to each other, except thoſe Temples which the Law or the Oracle orders to be ſeparate from all other buildings; and let theſe be in ſuch a conſpicuous eminence, that they may have every advantage of Situation, and in the neighbourhood of that part of the City which is beſt fortified. Adjoining to this place there ought to be a large ſquare, like that which they call in Theſſaly, The Square of Freedom, in which nothing is permitted to be bought or ſold; into which no Mechanic nor Huſbandman, nor any ſuch perſon, ſhould be permitted to enter, unleſs commanded by the Magiſtrates. It will alſo be an ornament to this place, if the Gymnaſtic Exerciſes of the Elders are performed in it. It is alſo proper, that for

performing theſe exerciſes the Citizens ſhould be divided into diſtinct claſſes, according to their ages, and that the Young Perſons ſhould have proper officers to be with them, and that the Seniors ſhould be with the Magiſtrates; for having them before their eyes would greatly inſpire true modeſty, and ingenuous fear. There ought to be another Square ſeparate from this, for buying and ſelling, which ſhould be ſo ſituated as to be commodious for the reception of goods both by ſea, and land. As the Citizens may be divided into Magiſtrates and Prieſts, it is proper that the Public Tables of the Prieſts ſhould be in buildings near the Temples. Thoſe of the Magiſtrates who preſide over contracts, indictments, and ſuch-like, and alſo over the markets, and the public ſtreets near the Square, or ſome public way, I mean the Square where things are bought and ſold; for I intended the other for thoſe who are at leiſure, and this for neceſſary buſineſs. The ſame order which I have directed here, ſhould be obſerved alſo in the Country; for there alſo their Magiſtrates, ſuch as the Surveyors of the Woods, and Overſeers of the Grounds, muſt neceſſarily have their Common Tables and their Towers, for the purpoſe of protection againſt an enemy. There ought alſo to be Temples erected at proper places, both to the Gods, and the Heroes: but it is unneceſſary to

dwell

dwell longer and moſt minutely on theſe particulars; for it is by no means difficult to plan theſe things, it is rather ſo to carry them into execution: for the theory is the child of our wiſhes, but the practical part muſt depend upon Fortune; for which reaſon we ſhall decline ſaying any thing farther upon theſe ſubjects.

CHAP. XIII.

WE will now ſhew, of what numbers and of what ſort of people a Government ought to conſiſt, that the State may be happy and well adminiſtered. As there are two particulars on which conſiſts the excellence and perfection of every thing depends, one of theſe is, that the object, and end propoſed ſhould be proper; the other, that the means to accompliſh it ſhould be adapted to that purpoſe; for it may happen that theſe may either agree, or diſagree with each other; for the end we propoſe may be good, but in taking the means to obtain it, we may err; at other times we may have the right and proper means in our power, but the end may be bad, and ſometimes we may miſtake in both: as in the art of medicine, the

Phyſician does not ſometimes know in what ſituation the body ought to be, to be healthy; nor what to do to procure the end he aims at. In every art and ſcience, therefore, we ſhould be maſter of this knowledge, namely, the proper end, and the means to obtain it. Now it is evident, that all perſons are deſirous to live well, and be happy; but that ſome have the means thereof in their own power, others not; and this either through Nature or Fortune: for many ingredients are neceſſary to a happy life; but fewer to thoſe who are of a good, than to thoſe who are of a bad diſpoſition. There are others who continually have the means of happineſs in their own power, but do not rightly apply them. Since we propoſe to inquire what Government is beſt, namely, that by which a State may be beſt adminiſtered, and that State is beſt adminiſtered where the People are the happieſt, it is evident, that Happineſs is a thing we ſhould not be unacquainted with. Now, I have already ſaid in my Treatiſe on Morals (if I may here make any uſe of what I have there ſhewn) that Happineſs conſiſts in the Energy and perfect Practice of Virtue; and this not relatively, but ſimply; I mean by relatively, what is neceſſary in ſome certain circumſtances; by ſimply, what is good and fair in itſelf: of the firſt ſort are juſt Puniſhments, and Reſtraints in a juſt cauſe; for they

ariſe

ariſe from Virtue, and are neceſſary, and on that account are Virtuous: tho' it is more deſirable, that neither any State or any Individual ſhould ſtand in need of them: but thoſe actions which are intended either to procure honour or wealth are ſimply good; the others eligible only to remove an evil: theſe, on the contrary, are the foundation and means of relative good. A worthy man indeed will bear poverty, diſeaſe, and other unfortunate accidents, with a noble mind; but Happineſs conſiſts in the contrary to theſe: (now we have already determined in our Treatiſe on Morals, that he is a man of worth, who conſiders what is good becauſe it is Virtuous, as what is ſimply good: it is evident therefore, that all the actions of ſuch a one muſt be worthy and ſimply good:) this has led ſome perſons to conclude, that the Cauſe of Happineſs was external goods; which would be as if any one ſhould ſuppoſe that the playing well upon the Lyre was owing to the inſtrument, and not to the art. It neceſſarily follows from what has been ſaid, that ſome things ſhould be ready at hand and others procured by the Legiſlator: for which reaſon, in founding a City, we earneſtly wiſh, that there may be plenty of thoſe things which are ſuppoſed to be under the dominion of Fortune (for ſome things we admit her to be miſtreſs over); but for a State to be worthy and great

is not only the Work of Fortune, but of Knowledge and Judgment alſo. But for a State to be worthy, it is neceſſary that thoſe Citizens which are in the Adminiſtration ſhould be worthy alſo: but as in our City every Citizen is to be ſo, we muſt conſider, how this may be accompliſhed; for if this is what every one could be, and not ſome individuals only, it would be more deſireable; for then it would follow, that what might be done by one, might be done by all. Men are worthy and good three ways; by Nature, by Cuſtom, by Reaſon. In the firſt place, a Man ought to be born a Man, and not any other Animal; that is to ſay, he ought to have both a Body and Soul: but it avails not to be only born with ſome things, for Cuſtom makes great alterations: for there are ſome things in Nature capable of alteration either way, which are fixed by Cuſtom, either for the better or the worſe. Now, other Animals live chiefly a life of Nature; and in very few things according to Cuſtom; but Man lives according to Reaſon alſo, which he alone is endowed with; wherefore he ought to make all theſe accord with each other: for if Men followed Reaſon, and were perſuaded, that it was beſt to obey her, they would act in many reſpects contrary to Nature, and Cuſtom. What Men ought naturally to be, to make good Members of a Community, I have already determined;

mined; the reſt of this diſcourſe therefore ſhall be upon Education: for ſome things are acquired by Habit, others by hearing them.

CHAP. XIV.

AS every Political Community conſiſts of thoſe who govern, and of thoſe who are governed, let us conſider, whether during the continuance of their lives they ought to be the ſame perſons or different; for it is evident, that the mode of Education ſhould be adapted to this diſtinction. Now, if one man differed from another as much, as we believe, the Gods and Heroes differ from men: in the firſt place, being far their ſuperiors in the Body; and, ſecondly, in the Soul: ſo that the ſuperiority of the Governors over the Governed might be evident beyond a doubt, it is certain, that it would be better for the one always to govern, the other always to be governed: but, as this is not eaſy to obtain, and Kings are not ſo ſuperior to thoſe they govern, as Scylax informs us they are in India, it is evident, that for many reaſons it is neceſſary, that all in their turns ſhould both govern, and be governed: for it is juſt, that

that thoſe who are equal ſhould have every thing alike; and it is difficult for a State to continue which is founded in injuſtice; for all thoſe in the country who are deſirous of innovation, will apply themſelves to thoſe who are under the Government of the reſt, and ſuch will be their numbers in the State, that it will be impoſſible for the Magiſtrates to get the better of them. But that the Governors ought to excell the Governed is beyond a doubt; the Legiſlator therefore ought to conſider, how this ſhall be, and how it may be contrived, that all ſhall have their equal ſhare in the Adminiſtration. Now, with reſpect to this it will be firſt ſaid, that Nature herſelf has directed us in our choice, laying down the ſelfſame thing, when ſhe has made ſome young, others old: the firſt of whom it becomes to obey, the latter to command; for no one when he is young is offended at his being under government, or thinks himſelf too good for it; more eſpecially when he conſiders, that he himſelf ſhall receive the ſame honours which he pays, when he ſhall arrive at a proper age. In ſome reſpects it muſt be acknowledged, that the Governors and the Governed are the ſame, in others they are different; it is therefore neceſſary that their Education ſhould be in ſome reſpect the ſame, in others different: as they ſay, that he will be a good Governor, who has firſt learnt to obey.

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Now, of Governments, as we have already ſaid, ſome are inſtituted for the ſake of him who commands; others, for him who obeys: of the firſt ſort is that of the Maſter over the Servant; of the latter, that of Freemen over each other. Now, ſome things which are commanded differ from others; not in the buſineſs, but in the end propoſed thereby: for which reaſon many works, even of a ſervile nature, are not diſgraceful for young Freemen to perform; for many things which are ordered to be done are not honourable or diſhonourable ſo much in their own nature as in the end which is propoſed, and the reaſon for which they are undertaken. Since then we have determined, that the Virtue of a good Citizen and good Governor is the ſame as of a good Man; and that every one before he commands ſhould have firſt obeyed, it is the buſineſs of the Legiſlator to conſider how his Citizens may be good Men, what Education is neceſſary to that purpoſe, and what is the final object of a good life. The Soul of man may be divided into two parts; that which has Reaſon in itſelf, and that which hath not, but is capable of obeying its dictates: and according to the Virtues of theſe two parts a man is ſaid to be good: but of thoſe Virtues, which are the ends, it will not be difficult for thoſe to determine who adopt the diviſion I have already given; for the inferior is always for

the ſake of the ſuperior; and this is equally evident both in the works of Art, as well as in thoſe of Nature; but that is ſuperior which has Reaſon. Reaſon itſelf alſo is divided into two parts, in the manner we uſually divide it; the Theoretic and the Practical; which diviſion therefore ſeems neceſſary for this part alſo: the ſame analogy holds good with reſpect to actions; of which thoſe which are of a ſuperior nature ought always to be choſen by thoſe who have it in their power; for that is always moſt eligible to every one, which will procure the beſt ends. Now Life is divided into Labour and Reſt, War and Peace; and of what we do, the objects are partly neceſſary and uſeful, partly noble: and we ſhould give the ſame preference to theſe, that we do to the different parts of the Soul, and its actions, as War to procure Peace; Labour, Reſt; and the Uſeful, the Noble. The Politician, therefore, who compoſes a Body of Laws ought to extend his views to every thing; the different parts of the Soul, and their Actions; more particularly to thoſe things which are of a ſuperior Nature, and Ends; and, in the ſame manner, to the Lives of men, and their different Actions. They ought to be fitted both for Labour and War, but rather for Reſt and Peace; and alſo to do what is Neceſſary and Uſeful, but rather what is Fair and Noble. It is to thoſe objects that the Education of the Children ought

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to tend, and of all the Youths who want Inſtruction. All the Grecian States which now ſeem beſt governed, and the Legiſlators who founded thoſe States, appear not to have framed their Polity with a view to the beſt End, or to every Virtue, in their Laws and Education; but eagerly to have attended to what is Uſeful, and productive of Gain: and nearly of the ſame opinion with theſe are ſome perſons who have wrote lately, who, by praiſing the Lacedæmonian State, ſhew they approve of the intention of the Legiſlator in making War and Victory the end of his Government. But how contrary to reaſon this is, is eaſily proved by argument, and has already been proved by facts: (but as the generality of men deſire to have an extenſive command, that they may have every thing deſirable in the greater abundance; ſo Thibron and others who have wrote on that State ſeem to approve of their Legiſlator, for having procured them an extenſive command, by continually enuring them to all ſorts of dangers and hardſhips:) for it is evident, ſince the Lacedæmonians have now no hope that the Supreme Power will be in their own hand, that neither are they happy, nor was their Legiſlator wiſe. This alſo is ridiculous, that while they preſerved an obedience to their Laws, and no one oppoſed their being governed by them, they loſt the Means of being Honourable: but

theſe people underſtand not rightly what ſort of Government it is which ought to reflect honour on the Legiſlator; for a Government of Freemen is nobler than Deſpotic Power, and more conſonant to Virtue. Moreover, neither ſhould a City be thought happy, nor ſhould a Legiſlator be commended, becauſe he has ſo trained the People as to conquer their neighbours; for in this there is a great Inconvenience: ſince it is evident, that upon this principle every Citizen who can, will endeavour to procure the Supreme Power in his own City; which crime the Lacedæmonians accuſe Pauſanias of, though he enjoyed ſuch great honours. Such Reaſoning and ſuch Laws are neither political, uſeful, or true: but a Legiſlator ought to inſtill thoſe Laws on the minds of men which are moſt uſeful for them, both in their public and private capacities. The rendering a People fit for war, that they may enſlave their inferiors, ought not to be the care of the Legiſlator; but that they may not themſelves be reduced to ſlavery by others. In the next place, he ſhould take care, that the object of his Government is, the Safety of thoſe who are under it, and not a Deſpotiſm over all: in the third place, that thoſe only are Slaves, who are fit to be only ſo. Reaſon indeed concurs with experience in ſhewing, that all the attention which the Legiſlator pays to

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the buſineſs of war, and all other rules which he lays down, ſhould have for their object Reſt and Peace; ſince moſt of thoſe States (which we uſually ſee) are preſerved by war; but, after they have acquired a Supreme Power over thoſe around them, are ruined; for during Peace, like a ſword, they loſe their brightneſs: the fault of which lies in the Legiſlator, who never taught them how to be at Reſt.

CHAP. XV.

AS there is one end common to a man both as an Individual and a Citizen, it is evident, that a good Man and a good Citizen muſt have the ſame object in view: it is evident, that all the Virtues which lead to Reſt are neceſſary: for, as we have often ſaid, the end of War is Peace, of Labour, Reſt; but thoſe Virtues, whoſe object is Reſt, and thoſe alſo whoſe object is Labour, are neceſſary for a Liberal Life and Reſt; for we want a ſupply of many neceſſary things, that we may be at reſt. A City therefore ought to be temperate, brave, and patient: for, according to the proverb, *Reſt is not for Slaves*; but thoſe who cannot bravely face danger, are the Slaves of thoſe who attack them.

Bravery,

Bravery, therefore, and Patience are neceſſary for Labour, Philoſophy for Reſt, and Temperance and Juſtice in both: but theſe chiefly in time of Peace and Reſt; for War obliges men to be juſt and temperate; but the enjoyment of Pleaſure, with the Reſt of Peace, is more apt to produce Inſolence: thoſe indeed who are eaſy in their circumſtances, and enjoy every thing that can make them happy, have great occaſion for the virtues of Temperance and Juſtice. Thus, if there are, as the Poets tell us, any inhabitants in the Happy Iſles, to theſe a higher degree of Philoſophy, Temperance, and Juſtice will be neceſſary, as they live at their eaſe, in the full plenty of every ſenſual pleaſure. It is evident therefore, that theſe virtues are neceſſary in every State that would be happy or worthy; for he who is worthleſs can never enjoy real good, much leſs is he qualified to be at reſt; but can appear good only by Labour and being at War, but in Peace and at Reſt, the meaneſt of creatures. For which reaſon Virtue ſhould not be cultivated as the Lacedæmonians did; for they did not differ from others in their opinion concerning the Supreme Good, but in imagining this Good was to be procured by a particular Virtue: but ſince there are greater Goods than thoſe of War, it is evident, that the enjoyment of thoſe which are valuable in themſelves ſhould be deſired, rather than thoſe

Virtues

Virtues which are uſeful in War: but how and by what means this is to be acquired is now to be conſidered. We have already aſſigned three cauſes on which it will depend; Nature, Cuſtom, and Reaſon, and ſhewn what ſort of men Nature muſt produce for this purpoſe; it remains then that we determine, which we ſhall firſt begin by in Education, Reaſon, or Cuſtom, for theſe ought always to preſerve the moſt intire harmony with each other: for it may happen, that Reaſon may err from the end propoſed, and be corrected by Cuſtom. In the firſt place, it is evident, that in this as in other things, its beginning or production ariſes from ſome principle, and its end alſo ariſes from another principle, which is itſelf an end. Now, with us, Reaſon and Intelligence are the end of Nature; our Production, therefore, and our Manners ought to be accommodated to both theſe. In the next place, as the Soul and the Body are two diſtinct things, ſo alſo we ſee that the Soul is divided into two parts, the Reaſoning and Not-reaſoning, with their habits, which are two in number, one belonging to each, namely, Appetite and Intelligence; and, as the Body is in production before the Soul, ſo is the Not-reaſoning part of the Soul before the Reaſoning: and this is evident; for Anger, Will, and Deſire are to be ſeen in Children nearly as ſoon as they are born;

born; but Reaſon and Intelligence ſpring up as they grow to maturity. The Body, therefore, neceſſarily demands our care before the Soul; next the Appetites, for the ſake of the Mind; the Body, for the ſake of the Soul.

CHAP. XVI.

IF then the Legiſlator ought to take care, that the Bodies of the Children are as perfect as poſſible, his firſt attention ought to be given to Matrimony; at what time and in what ſituation it is proper that the Citizens ſhould engage in the Nuptial Contract. Now, with reſpect to this alliance, the Legiſlator ought both to conſider the parties, and their time of life, that they may grow old at the ſame part of time, and that their bodily powers may not be different; that is to ſay, the Man being able to have Children, but the Woman too old to bear them; or, on the contrary, the Woman be young enough to produce Children, but the Man too old to be a Father: for from ſuch a ſituation diſcords and diſputes continually ariſe. In the next place, with reſpect to the Succeſſion of Children, there ought not to be too great an interval of time between them and their Parents; for, when there

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is, the Parent can receive no benefit from his Child's Affection, or the Child any advantage from his Father's Protection; neither ſhould the difference in years be too little, as great inconveniencies may ariſe from it; as it prevents that proper Reverence being ſhewn to a Father by a Boy, who conſiders him as nearly his equal in age, and alſo from the diſputes it occaſions in the œconomy of the family. But, to return from this digreſſion, care ought to be taken, that the Bodies of the Children may be ſuch as will anſwer the expectations of the Legiſlator; and this alſo will be affected by the ſame means. Since the ſeaſon for the production of Children is determined (not exactly, but to ſpeak in general); namely, for the Man till ſeventy years, and the Woman till fifty, the entering into the marriage ſtate, as far as time is concerned, ſhould be regulated by theſe periods. It is extremely bad for the Children when the Father is too young; for in all animals whatſoever the parts of the young are imperfect; and are more likely to be productive of Females than Males, and diminutive alſo in ſize: the ſame thing of courſe neceſſarily holds true in Men; as a proof of this you may ſee in thoſe Cities where the Men and Women uſually marry very young, the People in general are very ſmall and ill-framed; in child-birth alſo the Women ſuffer more, and many of them die. And thus

ſome perſons tell us the Oracle of Træzenium ſhould be explained, as if it referred to the many Women who were deſtroyed by too-early marriages, and not their gathering their Fruits too ſoon. It is alſo conducive to Temperance not to marry too ſoon; for Women who do ſo are apt to be intemperate. It alſo prevents the Bodies of Men from acquiring their full ſize, if they marry before their growth is completed; for this is the determinate period, which prevents any further increaſe: for which reaſon the proper time for a Woman to marry is eighteen, for a Man thirty-ſeven, a little more or leſs; for when they marry at that time their bodies are in perfection, and they will alſo ceaſe to have Children at a proper time: and moreover with reſpect to the Succeſſion of the Children, if they have them at the time which may reaſonably be expected, they will be juſt arriving into perfection when their Parents are ſinking down under the load of ſeventy years. And thus much for the time which is proper for marriage: but moreover a proper Seaſon of the Year ſhould be obſerved, as many perſons do now, and appropriate the Winter for this buſineſs. The married couple ought alſo to regard the precepts of Phyſicians and Naturaliſts, each of whom have treated on theſe ſubjects. What is the fit diſpoſition of the body will be better mentioned

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when we come to ſpeak of the Education of the Child: we will juſt ſlightly mention a few particulars. Now, there is no occaſion that any one ſhould have the habit of body of a Wreſtler to be either a good Citizen, or to enjoy a good Conſtitution, or to be the father of healthy Children; neither ſhould he be infirm or too much diſſpirited by misfortunes, but between both theſe. He ought to have a habit of labour, but not of too violent labour; nor ſhould that be confined to one object only, as the Wreſtler's is; but to ſuch things as are proper for Freemen. Theſe things are equally neceſſary both for Men and Women. Women with child ſhould alſo take care that their diet is not too ſparing, and that they uſe ſufficient exerciſe; which it will be eaſy for the Legiſlator to effect if he commands them once every day to repair to the worſhip of the Gods who are ſuppoſed to preſide over Matrimony. But, contrary to what is proper for the Body, the Mind ought to be kept as tranquil as poſſible; for as plants partake of the nature of the ſoil, ſo does the Child receive much of the diſpoſition of the Mother. With reſpect to the expoſing or bringing up of Children, let it be a Law, that nothing imperfect or maimed ſhall be brought up, * * * * * * * * * * * As the proper time has been pointed out for a Man and a Woman to enter into the Marriage-ſtate, ſo alſo let us determine how

long it is advantageous for the Community that they ſhould have Children; for as the Children of thoſe who are too young are imperfect both in body and mind, ſo alſo thoſe whoſe Parents are too old, are weak in both: while therefore the body continues in perfection, which (as ſome Poets ſay, who reckon the different periods of life by ſevens) is till fifty years, or four or five more, the Children may be equally perfect; but when the Parents are paſt that age, it is better they ſhould have no more. With reſpect to any connection between a Man and a Woman, or a Woman and a Man, when either of the parties are betrothed, let it be held in utter deteſtation on any pretext whatſoever; but ſhould any one be guilty of ſuch a thing after the marriage is conſummated, let his infamy be as great as his guilt deſerves.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

WHEN a child is born it muſt be ſuppoſed, that the ſtrength of its body will depend greatly upon the quality of its food. Now whoever will examine into the nature of animals, and alſo obſerve thoſe people who are very deſirous their children ſhould acquire a warlike habit, will find that they feed them chiefly with milk, as being beſt accommodated to their bodies, but without wine, to prevent any diſtempers: thoſe motions alſo which are natural to their age are very ſerviceable; and to prevent any of their limbs from being crooked, on account of their extreme ductility, ſome people even now uſe particular machines that their bodies may not be diſtorted. It is alſo uſeful to enure them to the cold when they are very little; for this is very ſerviceable for their health; and alſo to enure them to the buſineſs of war; for which reaſon it is cuſtomary with many of the Barbarians to dip their Children in rivers, when the water is cold; with others to clothe them very ſlightly, as among the Celts; for whatever it is poſſible to accuſtom Children to, it is beſt to accuſtom them to it at firſt, but to do it by degrees: beſides, boys have naturally an habit of loving the cold,

on account of the heat. Theſe, then, and ſuch-like things ought to be the firſt object of our attention: the next age to this continues till the Child is five years old; during which time it is beſt to teach him nothing at all, not even neceſſary labour, leſt it ſhould hinder his growth; but he ſhould be accuſtomed to uſe ſo much motion as not to acquire a lazy habit of body; which he will get by various means and by play alſo: his play alſo ought to be neither illiberal nor too laborious, nor lazy. Their governors and preceptors alſo ſhould take care what ſort of tales and ſtories it may be proper for them to hear; for all theſe ought to pave the way for their future inſtruction: for which reaſon the generality of their play ſhould be imitations of what they are afterwards to do ſeriouſly. They too do wrong who forbid by Laws the diſputes between Boys, and their quarrels, for they contribute to increaſe their growth; as they are a ſort of exerciſe to the body: for the ſtruggles of the heart, and the compreſſion of the ſpirits give ſtrength to thoſe who labour, which happens to Boys in their diſputes. The preceptors alſo ought to have an eye upon their manner of life, and thoſe with whom they converſe; and to take care that they are never in the company of Slaves. At this time and till they are ſeven years old it is neceſſary that they ſhould be educated at home.

home. It is alſo very proper to baniſh, both from their hearing and ſight, every thing which is illiberal, and the like. Indeed it is as much the buſineſs of the Legiſlator, as any thing elſe, to baniſh every indecent expreſſion out of the State: for, from a permiſſion to ſpeak whatever is ſhameful, very quickly ariſes the doing it, and this particularly with young people: for which reaſon let them never ſpeak, nor hear any ſuch thing: but if it appears that any Freeman has done or ſaid any thing that is forbidden, before he is of age to be thought fit to partake of the Common Meals, let him be puniſhed by diſgrace, and ſtripes; but if a perſon above that age does ſo, let him be treated as you would a Slave, on account of his being infamous. Since we forbid his ſpeaking every thing which is forbid, it is neceſſary that he neither ſees obſcene ſtories, or pictures; the Magiſtrates therefore are to take care, that there are no Statues or Pictures of any thing of this nature, except only to thoſe Gods to whom the Law permits them, and to which the Law allows perſons of a certain age to pay their devotions, for themſelves, their wives, and children. It ſhould alſo be illegal for young perſons to be preſent either at Iambics or Comedies, before they are arrived at that age when they are allowed to partake of the Pleaſures of the Table: indeed a good Education will preſerve them

them from all the evils which attend on theſe things. We have at preſent juſt touched upon this ſubject; it will be our buſineſs hereafter, when we properly come to it, to determine whether this care of Children is unneceſſary, or, if neceſſary, in what manner it muſt be done; at preſent we have only mentioned it as neceſſary. Probably the ſaying of Theodorus, the Tragic actor, was not a bad one---- That he would permit no one, not even the meaneſt actor, to go upon the ſtage before him, that he might firſt engage the Ear of the Audience. The ſame thing happens both in our connections with men and things: what we meet with firſt pleaſes beſt; for which reaſon Children ſhould be kept ſtrangers to every thing which is bad, more particularly whatſoever is looſe and offenſive to good manners. When five years are accompliſhed, the two next may be very properly employed, in being ſpectators of thoſe exerciſes they will afterwards have to learn. There are two periods into which Education ought to be divided, according to the age of the Child; the one is, from his being ſeven years of age to the time of puberty; the other, from thence till he is one-and-twenty: for thoſe who divide ages by the number ſeven are in general wrong: it is much better to follow the diviſion of Nature; for every Art and every Inſtruction is intended

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to compleat what Nature has left defective: we muſt firſt conſider, if any regulation whatſoever is requiſite for Children; in the next place, if it is advantageous to make it a common care, or that every one ſhould act therein as he pleaſes, which is the general practice in moſt Cities; in the third place, what it ought to be.

A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT.

BOOK VIII.

CHAP. I.

NO one can doubt that the Magiſtrate ought greatly to intereſt himſelf in the care of Youth; for, where it is neglected, it is hurtful to the City, for every State ought to be governed according to its particular nature; for the Form and Manners of each Government are peculiar to itſelf; and theſe, as they originally eſtabliſhed it, ſo they uſually ſtill preſerve it. For inſtance, Democratic Forms and Manners a Democracy;

mocracy; Oligarchic, an Oligarchy: but, univerſally, the beſt Manners produce the beſt Government. Beſides, as in every buſineſs and art there are ſome things which men are to learn firſt and be made accuſtomed to, which are neceſſary to perform their ſeveral works; ſo it is evident, that the ſame thing is neceſſary in the Practice of Virtue. As there is one end in view in every City, it is evident, that Education ought to be one and the ſame in each; and that this ſhould be a common care, and not the individual's, as it now is, when every one takes care of his own Children ſeparately; and their inſtructions are particular alſo, each perſon teaching them as they pleaſe; but what ought to be engaged in, ought to be common to all. Beſides, no one ought to think, that any Citizen belongs to him in particular, but to the State in general; for each one is a part of the State, and it is the Natural Duty of each Part to regard the Good of the Whole: and for this the Lacedæmonians may be praiſed; for they give the greateſt attention to Education, and make it public. It is evident then, that there ſhould be Laws concerning Education, and that it ſhould be public.

CHAP. II.

WHAT Education is, and how Children ought to be inſtructed, is what ſhould be well known; for there are doubts concerning the buſineſs of it, as all people do not agree in thoſe things they would have a Child taught, both with reſpect to their improvement in Virtue, and a Happy Life: nor is it clear, whether the object of it ſhould be to improve the Reaſon, or rectify the Morals. From the preſent mode of Education we cannot determine with certainty to which men incline, whether to inſtruct a Child in what will be uſeful to him in life; or what tends to Virtue, and what is Excellent: for all theſe things have their ſeparate defenders. As to Virtue, there is no particular in which they all agree: for as all do not equally eſteem all Virtues, it reaſonably follows, that they will not cultivate the ſame. It is evident, that what is neceſſary ought to be taught to all: but that which is neceſſary for one is not neceſſary for all; for there ought to be a diſtinction between the employment of a Freeman and a Slave. The firſt of theſe ſhould be taught every thing uſeful, which will not make thoſe who know it mean. Every work is to be eſteemed mean, and every art, and every

every diſcipline, which renders the body, the mind, or the underſtanding of Freemen unfit for the Habit and Practice of Virtue: for which reaſon all thoſe arts which tend to deform the body are called mean, and all thoſe employments which are exerciſed for gain; for they take off from the Freedom of the mind, and render it ſordid. There are alſo ſome liberal arts, which are not improper for Freemen to apply to in a certain degree; but to endeavour to acquire a perfect ſkill in them, is expoſed to the faults I have juſt mentioned; for there is a great deal of difference, in the reaſon for which any one does, or learns any thing: for it is not illiberal to engage in it for one's ſelf, one's friend, or in the Cauſe of Virtue; while, at the ſame time, to do it for the ſake of another, may ſeem to be acting the part of a Servant and a Slave. The Mode of Inſtruction which now prevails ſeems to partake of both parts.

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CHAP.

CHAP. III.

THERE are four things which it is uſual to teach Children; Reading, Gymnaſtic Exerciſes, and Muſic, to which (in the fourth place) ſome add Painting. Reading and Painting are both of them of ſingular uſe in life, and Gymnaſtic Exerciſes, as productive of Courage. As to Muſic, ſome perſons may doubt, as moſt perſons now uſe it for the ſake of pleaſure: but thoſe who originally made it part of Education, did it becauſe, as has been already ſaid, Nature requires, that we ſhould not only be properly employed, but to be able to enjoy leiſure honourably: for this (to repeat what I have already ſaid) is of all things the principal. But, though both Labour and Reſt are neceſſary, yet the latter is preferable to the firſt; and by all means we ought to learn what we ſhould do when at reſt: for we ought not to employ that time at play; for then play would be the neceſſary buſineſs of our lives. But if this cannot be, play is more neceſſary for thoſe who labour than thoſe who are at reſt: for he who labours requires relaxation; which play will ſupply: for as labour is attended with pain and continued exertion, it is neceſſary that play ſhould be introduced, under proper regulations, as a medicine:

dicine: for ſuch an employment of the mind is a relaxation to it, and eaſes with pleaſure. Now Reſt itſelf ſeems to partake of Pleaſure, of Happineſs, and an agreeable Life: but this cannot be theirs who labour, but theirs who are at reſt; for he who labours, labours for the ſake of ſome end which he has not: but Happineſs is an end which all perſons think is attended with Pleaſure, and not with Pain: but all perſons do not agree in making this Pleaſure conſiſt in the ſame thing; for each one has his particular ſtandard, correſpondent to his own habits; but the beſt man propoſes the beſt Pleaſure, and that which ariſes from the nobleſt actions. But it is evident, that to live a Life of Reſt, there are ſome things which a man muſt learn, and be inſtructed in; and that the object of this learning and this inſtruction centers in their acquiſition: but the learning and inſtruction which is given for Labour, has for its object other things; for which reaſon the Antients made Muſic a part of Education; not as a thing neceſſary, for it is not of that nature, nor as a thing uſeful, as Reading, in the common courſe of life, or for managing of a family, or for learning any thing as uſeful in public life. Painting alſo ſeems uſeful, to enable a man to judge more accurately of the productions of the Finer Arts: nor is it like the Gymnaſtic Exerciſes, which contribute to health

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and ſtrength; for neither of theſe things do we ſee produced by Muſic; there remains for it then to be the Employment of our Reſt, which they had in view who introduced it; and, thinking it a proper employment for Freemen, to them they allotted it; as Homer ſings;

How right to call Thalia *to the Feaſt:*

and, of ſome others, he ſays;

The Bard was call'd, to raviſh every ear:

and, in another place, he makes Ulyſſes ſay, the happieſt part of Man's Life is

When at the Feſtal Board, in order plac'd,
They hear the Song.

It is evident then, that there is a certain Education in which a Child may be inſtructed, not as uſeful, nor as neceſſary, but as noble and liberal: but whether this is one or more than one, and of what ſort they are, and how to be taught, ſhall be conſidered hereafter: we are now got ſo far on our way as to ſhew, that we have the teſtimony of the Antients in our favour, by what they have delivered down upon Education ----- for Muſic makes this plain. Moreover, it is neceſſary to inſtruct Children in what is uſeful, not only on account of its being uſeful in itſelf, as, for inſtance, to learn to read,

but

but alſo as the means of acquiring other different ſorts of inſtruction: thus, they ſhould be inſtructed in Painting, not only to prevent their being miſtaken in purchaſing Pictures, or in buying or ſelling of Vaſes, but rather as it makes them Judges of the Beauties of the Human Form; for to be always hunting after the profitable ill agrees with great and freeborn ſouls. As it is evident, whether a Boy ſhould be firſt taught Morals or Reaſoning, and whether his Body or his Underſtanding ſhould be firſt cultivated, it is plain, that Boys ſhould be firſt put under the care of the different Maſters of the Gymnaſtic Arts, both to form their Bodies and teach them their Exerciſes.

CHAP. IV.

NOW thoſe States which ſeem to take the greateſt care of their Childrens Education, beſtow their chief attention on Wreſtling, tho' it both prevents the increaſe of the Body, and hurts the form of it. This fault the Lacedæmonians did not fall into, for they made their Children fierce by painful labour, as chiefly uſeful, to inſpire them with Courage: though, as we have already often ſaid, this is neither the only thing, nor the principal thing neceſſary to attend to; and even with reſpect to this they may not thus attain their end; for we do not find either in other animals, or other nations, that Courage neceſſarily attends the moſt cruel, but rather the milder, and thoſe who have the diſpoſitions of lions: for there are many people, who are eager both to kill men, and to devour human fleſh, as the Achæans, and Heniochi in Pontus, and many others in Aſia, ſome of whom are as bad, others worſe than theſe, who indeed live by tyranny, but are men of no Courage. Nay, we know that the Lacedæmonians themſelves, while they continued thoſe painful labours, and were ſuperior to all others (though now they are inferior to many, both in War, and Gymnaſtic Exerciſes) did

did not acquire their ſuperiority by training their Youth to theſe Exerciſes, but becauſe thoſe who were diſciplined oppoſed thoſe who were not diſciplined at all. What is fair and honourable ought then to take place in Education of what is fierce, and cruel: for it is not a wolf, nor any other wild beaſt, which will brave any noble danger, but rather a good man. So that thoſe who permit Boys to engage too earneſtly in theſe Exerciſes, while they do not take care to inſtruct them in what is neceſſary to do, to ſpeak the real truth, render them mean and vile, accompliſhed only in one duty of a Citizen, and in every other reſpect, as reaſon evinces, good for nothing. Nor ſhould we form our judgments from paſt events, but from what we ſee at preſent: for now they have rivals in their Mode of Education, whereas formerly they had not. That Gymnaſtic Exerciſes are uſeful, and in what manner, is admitted; for, during youth, it is very proper to go through a courſe of thoſe which are moſt gentle, omitting that violent diet, and thoſe painful exerciſes which are preſcribed as neceſſary; that they may not prevent the growth of the Body: and it is no ſmall proof that they have this effect, that amongſt the Olympic Candidates we can ſcarce find two or three who have gained a victory, both when Boys and Men: becauſe the neceſſary exerciſes they went

through when young deprived them of their ſtrength. When they have allotted three years from the time of puberty to other parts of Education, they are then of a proper age to ſubmit to labour, and a regulated diet; for it is impoſſible for the Mind and Body both to labour at the ſame time, as they are productive of contrary evils to each other; the labour of the Body preventing the progreſs of the Mind, and the Mind of the Body.

CHAP. V.

WITH reſpect to Muſic we have already ſpoken a little in a doubtful manner upon this ſubject. It will be proper to go over again more particularly what we then ſaid, which may ſerve as an introduction, to what any other perſon may chuſe to offer thereon; for it is no eaſy matter to diſtinctly point out what power it has, nor on what accounts one ſhould apply it, whether as an amuſement and refreſhment, as Sleep, or Wine; as theſe are nothing ſerious, but pleaſing, and the killers of care, as Euripides ſays; for which reaſon they claſs in the ſame order, and uſe for the ſame purpoſe all theſe, namely, Sleep, Wine, and Muſic, to which ſome add Dancing;

Dancing; or ſhall we rather ſuppoſe, that Muſic tends to be productive of Virtue, having a power, as the Gymnaſtic Exerciſes have, to form the Body in a certain way, to influence the Manners, ſo as to accuſtom its profeſſors to rejoice rightly? or ſhall we ſay, that it is of any ſervice in the conduct of life, and an aſſiſtant to Prudence? for this alſo is a third property which has been attributed to it. Now that Boys are not to be inſtructed in it as play is evident; for thoſe who learn don't play, for to learn is rather troubleſome: neither is it proper to permit Boys at their age to enjoy perfect leiſure; for to ceaſe to improve is by no means fit for what is as yet imperfect: but it may be thought, that the earneſt attention of Boys in this art is for the ſake of that amuſement they will enjoy when they come to be Men and completely formed: but, if this is the caſe, why are they themſelves to learn it, and not follow the practice of the Kings of the Medes and Perſians, who enjoy the pleaſure of Muſic by hearing others play, and being ſhewn its beauties by them; for of neceſſity thoſe muſt be better ſkill'd therein, who make this ſcience their particular ſtudy and buſineſs, than thoſe who have only ſpent ſo much time at it as was ſufficient juſt to learn the principles of it. But, if this is a reaſon for a Child's being taught any thing, they ought alſo to learn

the art of Cookery, but this is abſurd. The ſame doubt occurs, if Muſic has a power of improving the Manners; for why ſhould they on this account themſelves learn it, and not reap every advantage of regulating the paſſions, or forming a judgment on the merits of the performance, by hearing others, as the Lacedæmonians; for they, without having ever learnt Muſic, are yet able to judge accurately what is good and what is bad: the ſame reaſoning may be applied if Muſic is ſuppoſed to be the amuſement of thoſe who live an elegant and eaſy life, why ſhould they learn themſelves, and not rather enjoy the benefit of others ſkill. Let us here conſider what is our belief of the immortal Gods in this particular. Now we find the Poets never repreſent Jupiter himſelf as ſinging and playing; nay, we ourſelves treat the profeſſors of theſe arts as mean people, and ſay, that no one would practice them but a drunkard or a buffoon. But probably we may conſider this ſubject more at large hereafter. The firſt queſtion is, whether Muſic is or is not to make a part of Education? and of thoſe three things which have been aſſigned as its proper employment, which is the right? Is it to inſtruct, to amuſe, or to employ the vacant hours of thoſe who live at reſt? or may not all three be properly allotted to it? for it appears to partake of them all: for play is neceſſary

ceſſary for relaxation, and relaxation pleaſant, as it is a medicine for that uneaſineſs which ariſes from labour. It is admitted alſo that a happy life muſt be an honourable one, and a pleaſant one too, ſince Happineſs conſiſts in both theſe; and we all agree, that Muſic is one of the moſt pleaſing things, whether alone, or accompanied with a voice; as Muſæus ſays, *Muſic's the ſweeteſt Joy of Man:* for which reaſon it is juſtly admitted into every company and every happy life, as having the power of inſpiring Joy. So that from this any one may ſuppoſe, that it is neceſſary to inſtruct young perſons in it; for all thoſe pleaſures which are harmleſs are not only conducive to the final end of life, but ſerve alſo as relaxations; and, as men are but rarely in the attainment of that final end, they often ceaſe from their labour, and apply to amuſement, with no further view than to acquire the pleaſure attending it. It is therefore uſeful to enjoy ſuch pleaſures as theſe. There are ſome perſons who make play and amuſement their end, and probably that end has ſome pleaſure annexed to it, but not what ſhould be: but while men ſeek the one, they accept the other for it; becauſe there is ſome likeneſs in human actions to the end: for the end is purſued for the ſake of nothing elſe that attends it; but for itſelf only: and pleaſures like theſe are ſought for, not on account of what follows them,

them, but on account of what has gone before them, as Labour, and Grief; for which reaſon they ſeek for Happineſs in theſe ſort of Pleaſures: and that this is the reaſon any one may eaſily perceive. That Muſic ſhould be general, not on this account only, but alſo as it is very ſerviceable during the hours of relaxation from labour, probably no one doubts: we ſhould alſo inquire whence this ariſes; for it is too noble in its Nature to be ultimately intended for this purpoſe; and we ought not only to partake of the common pleaſure ariſing from it (which all have the ſenſation of, for Muſic naturally gives pleaſure, therefore the uſe of it is agreeable to all ages and all diſpoſitions); but alſo to examine if it tends any thing to improve our Manners, and our Souls. And this will be eaſily known, if we feel our diſpoſitions any way influenced thereby: and that they are ſo is evident from many other inſtances, as well as the Muſic at the Olympic Games; and this confeſſedly fills the Soul with Enthuſiaſm: but Enthuſiaſm is an affection of the Soul which ſtrongly agitates the diſpoſition. Beſides, all thoſe who hear any Imitations ſympathize therewith; and this when they are conveyed even without Rhythm or Verſe. Moreover, as Muſic is one of thoſe things which are pleaſant, and as Virtue itſelf conſiſts in rightly enjoying, Loving, and Hating, it is evident, that we ought not

not to learn, or accuſtom ourſelves to any thing ſo much, as to judge right, and rejoice in honourable manners, and noble actions. But Anger and Mildneſs, Courage and Modeſty, and their contraries, as well as all other diſpoſitions of the mind, are moſt naturally imitated by Muſic and Poetry; which is plain by experience, for when we hear theſe our very Soul is altered; and he who is affected either with Joy or Grief by the imitation of any objects, is in very nearly the ſame ſituation as if he was affected by the objects themſelves: thus, if any perſon is pleaſed with ſeeing a ſtatue of any one, on no other account but its beauty, it is evident, that the ſight of the original from whence it was taken would alſo be pleaſing; now it happens in the other ſenſes there is no imitation of Manners; that is to ſay, in the touch, and the taſte; in the objects of ſight, a very little: for theſe are merely repreſentations of things, and the perceptions which they excite are in a manner common to all. Beſides, Statues and Paintings are not properly imitations of manners, but rather ſigns and marks, which ſhew the body is affected by ſome paſſion. However, the difference is not great, yet young men ought not to view the paintings of Pauſo, but of Polygnotus, or any other painter or ſtatuary who expreſſes Manners. But in Poetry and Muſic there are Imitations of Manners; and this is evident, for different

harmonies differ from each other ſo much by Nature, that thoſe who hear them are differently affected, and are not in the ſame diſpoſition of mind when one is performed as when another is; the one, for inſtance, occaſions Grief, and contracts the Soul, as the mixed Lydian: others ſoften the Mind, and as it were diſſolve the Heart: others fix it in a firm and ſettled ſtate, ſuch is the power of the Doric muſic only; while the Phrygian fills the Soul with Enthuſiaſm, as has been well deſcribed by thoſe who have wrote philoſophically upon this part of Education; for they bring examples of what they advance from the things themſelves. The ſame holds true with reſpect to Rhythm; ſome fix the Diſpoſition, others occaſion a change in it; ſome act more violently, others more liberally. From what has been ſaid it is evident what an influence Muſic has over the Diſpoſition of the Mind, and how variouſly it can faſcinate it: and if it can do this, moſt certainly it is what Youth ought to be inſtructed in. And indeed the learning of Muſic is particularly adapted to their diſpoſition; for at their time of life they do not willingly attend to any thing which is not agreeable; but Muſic is naturally one of the moſt agreeable things; and there ſeems to be a certain connection between

Harmony

Harmony and Rhythm; for which reaſon ſome wiſe men held, the Soul itſelf to be Harmony; others, that it contains it.

CHAP. VI.

WE will now determine, whether it is proper, that Children ſhould be taught to ſing, and play upon any inſtrument, which we have before made a matter of doubt. Now, it is well known, that it makes a great deal of difference when you would qualify any one in any art, for the perſon himſelf to learn the practical part of it; for it is a thing very difficult, if not impoſſible, for a man to be a good judge of what he himſelf cannot do. It is alſo very neceſſary that Children ſhould have ſome employment which will amuſe them; for which reaſon the Rattle of Architas ſeems well contrived, which they give Children to play with, to prevent their breaking thoſe things which are about the houſe; for at their age they cannot ſit ſtill: this therefore is well adapted to Infants, as Inſtruction ought to be their Rattle as they grow up; hence it is evident, that they ſhould be ſo taught Muſic as to be able to practiſe it. Nor is it difficult to ſay what is becoming or unbecoming of their

age, or to anſwer the objections which ſome make to this employment as mean and low. In the firſt place, it is neceſſary for them to practiſe, that they may be judges of the art: for which reaſon, this ſhould be done when they are young; but when they are grown older the practical part may be dropt; while they will ſtill continue judges of what is excellent in the art, and take a proper pleaſure therein, from the knowledge they acquired of it in their youth. As to the cenſure which ſome perſons throw upon Muſic, as ſomething mean and low, it is not difficult to anſwer that, if we will but conſider how far we propoſe thoſe, who are to be educated ſo as to become good Citizens, ſhould be inſtructed in this art, and what Muſic and what Rhythms they ſhould be acquainted with; and alſo what inſtruments they ſhould play upon; for in theſe there is probably a difference. Such then is the proper anſwer to that cenſure: for it muſt be admitted, that in ſome caſes nothing can prevent Muſic being attended, to a certain degree, with the bad effects which are aſcribed to it; it is therefore clear, that the learning of it ſhould never prevent the buſineſs of riper years; nor render the Body effeminate, and unfit for the Buſineſs of War or the State; but it ſhould be practiſed by the Young, judged of by the Old. That Children may learn Muſic properly,

perly, it is neceſſary that they ſhould not be employed in thoſe parts of it which are the objects of diſpute between the Maſters in that ſcience; nor ſhould they perform ſuch pieces as are wondered at from the difficulty of their execution; and which, from being firſt exhibited in the public Games, are now become a part of Education; but let them learn ſo much of it as to be able to receive proper pleaſure from excellent Muſic, and Rhythms; and not that only which Muſic muſt make all Animals feel, and alſo Slaves and Boys, but more. It is therefore plain what Inſtruments they ſhould uſe; thus, they ſhould be never taught to play upon the Flute, or any other inſtrument which requires great ſkill, as the Harp, or the like, but on ſuch as will make them good judges of Muſic, or any other inſtruction: beſides, the Flute is not a moral Inſtrument, but rather one that will inflame the Paſſions, and is therefore rather to be uſed when the Soul is to be animated, than when inſtruction is intended. Let me add alſo, that there is ſomething therein which is quite contrary to what Education requires; as the player on the Flute is prevented from ſpeaking: for which reaſon our forefathers very properly forbid the uſe of it to Youth and Freemen, though they themſelves at firſt uſed it; for when their riches procured them greater leiſure, they grew more animated in the

the Cauſe of Virtue; and both before and after the Median War, their noble actions ſo exalted their minds that they attended to every part of Education; ſelecting no one in particular, but endeavouring to collect the whole: for which reaſon they introduced the Flute alſo, as one of the inſtruments they were to learn to play on. At Lacedæmon the Choregus himſelf played on the Flute; and it was ſo common at Athens, that almoſt every Freeman underſtood it, as is evident from the Tablet which Thraſippus dedicated when he was Choregus; but afterwards they rejected it, as dangerous; having become better judges of what tended to promote Virtue, and what did not. For the ſame reaſon many of the antient inſtruments were thrown aſide, as the Dulcimer and the Lyre; as alſo thoſe which were to inſpire thoſe who played on them with pleaſure, and which required a nice finger and great ſkill to play well on. What the Antients tell us, by way of fable, of the Flute, is indeed very rational; namely, that after Minerva had found it, ſhe threw it away: nor are they wrong, who ſay, that the Goddeſs diſliked it for deforming the face of him who played thereon: not but that it is more probable, that ſhe rejected it, as the knowledge thereof contributed nothing to the improvement of the Mind. Now, we regard Minerva as the Inventreſs of Arts

and Sciences. As we diſapprove of a Child's being taught to underſtand inſtruments, and to play like a Maſter (which we would have confined to thoſe, who are candidates for the prize in that ſcience; for they play not to improve themſelves in Virtue, but to pleaſe thoſe who hear them, and gratify their importunity); therefore we think the practice of it unfit for Freemen; but then it ſhould be confined to thoſe who are paid for doing it; for it uſually gives people ſordid notions, for the end they have in view is bad: for the impertinent ſpectator is accuſtomed to make them change their Muſic; ſo that the artiſts who attend to him regulate their Bodies according to his Motions.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

WE are now to enter into an inquiry concerning Harmony and Rhythm; whether all ſorts of theſe are to be employed in Education, or whether ſome peculiar onesare to be ſelected; and alſo whether we ſhould give the ſame directions to thoſe who are engaged in Muſic as part of Education, or whether there is ſomething different from theſe two. Now, as all Muſic conſiſts in Melody and Rhythm, we ought not to be unacquainted with the Power which each of theſe has in Education; and whether we ſhould rather chuſe Muſic in which Melody prevails, or Rhythm: but when I conſider how many things have been well wrote upon theſe ſubjects, not only by ſome Muſicians of the preſent age, but alſo by ſome Philoſophers, who are perfectly ſkilled in that part of Muſic which belongs to Education; we will refer thoſe who deſire a very particular knowledge therein to thoſe writers, and ſhall only treat of it in general terms, without deſcending to particulars. Melody is divided by ſome Philoſophers, whoſe notions we approve of, into Moral, Practical, and that which fills the Mind with Enthuſiaſm: they alſo allot to each of theſe a particular kind of Harmony which naturally correſponds

ſpond therewith: and we ſay, that Muſic ſhould not be applied to one purpoſe only, but many; both for Inſtruction, and purifying the Soul (now I uſe the word purifying at preſent without any explanation, but ſhall ſpeak more at large of it in my Poetics); and, in the third place, as an agreeable manner of ſpending the time and a Relaxation from the Uneaſineſs of the Mind. It is evident, that all Harmonies are to be uſed; but not for all purpoſes; but the moſt moral, in Education: but to pleaſe the ear, when others play, the moſt active and enthuſiaſtic; for that paſſion which is to be found very ſtrong in ſome Souls, is to be met with alſo in all; but the difference in different perſons conſiſts in its being in a leſs or greater degree, as Pity, Fear, and Enthuſiaſm alſo; which latter is ſo powerful in ſome as to overpower the Soul: and yet we ſee thoſe perſons, by the application of Sacred Muſic to ſooth their mind, rendered as ſedate and compoſed as if they had employed the art of the Phyſician: and this muſt neceſſarily happen to the Compaſſionate, the Fearful, and all thoſe who are ſubdued by their paſſions: nay, all perſons, as far as they are affected with thoſe paſſions, admit of the ſame cure, and are reſtored to tranquillity with pleaſure. In the ſame manner, all Muſic which has the power of purifying the Soul, affords a harmleſs

pleaſure to man. Such therefore ſhould be the Harmony and ſuch the Muſic which thoſe who contend with each other in the Theatre ſhould exhibit: but as the Audience is compoſed of two ſorts of People, the Free and the Well-inſtructed, the Rude, the mean Mechanics, and hired Servants, and a long collection of the like, there muſt be ſome Muſic and ſome Spectacles to pleaſe, and ſooth them; for as their Minds are as it were perverted from their natural habits, ſo alſo is there an unnatural Harmony, and overcharged Muſic, which is accommodated to their taſte: but what is according to Nature gives pleaſure to every one, therefore thoſe, who are to contend upon the Theatre, ſhould be allowed to uſe this ſpecies of Muſic. But in Education Ethic Melody and Ethic Harmony ſhould be uſed, which is the Doric, as we have already ſaid, or any other which thoſe Philoſophers who are ſkilful in that Muſic which is to be employed in Education ſhall approve of. But Socrates, in Plato's Republic, is very wrong, when he permits only the Phrygian Muſic to be uſed as well as the Doric, particularly as amongſt other inſtruments he baniſhes the Flute; for the Phrygian Muſic has the ſame power in Harmony as the Flute has amongſt the Inſtruments; for they are both pathetic and raiſe the Mind: and this the practice of the Poets proves; for in their Bacchanal

Songs, or whenever they deſcribe any violent Emotions of the Mind, the Flute is the inſtrument they chiefly uſe: and the Phrygian Harmony is moſt ſuitable to theſe ſubjects. Now, that the Dythirambic meaſure is Phrygian is allowed by general conſent; and thoſe who are converſant in ſtudies of this ſort bring many proofs of it; as, for inſtance, when Philoxenus endeavoured to compoſe Dythirambic Muſic for Doric Harmony, he naturally fell back again into Phrygian, as being fitteſt for that purpoſe; as every one indeed agrees, that the Doric Muſic is moſt ſerious, and fitteſt to inſpire Courage: and, as we always commend the middle as being between the two extremes, and the Doric has this relation with reſpect to other Harmonies, it is evident, that is what the Youth ought to be inſtructed in. There are two things to be taken into conſideration, both what is poſſible and what is proper; every one then ſhould chiefly endeavour to attain thoſe things which contain both theſe qualities: but this is to be regulated by different times of life; for inſtance, it is not eaſy for thoſe who are advanced in years to ſing ſuch pieces of muſic as require very high notes, for Nature points out to them thoſe which are gentle, and require little ſtrength of voice (for which reaſon ſome who are ſkilful in Muſic juſtly find fault with Socrates, for forbidding the Youth

to be inſtructed in gentle Harmony; as if, like wine, it would make them drunk, whereas the Effect of that is to render men Bacchanals, and not make them languid): theſe therefore are what ſhould employ thoſe who are grown old. Moreover, if there is any Harmony which is proper for a Child's age, as being at the ſame time elegant and inſtructive, as the Lydian of all others ſeems chiefly to be——Theſe then are as it were the three boundaries of Education, Moderation, Poſſibility, and Decorum.

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